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My dissertation studies the influence of global institutional investors on liquidity distribution and 
excess comovement in returns for cross-listed stocks around the world. Furthermore, my 
dissertation investigates the impact of investor protection change on the liquidity distribution of 
cross-listed stocks.  
 
Chapter 1 studies how global institutional investors’ selection of trading venues influences the 
liquidity distribution of cross-listed stocks on 19 target (“host”) markets around the world. I 
document strong empirical evidence indicating that institutional investors gravitate towards 
markets that are more geographically, culturally, and economically proximate. However, 
institutional investor’s familiarity preference abates in the selection of trading venues when the 
target exchange does not furnish detailed rules on trading practices. 
 
Chapter 2, co-authored with G. Andrew Karolyi, studies the impact of abrupt change in the U.S. 
investor protection laws on the location of stock trading for firms with U.S. cross-listings. The 
U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of Morrison vs. National Australia Bank in June 2010 
communicates that civil liability for securities fraud applies only to securities listed on U.S. 
markets and to security transactions taken place in the U.S. We investigate whether and how the 
trading volume distribution of U.S. cross-listed stocks changed around the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling on the Morrison case. Our results indicate that for U.S. cross-listed foreign firms, the U.S. 
market share of trading volume has increased after the Morrison decision. 
 
Chapter 3, co-authored with G. Andrew Karolyi, examines the influence of global institutional 
investors on excess comovement in stock returns using cross-listed stocks around the world. We 
find that the return differentials between the cross-listed and its ordinary home market share, 
though small, exhibit excess comovements relative to market index returns, the home and the 
target market returns. Furthermore, we examine whether institutional investors exert significant 
influence on excess comovement in the returns of long-short positions that consist of a cross-
listed and its counterpart home market shares with respective market index returns. We find that 
institutional investors domiciled in home country intensify the excess comovement in long-short 
position returns with the home market returns. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MULTIMARKET TRADING AND LIQUIDITY AROUND THE WORLD: 
WHERE DO GLOBAL INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS TRADE? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Many firms around the world choose to cross-list their shares globally. Managers at corporations, 
investors, and academics have studied and weighed various sources of cross-listing benefits 
[Karolyi (2006); Gagnon and Karolyi (2012)]. According to Mittoo (1992), Fanto and Karmel 
(1997), and Bancel and Mittoo (2001), both investors and corporate managers often quoted 
enhanced trading environment as one of the primary motivations and benefits for listing shares 
on overseas markets. Empirical evidence suggests that there is a dramatic increase in trading 
volume and turnover rates both at the home and at the US market around the US listing of 
foreign shares [Smith and Sofianos (1997); Foerster and Karolyi (1998); Halling, Pagano, Randl, 
and Zechner (2008)]. An important question is whether trading activity of all cross-listed shares 
on the overseas markets persists after the cross-listing and what determines where stock trading 
is likely to take place between the home market and the new “host” (or target) market. These 
issues are relevant to all corporate managers who already listed their shares and are looking to 
cross-list on foreign markets, to stock exchanges, which compete with one another for order flow 
among existing listings and for new listings, and to broker dealers who have commercial 
interests in facilitating trades of existing and newly listed shares. 
 
Furthermore, cross-border investment has increased during the past two decades, and it has 
become an indispensable part of investor portfolios around the world. In general, restrictions and 
barriers on capital flows across national borders have steadily been lowered throughout the last 
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three decades [Karolyi and Stulz (2003)]. Understanding the dynamics of multimarket trading is 
important to global institutional investors as these institutional investors have greater freedom in 
selecting trading venues. In particular, it is important to global institutional investors who are 
faced with choices of where to trade securities with cross-listings and who engage in multimarket 
trading for arbitrage. 
 
In this paper, I examine the factors that explain the trading volume distribution of cross-listed 
securities. My results suggest that investor familiarity bias and ambiguity aversion exert 
significant influence on the selection of trading venues. Using a sample of 1,953 globally cross-
listed securities on 19 target (“host”) markets around the world, I show that institutional 
investors are drawn to markets that are more “proximate”: the target market share of trading 
volume is larger for the firms primarily owned by institutional shareholders who are more 
geographically, culturally, and economically proximate to the target market than to its 
counterpart home market. Additionally, I find that the target market rules governing trading 
practices play important role in determining the trading volume distribution of cross-listed 
securities. I document strong empirical evidence indicating that the influence of institutional 
investor familiarity bias lessens in the selection of trading venues when the target market does 
not furnish detailed exchange trading rules (greater ambiguity). 
 
This paper makes important contributions to the existing empirical research on multimarket 
trading dynamics. First, I examine the importance of investor familiarity bias in the selection of 
trading venues. There are a multitude of articles that examine the importance of investor 
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proximity preference in investing decisions and financing decisions.1 There is strong empirical 
evidence from “home bias” literature that geographical and time zone proximity and familiarity 
in language and culture matter in portfolio holding and investing decisions.2 Sarkissian and 
Schill (2004) show that geographical, economic, cultural, and economic proximity play dominant 
role in overseas listing and financing decisions.  
 
Both Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) evaluate factors related to investor familiarity 
in the context of multimarket trading. Unlike in these previous studies, I do not simply measure 
familiarity between home and target markets in my analysis. I take who the market participants 
are into account. In trading cross-listed shares, global institutional investors are faced with 
choices in trading venues. Specifically, my focus is on whether institutional investor’s familiarity 
bias influences the location of stock trading. 
 
Secondly, this article investigates whether investors are averse to trading in markets that do not 
furnish detailed market rules governing trading practices (greater ambiguity). To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no empirical work that examines the importance of investor ambiguity 
aversion in the selection of trading venues. A long line of research suggests that ambiguity 
aversion is one of the major factors that affect investor participation.3 Easley and O’Hara (2010) 
demonstrate how certain microstructure features, such as market rules, trading systems, and 
                                                          
1 Brennan and Cao (1997); Kang and Stulz (1997); Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001); Hau (2001); 
Huberman (2001); Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Sarkissian and Schill (2004); Chan, Covrig, and Ng 
(2005). 
2 Coval and Moskowitz (1999); Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005); Warnock 
and Cleaver (2001); Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004); Kang and Stulz (1997). 
3 Dow and Werlang (1992); Epstein and Wang (1994); Easley and O’Hara (2009); Easley and O’Hara 
(2010). 
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trading procedures, can reduce perceived ambiguity and thereby induce investor and issuer 
participation in markets. This has immediate implications for stock exchanges, which compete 
with one another for trading volume and new listings. Easley and O’Hara (2010) offers a 
prediction that stock exchanges with better (less ambiguous) market rules host greater liquidity 
and larger trading volume. 
 
In this paper, I examine whether institutional investors avoid trading in markets with ambiguous 
(less detailed) market rules regulating trading practices even if institutional investors are familiar 
with them. Linking investor familiarity bias and ambiguity aversion is appropriate as what 
institutional investors find ambiguous market rules depends on what they are “used to.” Suppose 
you are a sophisticated institutional investor from a country with ambiguous market rules and 
you are “familiar with” trading and dealing with ambiguous market rules. In this case, you may 
be equally comfortable trading in some other markets with familiarly ambiguous market rules. 
However, even if institutional investors are familiar with trading in markets with ambiguous 
market rules, these institutional investors may choose to avoid trading in these markets. On the 
other hand, if you are an institutional investor from a country with good (less ambiguous) market 
rules, then you may not be willing to delve into trading in a market with ambiguous rules 
governing trading practices. 
 
Thirdly, I extend the earlier studies of Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) by 
examining firm and market level factors that influence the trading volume distribution of cross-
listed shares on non-US target (“host”) markets, and also for cases, which there are more than 
one competing target markets for trading volume. The bulk of empirical research on multimarket 
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trading dynamics of cross-listed securities primarily draws samples from cross-listed securities 
on one target market, the US market, and ignores potential competition among multiple target 
markets.4 Little is known about the relative importance of factors that determine the trading 
volume distribution of cross-listed securities on non-US target markets. My sample consists of 
2,226 unique exchange listed securities on 19 target markets around the world: 1 stock exchange 
from Africa, 5 stock exchanges from Asia, 4 stock exchanges from Americas, and 9 European 
bourses. Moreover, of 2,226 securities in the sample, three hundred seventy one (371) of these 
securities have cross-listings on multiple target markets. My sample provides greater cross-
section of target markets to study the factors that influence the multimarket trading dynamics of 
cross-listed securities. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the sample and cross-
border listing trends. Section 1.3 discusses familiarity bias and ambiguity aversion hypothesis. 
Section 1.4 reports the summary statistics. Section 1.5 reports the empirical results. In Section 
1.6, using the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID), I re-examine the influence 
of investor familiarity bias and ambiguity aversion on the multimarket trading dynamics of 
cross-listed securities in an experimental setting where potential endogeneity issues are 
minimized. Section 1.7 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Karolyi (2006); Gagnon and Karolyi (2012); Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998); Pulatkonak and 
Sofianos (1999); Baruch, Karolyi, and Lemmon (2007); Halling, Pagano, Randl, and Zechner (2008); 
Cumming, Humphery-Jenner, and Wu (2011); Halling, Moulton, and Panayides (2013). 
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1.2 Sample description & cross-border listing trend 
In this section, I describe the sample and discuss global cross-listing trend. The World Federation 
of Exchanges provides statistics on the number of foreign listings for stock exchanges around the 
world. In selecting target (or “host”) markets, I pick out stock exchanges that list larger number 
of foreign securities for each of the four regions, Africa, Americas, Asia, and Europe. This 
process results in 19 target stock exchanges from 2001 to 2011. These 19 target markets include 
Johannesburg (Africa), Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Tokyo (Asia), Lima, 
NASDAQ, New York, Toronto (Americas), Euronext Amsterdam, Euronext Brussels, Euronext 
Lisbon, Euronext Paris, Frankfurt, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, and Swiss (Europe). I only 
consider exchange listed securities. The London Stock Exchange listings include foreign listings 
on Alternative Investment Market (AIM) but not SEAQ International as securities traded on 
SEAQ are not exchange listed securities. The Singapore Stock Exchange data includes listings 
on SESDAQ. The listings on the TSX Venture are a part of the Toronto market sample. My 
Euronext samples include listings on Alternext markets. The New York Stock Exchange sample 
includes listings on AMEX. For the Frankfurt sample, I only consider foreign securities listed 
under prime standard, general standard, and entry standard. I ignore all foreign listings on OTC 
markets.  
 
I use Datastream stock universe to construct the sample of cross-listed securities. I exclude all 
securities of special types, such as preferred shares, royalty trusts, and investment funds. I also 
drop all company stocks domiciled in tax havens. I then identify foreign securities based on the 
country of incorporation. To seek out cross-listings, I manually match securities listed on target 
markets with the home market securities using company name, security name, and ISIN codes. 
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The cross-listed securities sample is further restricted by the availability of weekly price and 
trading volume data from Datastream. The sample period spans from January 2001 to December 
2011. I am left with the final sample of 2,226 unique securities with cross-listings on at least one 
of the 19 target markets from 60 different home countries. 
 
Table 1.1 shows the distribution of cross-border listings across 19 target exchanges grouped by 
home region and home country’s degree of economic development (developed vs. emerging). I 
use the list of developed and emerging countries from International Financial Corporation (IFC) 
of the World Bank Group. There are 2,932 cross-listed securities (secondary listings) during the 
period between January 2001 and December 2011. The London Stock Exchange hosts the largest 
number of cross-listings, 880. The London Stock Exchange hosts more cross-listings than the 
NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange combined, 700. The Euronext Lisbon is the 
smallest host market with only 5 cross-listings. Most target markets draw a larger number of 
cross-listings from countries geographically close. This is consistent with the findings of 
Sarkissian and Schill (2004). Sarkissian and Schill (2004) finds that geographical proximity 
plays an important role in the choice of overseas listing venues. Furthermore, approximately 
85% (2,491 out of 2,932) of cross-listings come from companies domiciled in developed 
countries. The majority of cross-border listings from the developing world originates from 
companies domiciled in emerging Americas and emerging Asia. Companies from emerging 
Americas mainly cross-list their shares on the New York Stock Exchange. On the other hand, 
cross-listing destinations for firms domiciled in emerging Asia are more diverse; the share of 
Asian, American, and European target markets are about 40% (80 out of 199), 21% (42 out of 
199), and 39% (77 out of 199), respectively. 
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Table 1.2 describes cross-listing trend over the last decade. The number of cross-listings 
decreased over the past decade, from 1,802 in 2001 to 1,221 in 2010. In particular, the cross-
border listings on the European target markets diminished over time. This decrease is rather 
dramatic. The decrease in the number of cross-listed shares on European targets is on average 
60% from 2001 to 2010. Contrastingly, the number of cross-listings on the Asian target markets 
has increased over the last decade with the exception of Tokyo. The Hong Kong and the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange are the notable gainers. Among the North American target markets, the Toronto 
Stock Exchange experienced a large increase in cross-listings from 32 listings in 2001 to 66 in 
2010.  
 
My sample includes firms that cross-list on multiple target markets. Table 1.3 presents the 
distribution of multiple cross-listings across 19 target markets for selected years. Of 2,226 
securities with cross-listings, three hundred seventy one (371) of these securities have cross-
border listings on multiple target bourses. Some firms have a maximum of 8 cross-listings in 
some years. The cross-listing on multiple target markets has decreased over the last decade. This 
decrease is more evident during the latter half of the sample period, mainly after 2005. There are 
a total of 1,033 cross-listings with no other secondary listing on any other target bourses in 2001, 
and a total of 368 cross-listings with exactly 1 other secondary listing on other host markets, 172 
secondary listings with 2 other cross-listings, 89 cross-listings with 3 other cross-listings, and 
140 secondary listings with 4 or more other cross-listings in 2001. There are about the same 
number of secondary listings, 958, with no other cross-listing on any other host markets in 2010 
compared to in 2001. However, in contrast to this, by 2010, there are only 179 cross-listings with 
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1 other secondary listing on other host markets, only a total of 42 secondary listings with 2 other 
cross-listings, 32 cross-listings with 3 other secondary listings, and lastly, only 10 cross-listings 
with 4 or more other secondary listings. In addition, I observe great variations across different 
target markets. Most notably, the cross-listed securities on the NASDAQ have only a small 
number of secondary listings on other target bourses. This is not the case for most European 
target bourses. European target markets in general are not the sole destination of cross-listing. 
For instance, there are 25 firms, which came to Euronext Paris to cross-list, with no other 
secondary listing in 2001. Contrastingly, in 2001, there are 20 firms that secondarily listed on 
Euronext Paris have 4 or more additional cross-listings on other target bourses. 
 
1.3 Hypotheses & variable construction 
My goal is to study the trading volume distribution of cross-listed securities around the world. 
First, I describe the construction of dependent variable, target market share of trading. Secondly, 
I introduce the “familiarity” bias hypothesis and eight “familiarity” measures. The construction 
of eight “familiarity” measures is discussed in 1.3.3. Lastly, I discuss the ambiguity aversion 
hypothesis in this section.  
 
The hypotheses and details of variable constructions for known firm (bkl information factor, size, 
foreign sales, relative industry capitalization, home market analyst, volatility) and market 
(geographical distance, relative investor protection, relative transaction cost, relative market 
turnover) level factors that influence multimarket trading dynamics are discussed in 1.3.5 and 
1.3.6. Firm and market characteristic variables are based on the theories of Pagano (1989), 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), Admati and Pfleifer (1988), and Baruch et al. (2007). I also 
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include several known firm and market level explanatory variables from an important empirical 
paper on multimarket trading, Halling et al. (2008).  
 
1.3.1 target market share of trading 
The purpose of this article is to examine factors that influence the trading volume distribution of 
cross-listed securities. I measure the intensity of trading activity in terms of the dollar value of 
transaction amount (the number of shares traded times the closing price).5 For each cross-listed 
security of firm i traded on target market j, I define target market share of trading as the ratio of 
dollar amount traded on target market j (in US dollars) to the total dollar amount traded (in US 
dollars). The total dollar amount traded is the sum of the dollar amount traded on all target 
markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market for firm i.  
 
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗
= 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑗  × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑗
∑ [𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑙  × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑙] +  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒ℎ𝑚 × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑙    [1] 
 
where tmj denotes target market j, and hm indicates home market. Using data from Datastream, I 
compute the target market share of trading at weekly frequency, and these ratios are averaged 
over 1 year. I then take the natural log of these annually averaged ratios. My measure of trading 
volume share improves upon those of Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008). Both Baruch 
et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) only include the trading volume of US markets and that of 
home market. They ignore trading activities in other target markets (non-US host markets).  
                                                          
5 This definition resolves any complications arising from ADR and GDR bundling ratios in measuring 
trading volume as the price of ADR and GDR account for bundling ratios. 
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1.3.2 Familiarity bias hypothesis 
I examine the importance of investor “proximity” or “familiarity” bias in trading decisions. In 
the world of cross-listed securities, investors may select where to trade those cross-listed shares. 
Investors, at a minimum, have an option to trade the same security either in the target market or 
in its home market. Investors may have more than two choices of trading venues if the security is 
listed on multiple host markets. Among investor groups, institutional investors are the ones who 
have the experience and the means to trade in foreign markets with greater freedom whereas 
retail investor trading may be more confined to their local markets. My focus is on testing 
whether global institutional investors exhibit “proximity” or “familiarity” bias in the selection of 
trading venues. Would global institutional investors be “pulled to trade” in markets with which 
they are more familiar? 
 
The literature suggests geographic, cultural, regulatory, and economic “proximity” or 
“familiarity” play dominant role in financing and portfolio holding decisions.6 I consider eight 
“proximity” proxies: geographical distance, language, colonial heritage, legal origin, bilateral 
trade, exchange trading rules, investor protection, and accounting standards. More specifically, I 
investigate whether institutional investor’s relative proximity to home and target markets 
influence the trading activity distribution of cross-listed securities. The institutional investor’s 
country of domicile is the reference point in measuring proximity to the target and to the home 
market (country) of cross-listed security. For each cross-listed security and each sample year, I 
                                                          
6 Coval and Moskowitz (1999); Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005); Warnock 
and Cleaver (2001); Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004); Kang and Stulz (1997); Sarkissian and Schill 
(2004). 
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construct familiarity “distance” measures to estimate how “far away” institutional investors are 
in aggregate from the target and also from the home market (country), respectively. For each 
familiarity proxy and each firm i in each sample year t, I define the familiarity distance measure 
as: 
 
𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡,ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒=  � |𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑘
 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡|𝑘,𝑡 × 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑘,𝑡      [2] 
 
𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡=  � |𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑘
 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡|𝑘,𝑡 × 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑘,𝑡      [3] 
 
where ownershipk,t is the percentage of firm’s market capitalization held by institution k at the 
end of year t. By construction, the distance between the home market (country) of cross-listed 
security and the institutional investors domiciled in the home country of cross-listed security is 0 
in [2]. Similarly, the institutional investors domiciled in the target country of cross-listed security 
have distance 0 in [3]. Intuitively, the familiarity distance measure may be thought of as the 
weighted (institutional ownership acting as weights) average “distance” of institutional 
shareholder base either to target or home market (country). I then take the difference between [2] 
and [3] to create the relative distance variable for each of the eight aforementioned proximity 
proxies and for each sample year t.   
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𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡    = 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡,ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡        [4] 
 
The relative distance variable measures how much “closer” institutional investors are to the 
target compared to the counterpart home market. If “proximity” is the dominant concern for 
trading venue selection to global institutional investors, then I expect the relative distance 
variables to be positively associated with the target market share of trading volume.  
 
It would be ideal to have global institutional investor trading record at the transaction level. 
However, transaction level datasets are often proprietary in nature. I instead use FactSet Global 
Institutional Ownership database.7 One notable advantage of using FactSet Global Institutional 
Ownership database is that FactSet Global Institutional Ownership database has a comprehensive 
coverage of global institutional ownership around the world unlike Thomson Financial’s 13F 
database, which only includes US institutional ownership.8 Both Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling 
et al. (2008) rely on 13F database as their only source of institutional ownership data. I use year-
end values (December 31) of institutional investor ownership. The construction of familiarity 
measures is discussed in the next section, 1.3.3. 
 
1.3.3 Familiarity measures 
I discuss the construction of familiarity measure in this section. In computing [2] ([3]) (in 
Section 1.3.2), the geographical distance is the distance (in ten thousand miles) between the city 
                                                          
7 FactSet Global Institutional Ownership dataset is only used in a few studies: Bartram, Griffin, and Ng 
(2010) and the papers co-authored mainly by Ferreira and Matos. 
8 Bartram, Griffin, and Ng (2010) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) provide detailed discussions on the 
institutional investor coverage of the FactSet Global Institutional Ownership database. 
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in which the target (home) market is located and the city that hosts the major stock exchange(s) 
of the institutional investor’s domicile country. For colonial heritage, I assign the distance to be 1 
in calculating [2] ([3]) (in Section 1.3.2) if the target (home) country and the institutional 
investor’s country of domicile do not share the common colonial heritage, and the distance is 0 
otherwise. I use the same methodology in assigning the distance for legal origin and language. I 
consider up to 5 official languages in matching a common language between the target (home) 
country and the institutional investor’s country of domicile. The data for language and colonial 
heritage come from the CIA World Factbook.  
 
For bilateral trade, I sum the annual imports and exports (the total trade amount in current US 
dollars) of the institutional investor’s domicile country from and to the target (home) country. I 
scale this total trade amount by the nominal GDP of the institutional investor’s domicile country. 
I attach the minus sign to the scaled bilateral trade to account for the intuition that the larger the 
value of bilateral trade, the more economically proximate the two countries are. The dyadic trade 
values are constructed from IMF trade data. For each measure of exchange trading rules, investor 
protection, and accounting standards, I measure the distance by taking the absolute values of the 
difference between the target (home) country score and that of the institutional investor’s 
domicile country.  
 
Cumming, Johan, and Li (2011) provides exchange trading rule scores for 45 stock exchanges 
around the world. I define the exchange trading rules index to be the equally weighted average 
value of the market manipulation, insider trading, and broker-agency index from Cumming, 
Johan, and Li (2011). When there is more than one major stock exchange in institutional 
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investor’s country of domicile, I take the average of exchange rule measures among the major 
stock exchanges in computing the distance for exchange rules. The investor protection index and 
the accounting standards data are obtained from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) 
and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), respectively. The investor 
protection index is the principal component of disclosure requirements, liability standards, and 
anti-director rights. 
 
1.3.4 Ambiguity aversion hypothesis 
I next investigate whether global institutional investors are averse to trading in markets that do 
not furnish detailed market rules governing trading practices (greater ambiguity) and thereby 
influencing the trading activity distribution of cross-listed securities. Institutional investors are 
likely to have greater freedom in selecting trading venues. At the same time, global institutional 
investors may be drawn to trade in markets with trading rules with which they are more familiar. 
If an institutional investor is used to trading in markets with detailed market rules, then this 
institutional trader may be reluctant to trade in other markets with unfamiliarly ambiguous (less 
detailed) market rules. If you are an institutional investor who is used to dealing with ambiguous 
market rules, then you may be comfortable trading in other markets with ambiguous rules. 
However, in trading cross-listed shares, institutional investors may have options to go to the 
markets with less ambiguous market rules to trade the exact same security. I test whether 
institutional investors avoid trading in a market with ambiguous (less detailed) market rules 
governing trading practices even if these sophisticated institutional investors are familiar with 
them given choices among trading venues. 
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To test my ambiguity aversion hypothesis, I consider a subset of variables used to proxy investor 
familiarity: exchange trading rules, investor protection law, and accounting standards. Investor 
protection law and accounting standards may proxy the quality of market rules: stock exchanges 
alone may not be able to overcome ambiguities arising from a country’s legal and regulatory 
system. Easley and O’Hara (2009) show how a country’s legal system and regulation (especially 
regulation of left-tail events) can diminish the effect of ambiguity, by that inducing investor 
participation in financial markets. Investor protection law and accounting standards are two of 
the measures that adequately reflect a country’s legal system and regulations. To account for the 
importance of legal system and regulation at a country level, I include investor protection law 
and accounting standards in the analyses.9  
 
I note that three aforementioned variables (exchange trading rules, investor protection law, and 
accounting standards) can be ordered. All three variables are numeric measurements: the more 
detailed the regulations/rules, the higher the values for each of three aforementioned measures. 
Using each of three market rule measures, I classify target markets into two categories: the 
markets with detailed rules and the markets with ambiguous rules. I create target market dummy 
variables based on the categorization. For each market rule, 
 
𝑡𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑤 (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠) = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠 ≤  𝛼,𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.  
                                                          
9 Cumming, Johan, and Li (2011) provides exchange trading rule scores for 45 stock exchanges around 
the world. I define the exchange trading rules index to be the equally weighted average value of the 
market manipulation, insider trading, and broker-agency index from Cumming, Johan, and Li (2011). The 
investor protection index and the accounting standards data are obtained from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (2006) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), respectively. The 
investor protection index is the principal component of disclosure requirements, liability standards, and 
anti-director rights. 
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where market rules are exchange trading rules, investor protection law, and accounting 
standards. The α values for exchange trading rules, investor protection law, and accounting 
standards are 0.13, 6, and 69, respectively. For these α values, approximately 25% to 30% of the 
observations in the sample are from the target markets that feature ambiguous (less detailed) 
market rules. 
 
Easley and O’Hara (2009, 2010) predicts that ambiguous market rules limit investor participation 
in financial markets. This translates to lower target market share of trading volume for the target 
markets with ambiguous market rules. I also generate interaction terms by interacting the tm low 
(market rules) with the corresponding familiarity relative distance variable. If institutional 
investors avoid trading in target markets with ambiguous market rules even though these 
institutional investors are familiar with them, then I expect to observe a negative relation 
between the interaction terms and the target market share of trading volume. 
 
1.3.5 Known firm-specific factors 
bkl factor 
Baruch et al. (2007) develops a multimarket trading model (the BKL model hereafter) to explain 
cross-sectional variations in the foreign share of trading activity of cross-listed stocks. 
Empirically, the bkl information factor represents the incremental contribution of target market 
returns in explaining the firm’s stock returns over and above the portion captured by the firm’s 
home market returns. I adjust bkl factor estimation to account for the cases where a firm’s stock 
is cross-listed on multiple target bourses. For securities with cross-border listings on multiple 
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host markets, the bkl factor measures the incremental contribution of host market returns in 
explaining the firm’s stock return variations in addition to the firm’s stock return information 
contained in the firm’s home and other host market returns. To compute bkl measures, for each 
cross-listed security of firm i traded on target market j, I estimate the following two time-series 
regressions: 
 
[Restricted model (R)]:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + � 𝛽𝑖,ℎ𝑚,𝑡+𝑘𝑅ℎ𝑚,𝑡+𝑘 + � � 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑚~𝑗,𝑡+𝑘𝑅𝑡𝑚~𝑗,𝑡+𝑘+1
𝑘=−1~𝑗  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡+1𝑘=−1       [5] 
 
and 
[Unrestricted model (UR)]: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + � 𝛽𝑖,ℎ𝑚,𝑡+𝑘𝑅ℎ𝑚,𝑡+𝑘 + � � 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑚~𝑗,𝑡+𝑘𝑅𝑡𝑚~𝑗,𝑡+𝑘+1
𝑘=−1~𝑗  + � 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑚𝑗,𝑡+𝑘𝑅𝑡𝑚𝑗,𝑡+𝑘+1𝑘=−1  +  +1𝑘=−1 𝜀𝑖𝑡        [6] 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the total return (measured in US dollars) of firm i in period t, 𝑅ℎ𝑚,𝑡+𝑘 is the total 
return (measured in US dollars) on the market index in the firm i’s home country in period t+k, 
𝑅𝑡𝑚𝑗,𝑡+𝑘 is the total market index return (measured in US dollars) of target market j in period t+k, 
and  𝑅𝑡𝑚~𝑗,𝑡+𝑘 is the total market index return (measured in US dollars) on other target markets 
(other than target market j) with firm i’s cross-listings in period t+k. The lead and lag terms are 
included in the above time-series regressions to account for nonsynchronous trading across 
markets located in different time zones. The bkl measure is an F-statistic that quantifies the 
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explanatory power of the unrestricted model (UR) relative to that of the restricted model (R). The 
bkl factor is defined as: 
 
𝑏𝑘𝑙 =  (𝑅𝑈𝑅2 − 𝑅𝑅2)/3(1 − 𝑅𝑈𝑅2 )/(𝑛 − 𝑝 + 1)                     [7] 
 
where n is the number of observations, and p is the number of parameters to be estimated in the 
unrestricted model (UR). The bkl factor is computed using weekly total return series from 
Datastream. I use the total return series of Datastream country index for home and target market 
returns. For each sample year and for each security with up to 2 secondary listings, I require at 
least 120 weeks of past total return data in computing bkl. I require 160 weeks of past total return 
series for securities with 3 to 5 secondary listings. To obtain reasonably precise estimates of the 
bkl factor for cross-listed shares with more than 5 secondary listings, I require a minimum of 200 
weekly past total return data. The BKL model predicts that the higher the return correlation of 
the cross-listed security with other securities listed on the target market, the larger the target 
market share of trading volume. I expect the bkl factor to be positively associated with the target 
market share of trading. 
 
1.3.5 Known firm-specific factors (cont’d) 
{size, foreign sales, relative industry capitalization, home market analyst, volatility} 
Firm level information environment is likely to influence the trading volume distribution of 
cross-listed shares. Firm size may proxy for the visibility of the firm to target market investors. 
Larger market capitalization may indicate that the firm is better known to the investors in the 
target market. I control for firm size using the natural logarithm of the stock’s annual average 
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market capitalization in US dollars from Datastream. Furthermore, I include the percentage of 
firm’s foreign sales as it may capture how well-known the firm is to the target market investors 
[Kang and Stulz (1997), Baruch et al. (2007), and Halling et al. (2008)]. I collect the percentage 
of foreign sales data annually from the Worldscope (item WC08731). As another proxy for the 
firm visibility to the target market investors, I consider the difference between the percentage of 
global industry market capitalization for the firm’s industry in the target market and the 
percentage of global industry market capitalization for the firm’s industry in the home market 
(relative industry capitalization) [Baruch et al. (2007)]. The relative industry capitalization 
variable is constructed using the Level 3 Datastream industry indices data (10 industry groups). I 
expect the proxies for firm visibility to be positively related to the target market share of 
trading.10 
 
Furthermore, higher analyst coverage in the home market may lower information acquisition cost 
for foreign investors trading in the home market [Baruch et al. (2007)]. This reasoning predicts a 
negative association between the home market analyst coverage and the trading volume share of 
target market.11 Following Baruch et al. (2007), I measure the extent of home market analyst 
coverage using the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 1-year-ahead earnings-per-share 
(EPS) estimates for the home market security. Analyst EPS estimates are from the International 
Summary data of I/B/E/S, and I use the year-end values (December). 
 
                                                          
10 There is little empirical support for the aforementioned hypothesis. In fact, both Baruch et al. (2007) 
and Halling et al. (2008) find that firm size is negatively related to the trading activity in target market. 
11 The extent of analyst coverage in the home market may also proxy for the amount of information 
available to the general public. This interpretation makes the relationship between the analyst coverage in 
the home market and the target market share of trading rather unclear. 
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Halling et al. (2008) shows that the sensitivity to private information affects the distribution of 
target market share of trading activity. If private information originates in the target market, then 
investors in the target market may have informational advantage, leading to larger share of 
trading in the target market. It is shown that firms with higher return volatility are more sensitive 
to private information. Halling et al. (2008) find a positive association between return volatility 
and the target market trading share. I estimate the return volatility as the annual standard 
deviation of weekly home market security returns using data from Datastream. 
 
1.3.6 Known market-specific factors 
{geographical distance, relative investor protection, relative transaction cost, relative market 
turnover} 
Literature has shown that geographical proximity plays an important role in information flows 
[Prinsky and Wang (2006); Coval and Moskowitz (2001); Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999); 
Sarkissian and Schill (2004); Baruch et al. (2007); Halling et al. (2008)]. Baruch et al. (2007) and 
Halling et al. (2008) demonstrate that the closer the US markets to the home market of the firm, 
the higher the US share of trading activity. I measure geographical proximity in terms of 
geographical distance (in miles) between the target and the home market of the security. I expect 
a negative relation between the target market share of trading volume and the geographical 
distance. 
 
Halling et al. (2008) argue that investors would prefer to trade on the stock exchanges with 
stricter and better enforced rules against insider trading as better legal protection against insider 
trading reduces adverse selection costs for market participants. If this is the case, then we would 
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expect to observe a larger target market share of trading for target markets with better investor 
protection. To measure the extent of the difference in investor protection (relative investor 
protection) between the target and the home market, I take the difference between the investor 
protection index score of the target and that of the home market. The values of the investor 
protection index are drawn from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006).      
 
Transaction costs and liquidity play an important role in the ability of markets to attract trading 
volume [Chowdhry and Nanda (1991); Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998)]. Those target 
markets with lower transaction costs would host a larger portion of trading activity. To account 
for this, I measure the relative transaction cost between the target and the home market using the 
institutional investors’ transaction costs data from Elkins McSherry. I take the annual average of 
quarterly commission, fees, and market impact costs in basis points for each market in our 
sample. I then subtract the yearly average transaction costs of trading in the home market from 
that of at the target market to generate the estimates for the relative transaction cost. I expect a 
negative relation between the relative transaction cost and the trading volume share of target 
market.  
 
Furthermore, I control for the difference in the level of overall market trading activity in 
regression analyses. I measure the level of overall market trading activity in terms of total 
turnover scaled (in US dollars) by total market capitalization (in US dollars). I take the annual 
average of the scaled weekly market turnover. The relative market turnover is defined as the 
difference in the yearly average scaled turnover of the target and that of the home market of the 
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cross-listed security. I use the Datastream country index data to compute the relative market 
turnover. 
 
1.4 Summary statistics 
I present the trading volume distribution of cross-listed securities across 19 target markets in 
Table 1.4. The target market share of trading is the ratio of weekly dollar amount traded on 
target market (in US dollars) to the weekly total dollar amount traded (in US dollars) averaged 
over 1 year. The total dollar amount traded is the sum of the dollar amount traded on all target 
markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market of the firm. Table 4 summarizes the 
average target market share of trading for each of the 19 target markets grouped by home region 
and home country’s degree of economic development (developed vs. emerging). The average 
values are calculated first by averaging over time for each cross-listing and then by computing 
the average within each target market. The overall mean value for the target market share of 
trading is 18%. There are substantial variations in the target market share of trading across 
target bourses. Among the target exchanges that host larger number of cross-listings, New York 
(36%), NASDAQ (48%), Australia (22%), and Hong Kong (30%) grab larger share of trading 
than the overall average. The London Stock Exchange, which hosts the largest number of cross-
listings, attracts only 9% of global trading volume. In fact, most European target bourses grab 
relatively small share of global trading volume. Furthermore, Table 1.4 demonstrates that the 
target market share of trading in general is larger for firms domiciled in the countries 
geographically closer. This is consistent with the findings of Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et 
al. (2008). 
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Panel A, B, and C of Table 1.5 report the summary statistics of the sample grouped by target 
markets. All mean values are calculated first by taking the time-series averages of the variables 
for each cross-listing and then by computing the average within each target market. Panel A of 
Table 1.5 presents the mean values of firm-specific variables for each target market. The bkl is 
computed using [5], [6], and [7] in Section 1.3.5. The overall sample mean of bkl is 1.897. 
Toronto (2.488), New York (2.187), and NASDAQ (2.222) provide more incremental pricing 
information for cross-listed securities, on average. Contrastingly, the European financial centers, 
Frankfurt (1.541) and London (1.541), add relative little price-relevant information for cross-
listed shares. Johannesburg furnishes the most and Tokyo provides the least incremental pricing 
information. The average firm size is 17 billion US dollars. Tokyo (58.6), Lima (65.4), and Swiss 
(45.9) host cross-listings from larger companies. Mainly, these target bourses lists the stocks of 
large US firms. However, Tokyo, Lima, and Swiss grab a small portion of global trading volume. 
Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) find that firm size is negatively related to the US 
share of trading.    
 
Panel B of Table 1.5 shows the averages of market-specific variables for each target bourse. The 
mean of relative investor protection is 0.38, indicating that target markets provide only a little 
better investor protection compared to their counterpart home markets. Most notably, Singapore, 
New York, and NASDAQ offer far better investor protection. On the other hand, a majority of 
European target markets offers worse protection than their counterpart home markets. The 
average difference in transaction costs between the target market and its counterpart home 
markets (relative transaction costs) is -0.01. This indicates that it is cheaper to trade in the target 
than in the home markets. US target bourses have the lowest transaction costs compared to their 
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counterpart home markets. The average transaction cost for the London Stock Exchange is 
higher than in its counterpart home markets. 
 
Panel C of Table 1.5 presents the summary statistics of familiarity relative distance measures 
across target markets. The relative distance measures are constructed using [2], [3], and [4] in 
Section 1.3. The relative distance measures how much “closer” institutional shareholders are to 
the target compared to its counterpart home market. The overall average values of relative 
distance variables are negative with the exception of the relative distance (bilateral trade). This 
tells us that a typical cross-listing firm has institutional shareholders base that is more proximate 
to the home markets. All relative distance measures are consistently positive for New York and 
NASDAQ. Firms that cross-list on US target markets attract global institutional traders who are 
more familiar with US exchanges than their counterpart home markets.       
 
Lastly, Table 1.11 tabulates correlation coefficients of all variables. With the exception of firm 
size, the signs of correlation coefficients on firm and market level variables are consistent with 
the predictions in Section 1.3.5 and Section 1.3.6. The negative correlation between target 
market share of trading and size agrees with the findings of Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et 
al. (2008), however. All familiarity relative distance measures are positively correlated with 
target market share of trading. The target market share of trading is higher when the firm has 
institutional investor base that is more proximate to the target market than to their counterpart 
home markets. The relative distance variables are highly correlated with each other. The only 
exception is relative distance (bilateral trade).   
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1.5 Regression results 
To examine the determinants that affect target market share of trading volume, I turn to 
regression analyses. The dependent variable in the regressions is the logistic transformation of 
weekly target market share of trading averaged over 1 year (defined in [1], Section 1.3).12 The 
annual panel includes 9,362 observations (security-target market-year) for 1,953 cross-listed 
securities ranging from 2001 to 2011. However, the number of observations varies across 
different regression specifications due to the data availability of explanatory variables. I allow 
securities to enter and exit the panel over time. Following Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. 
(2008), all explanatory variables are lagged 1 year in regressions. I estimate pooled ordinary least 
squares (pooled OLS) regressions with robust standard errors. In all regression specifications, 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, I cluster standard errors by firm 
and by year. This allows for potential correlation among observations of different firms in the 
same year and for possible correlation among observations on the same firm across different 
years [Petersen (2009); Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006)].  
 
1.5.1 Baseline results 
Table 6 reports the baseline regression estimation results. In Table 1.6, model (1), (2), (3), and 
(4) are estimated using the entire sample. Models (1) through (4) only differ by the inclusion and 
exclusion of year and target market fixed-effects. Model (5) is the estimates on the sample of 
securities with 1 target market in a given year. The estimation result using only the sample of 
                                                          
12 The target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on the target market 
(in US dollars) to the total dollar amount traded (in US dollars). For each firm, the total dollar amount 
traded is the sum of the dollar amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the 
home market. I compute the target market share of trading at weekly frequency, and these ratios are 
averaged over 1 year. I then take the natural log of these annually averaged ratios. 
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securities that have cross-lists on more than 1 target market in a given year is labeled model (6). 
Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) study multimarket trading dynamics with a sample 
of firms that cross-list on US markets. To compare the relative importance of factors that 
influence the trading volume distribution of cross-listed securities listed on US markets versus 
non-US target markets, I further split the sample into two: one with cross-listings on US markets 
and the other with cross-listings on non-US target markets. Model (7) reports the estimation 
result for the firms with US target markets, and model (8) shows the result on the firms that 
cross-list on non-US host markets. The institutional ownership enters regressions as a control. 
For each firm, the institutional ownership is the percentage of the company’s market 
capitalization (in US dollars) owned by institutions. I drop foreign sales from all regression 
specifications. The foreign sales variable is mostly statistically insignificant, and the inclusion of 
foreign sales erodes the number of observations.  
 
I take model (2) in Table 1.6, which includes year fixed-effects, to be the base case specification. 
The estimates of the base case specification are mostly consistent with my hypotheses. All 
coefficients of statistically significant independent variables have the expected signs. The only 
exception is firm size. Target markets host lower share of trading for larger firms. The target 
market share of trading is reduced by only 2.5% if firm size increases by 10%. However, this is 
consistent with the findings of Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008). The estimated 
coefficient on bkl is positive indicating that the target market share of trading is larger if the 
target market contributes more to price discovery. A one standard deviation (2.29) increase in bkl 
results in a 31% (=exp(0.118*2.29)-1) increase in trading volume share of the target market. The 
negative coefficient on volatility agrees with the estimation results of Halling et al. (2008). A 
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larger share of trading volume is hosted in the target market if the firm is sensitive to private 
information.  
 
The geographical proximity plays only a marginally important role on the trading volume 
distribution of cross-listed securities as geographic distance is significant at 10% level. The 
estimated coefficient on relative market turnover is positive and significant indicating that the 
level of overall target market trading activity matters. A one standard deviation (2.13) increase in 
relative market turnover leads to a 104% (=exp(0.336*2.13)-1) increase in the target market 
share of trading. The relative investor protection is insignificant in model (2). Halling et al. 
(2008) shows that the fraction of US trading is larger for companies from countries with poor 
insider trading protection. My result indicates that this specific finding of Halling et al. is limited 
to the firms with a US cross-listing. Indeed, this is further validated by the comparison of 
estimation results on model (7) and (8). Model (7) reports the estimates using the sample of US 
cross-listings, and relative investor protection is statistically significant, which is consistent with 
the findings of Halling et al. (2008). However, this is not the case in model (8), which is the 
estimation result on the sample of cross-listings on non-US target markets. 
 
Model (5) reports the result on the sample drawn from the firms with only 1 host market in a 
given year. For model (6), the sample is restricted to the firms with multiple cross-listings. In 
both model (5) and (6), geographical distance and relative investor protection are not 
statistically significant. For firms with multiple cross-listings, some explanatory variables that 
are designed to proxy firm’s information environment are no longer significant factors in 
explaining multimarket trading dynamics. The measure of firm return volatility and the extent of 
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home market analyst coverage have little influence on the trading volume distribution of cross-
listed securities with multiple target markets. However, bkl is statistically significant in both 
model (5) and model (6). The estimated coefficient of bkl is positive, which confirms the 
importance of incremental pricing information generated from the target market in attracting 
trading volume. The estimated coefficient of bkl is larger for the firms with multiple cross-
listings. From model (5), for the firms with only 1 cross-listing, a one standard deviation (2.19) 
increase in bkl results in a 22% (=exp(0.09*2.19)-1) increase in the target market share of 
trading. On the other hand, for the firms that cross-list on multiple target markets, model (6) 
reports that a one standard deviation (1.97) increase in bkl leads to a 42% (=exp(0.179*1.97)-1) 
increase in total volume share of the target market. When there are multiple target markets 
competing for order flows, the target market that provides better price relevant information hosts 
larger share of trading volume.     
 
Model (7) is estimated using the sample US cross-listings and model (8) with cross-listings on 
non-US target markets. The estimation result of model (7) is mostly consistent with the findings 
of Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008). I note that only four explanatory variables are 
statistically significant in model (8). These include one market level (relative market turnover) 
and two firm level (bkl and firm size) factors. The trading volume distribution of cross-listed 
securities on non-US target markets is mainly driven by the level of overall target market trading 
activity and the target market’s incremental contribution to price discovery. Furthermore, higher 
institutional ownership increases the US share of trading in model (7). The opposite is the case in 
model (8); for firms that cross-list on non-US target markets, higher institutional ownership 
30 
 
reduces trading volume share of the target market. I examine the effects of global institutional 
investors on multimarket trading dynamics in the next section. 
 
1.5.2 Results on familiarity bias and ambiguity aversion 
First, I investigate whether institutional investor’s relative proximity to home and target markets 
influence the trading volume distribution of cross-listed securities. I include eight proxies that 
measure geographical, cultural, economic, and market governance proximity: geographical 
distance (geographical proximity); language, colonial heritage, legal origin (cultural proximity); 
bilateral trade (economic proximity); exchange trading rules, investor protection, and accounting 
standards (market rules proximity). For each of eight familiarity proxies, I construct the relative 
distance measures using [2], [3], and [4] in Section 1.3. The relative distance measures are the 
key variables of interest. Intuitively, these relative distance variables measure how much 
“closer” institutional shareholders are to the target compared to the counterpart home market. If 
“proximity” preference guides global institutional investors in the selection of trading venues, 
then we should observe positive relation between relative distance and the target market share of 
trading volume.  
 
Table 1.7 reports the familiarity bias regression estimation results. As shown in the correlation 
matrix (Table 1.11), relative distance measures are highly correlated with each other. Thus, each 
relative distance measure enters the regression separately in model (1) through model (8) in 
Table 1.7. I control for known factors that determine the trading volume distribution of cross-
listed stocks. All regression specifications include year-fixed effects. All estimated coefficients 
on relative distance measures are positive and statistically significant at 1% level with the 
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exception of relative distance (investor protection), which is statistically significant at 5% level. 
This indicates that institutional investor familiarity bias influences the trading volume 
distribution of cross-listed stocks. The target market share of trading volume is higher for the 
firms that have institutional investor base “closer to” the target market. From model (1), I infer 
that geographical proximity matters to institutional investor in the selection of trading venues. A 
one standard deviation (13.96) increase in relative distance (geo. distance) leads to a 65% 
(=exp(0.036*13.96)-1) increase in the target market fraction of global trading volume. The 
estimation results of model (2), (3), and (4) indicate that institutional investor’s cultural 
proximity influence the location of stock trading. A one standard deviation (22.38) increase in 
relative distance (language) raises the target market share of trading by 50% 
(=exp(0.018*22.38)-1). Model (5) shows that economic proximity also plays an important role in 
multimarket trading dynamics. Lastly, the estimates of model (6), (7), and (8) confirm the 
importance of institutional investor’s proximity to market rules in attracting trading volume for 
the target market. A one standard deviation (15.16) increase in relative distance (exchange rules) 
results in a 53% (=exp(0.028*15.16)-1) increase in the target market share of trading volume. 
 
Secondly, I examine whether institutional investors are averse to trading in markets with 
ambiguous (less detailed) market rules governing trading practices and thereby influencing the 
trading volume distribution of cross-listed securities. More specifically, I investigate whether 
institutional investors avoid trading in a market with ambiguous market rules even though these 
sophisticated institutional investors are familiar with them. I include three market rule measures: 
exchange trading rules, investor protection law, and accounting standards in regression analyses. 
Using each of three market rule measures, I lump target markets into two groups: the markets 
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with detailed market rules and the markets with ambiguous rules. The target market dummy 
variables (tm low (exchange rules), tm low (investor protection), and tm low (accounting 
standards)) are as defined previously in Section 1.3. I include the interaction terms between the 
target dummy and the corresponding relative distance measure in the model specifications. The 
target market dummies and the interaction terms are the key variables. As investor participation 
would be limited if the target market is governed by ambiguous market rules, I expect to observe 
negative relations with the fraction of host market trading for both the target dummies and the 
interaction terms.    
 
Table 1.8 tabulates the estimation results. Year-fixed effects are included in all regression 
specifications. I also control for known market- and firm-specific factors. I evaluate the above 
three cases separately in model (1), (2), and (3). Model (4), (5), and (6) include relative distance 
(bilateral trade) as an additional control. The estimated coefficients on all three target dummies 
are negative and statistically significant in model (1), (2), and (3) of Table 1.8, indicating that 
target markets with ambiguous market rules host less trading volume of cross-listed securities. 
From model (1), the target market share of trading volume is lower by 78% (=exp(-1.511)-1) if 
the host market features ambiguous exchange trading rules. Furthermore, the estimated 
coefficients on all three interaction terms are negative and statistically significant at 1% level. 
This implies that institutional investor’s familiarity bias abates in the selection of trading venues 
if the target market has ambiguous market rules governing trading practices. As an example, in 
model (1), a one standard deviation (15.16) increase in relative distance (exchange rules) leads 
to a 120% (=exp(0.052*15.16)-1) increase in the target market share of trading volume. 
However, this increase in target market share of trading volume is reduced to only 11% 
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(=exp((0.052-0.045)*15.16)-1) when the target market features ambiguous exchange trading 
rules. 
 
1.6 Event study: MiFID (the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments) 
In this section, I address potential endogeneity concerns in examining investor familiarity bias 
and ambiguity aversion. MiFID (the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments) is an 
exogenous shock to exchange trading rules and investor protection regulations, which only 
affects UK and the countries in the European Union. The implementation of MiFID has two 
consequences; the harmonization and improvement (in the sense that regulations became more 
detailed and transparent) of exchange trading rules and investor protection provisions among the 
MiFID exchanges. For the cross-listed securities with both MiFID home exchange and MiFID 
target exchange, there is essentially no difference in trading rules and investor protection 
between the two markets after MiFID went into effect.   
 
As much as the introduction of MiFID is a shock to exchange trading rules and investor 
protection regulations, it is also an exogenous shock to the investors in the MiFID countries. 
With the implementation of MiFID, for institutional traders domiciled in the MiFID countries, 
the market rules of the local trading venues has improved. In other words, the exchange rules and 
investor protection provisions, with which the institutional investors domiciled in the MiFID 
countries are familiar, became more detailed and transparent. Would these institutional investors 
from the MiFID countries become more averse to trading in other markets with ambiguous 
market rules as these institutional traders have become more accustomed to the better market 
rules of their local markets after MiFID? If investor familiarity bias and ambiguity aversion play 
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important role in the selection of trading venues for the institutional traders from the MiFID 
countries, then I expect these institutional investors to avoid trading in markets with more 
ambiguous market rules after MiFID. 
 
First, I examine the impact of regulatory harmonization or familiarization on multimarket trading 
dynamics.13 To conduct difference-in-differences regression analyses, I define the following 
dummy variables. MiFID became effective in November 2007. The year 2008~2011 dummy 
takes the value 1 for years, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011, and 0 otherwise. The tm & hm MiFID 
indicator variable takes the value 1 if both the target and the home market of the security are 
MiFID exchanges, and 0 otherwise. If the target market is a MiFID exchange and the home 
market is not, then the tm MiFID & hm not takes the value 1, and 0 otherwise. The tm not & hm 
MiFID takes the value 1 if the home market is a MiFID exchange and the target is not, and 0 
otherwise. Lastly, the tm not & hm not takes the value 1 if both the target and the home market 
are non-MiFID exchanges, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, I generate interaction terms between 
the target-home market combination indicator variables and year 2008~2011 dummy. 
 
Table 1.9 summarizes the impact of regulatory harmonization on the trading volume distribution 
of cross-listed securities. I draw the sample from 2004 to 2011 for all regression analyses in 
Table 1.9. All regression specifications include year-fixed effects. Models (2), (4), (6), and (8) 
include target market-fixed effects in addition to year-fixed effects. I control for known firm and 
market level factors in all regressions. Target markets on average gained trading volume share 
                                                          
13 Cumming, Johan, and Li (2011) examines the impact of MiFID on overall market liquidity. They also 
identify legal factors that are associated with cross-sectional differences in liquidity. Furthermore, using a 
sample of cross-listed stocks on US markets, Cumming, Humphery-Jenner, and Wu (2011) tests whether 
exchange trading rules influence the US share of trading volume. 
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during the years between 2008 and 2011 as the coefficient of year 2008~2011 dummy is positive 
and statistically significant. Model 1 examines the influence of harmonization of exchange 
trading rules among the MiFID exchanges. In model (1), the estimated coefficient of tm & hm 
MiFID is negative and statistically significant. On average, the MiFID targets have lower share 
of trading for firms with MiFID home markets. The estimated coefficient of interaction term (tm 
& hm MiFID) is positive, and it is statistically significant. The impact of exchange rule 
harmonization among the MiFID exchanges on the trading volume share of MiFID targets is 
estimated to be a gain of 227% (=exp(1.185)-1). The exchange rule harmonization between the 
target and its counterpart home market facilitates significantly more trading in the target markets.  
 
Furthermore, I find some evidence that the improvement (become less ambiguous) in the market 
rules results in a larger share of trading volume for cross-listed securities from model (3), (4), 
(5), and (6). The estimation result is much stronger for the case where the home market is a 
MiFID exchange and the target is not. In model (5), the negative estimated coefficient on 
interaction term (tm not & hm MiFID) implies a smaller trading volume share for the target 
market when the integrity of market rules governing trading practices improves. The trading 
volume share decrease in a non-MiFID target market is approximately 53% (=exp(-0.748)-1). 
 
Secondly, I investigate whether a shock to the local exchange trading rules induces a change in 
institutional investor trading behavior in other markets. Specifically, I examine whether the 
trading volume share of target markets with more ambiguous exchange trading rules is smaller 
for stocks that have higher MiFID institutional ownership after MiFID. The indicator variable 
MiFID ownership equals 1 if the stock has greater than the median MiFID institutional 
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ownership of 3.6%, and 0 otherwise. The tm low (non-MiFID tm) is the same variable as the tm 
low (exchange rules) (defined in Section III) but labeled differently. Furthermore, I generate a 
three-way interaction variable among tm low (non-MiFID tm), MiFID ownership, and year 
2008~2011. I expect this 3-way interaction term to be negatively associated with the target 
market share of trading volume.   
 
The estimation results are reported in Table 1.10. I only include securities with both non-MiFID 
home and target markets from 2004 to 2011 for all regression analyses in Table 10. Both model 
(1) and (2) include all known factors and year-fixed effects. I also include home market-fixed 
effects in model (2). The variable of interest is interaction term (tm low & MiFID ownership & 
year 2008~2011) in model (1). The estimated coefficient of this 3-way interaction term is 
negative and statistically significant. For stocks with higher MiFID institutional investor 
ownership, after MiFID was implemented, the non-MiFID target market share of trading volume 
decreased by additional 79% (=exp(-1.563)) if the target featured ambiguous exchange trading 
rules. This implies that institutional investors domiciled in the MiFID countries become more 
averse to trading in other markets with ambiguous trading rules as these institutional traders have 
become more accustomed to detailed trading rules of their local markets after MiFID. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
One of major reasons for cross-listing on foreign stock exchanges is to provide more liquid 
trading environment for investors. The long-term viability of cross-listings critically depends on 
whether trading activity persists and where stock trading takes place. Consequently, 
understanding the trading volume distribution of cross-listed securities is important to firm 
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managers who are seeking to cross-list, to stock exchanges, which compete with another for 
order flows, and to broker dealers who earn fees for facilitating trades. Lastly, it is also important 
to institutional investors who must decide on where to trade these cross-listed stocks. 
 
The previous studies of Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) draw a sample of firms that 
cross-list on US markets. We have little knowledge on the trading volume distribution of cross-
listed securities on non-US target markets. There is a large variation in trading activities of cross-
listed shares across target markets. US target markets mostly held on to their trading volume 
share of cross-listed stocks. The majority of European bourses never developed into vibrant 
target markets, including the London Stock Exchange. 
 
Using a sample of 1,953 globally cross-listed securities on 19 target markets, I examine the 
factors that influence the trading volume distribution of cross-listed stocks. Only a small subset 
of known factors contributes in explaining multimarket trading dynamics of cross-listed 
securities on non-US target markets. This calls for further research. The main contribution of this 
paper is in the analyses that reveal the importance of investor familiarity bias and ambiguity 
aversion in explaining the trading volume distribution of cross-listed securities. The relative 
“proximity” of institutional shareholder base to the target and the home market exerts significant 
influence on multimarket trading dynamics of cross-listed securities. This result indicates that the 
investor familiarity bias plays an important role not only in portfolio holding and overseas 
financing decisions, but also in the selection of trading venues. Additionally, I document the 
importance of market rules governing trading practices in explaining the trading volume 
distribution of cross-listed shares. I find strong empirical evidence indicating that global 
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institutional investors are averse to trading in markets that do not furnish detailed market rules 
(ambiguous rules) even if these institutional traders are “familiar” with ambiguous rules. 
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Table 1.1: 
This table reports the distribution of cross-border listings across 19 target (“host”) exchanges grouped by home market region and home country’s degree of economic 
development (developed vs. emerging). I use the list of developed and emerging countries from International Financial Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group. Each cell in 
the table represents the number of cross-listings. There are 2,932 cross-listed securities (secondary listings) during the period between January 2001 and December 2011.  
 
 
 
 
Developed Developed Developed Developed Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging
target market Americas Asia Europe Middle East Africa Americas Asia Europe Middle East total
Australia 37 39 27 . 2 . 1 . . 106
Hong Kong 10 14 7 . . 2 70 . . 103
Singapore . 20 4 . . . 7 . . 31
Taiwan . 25 1 . 1 . . . . 27
Tokyo 16 3 22 . . . 2 . . 43
Lima 39 . 5 . . . . . . 44
NASDAQ 76 13 59 36 2 7 3 1 . 197
New York 202 20 121 4 6 107 39 3 1 503
Toronto 60 38 29 . 1 1 . . . 129
Euronext Amsterdam 44 . 65 . . . 1 . . 110
Euronext Brussels 10 . 41 1 2 . . . . 54
Euronext Lisbon . . 5 . . . . . . 5
Euronext Paris 40 2 110 . 6 1 . . . 159
Europe Frankfurt 86 12 103 1 3 4 3 22 2 236
& Africa London 237 94 450 6 12 . 42 31 8 880
Luxembourg . . 20 . 1 3 31 4 1 60
Oslo 19 . 11 . . . . . . 30
Swiss 84 2 77 . 3 1 . . . 167
Johannesburg 10 4 30 . 4 . . . . 48
Total 970 286 1187 48 43 126 199 61 12 2932
Asia
America
home market region
Number of cross-listed securities
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Table 1.2:  
This table describes cross-listing trend over the last decade. The sample includes cross-listed securities on 19 target (“host”) markets grouped by region. The sample period spans 
from 2001 to 2011. Each cell represents the total number of cross-listed securities in a given year. The number of cross-listings decreased over the past decade, from 1,802 in 2001 
to 1,221 in 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
target market 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia 50 47 42 49 48 52 52 48 50 52 52
Hong Kong 33 37 40 41 42 49 62 69 75 91 95
Singapore 19 19 18 18 18 19 22 20 19 21 19
Taiwan . 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 11 23 27
Tokyo 38 38 34 32 30 27 24 20 12 12 9
Lima 19 23 26 25 25 24 28 27 26 27 27
NASDAQ 141 139 136 134 133 122 124 124 115 107 102
New York 351 359 375 394 395 387 377 357 357 349 343
Toronto 32 29 28 27 32 39 49 58 56 66 70
Euronext Amsterdam 83 64 57 59 61 53 51 47 37 25 24
Euronext Brussels 46 42 43 38 33 30 25 21 19 7 7
Euronext Lisbon 1 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 3
Euronext Paris 122 109 106 101 92 81 67 62 55 46 37
Europe Frankfurt 216 186 168 148 140 119 102 84 61 53 45
& Africa London 462 608 612 617 612 638 654 357 251 214 201
Luxembourg 42 39 35 33 32 34 31 25 23 22 23
Oslo 12 13 11 9 10 14 14 12 12 12 10
Swiss 122 118 112 105 125 123 124 121 49 48 37
Johannesburg 13 14 14 15 17 22 27 34 41 41 40
Asia
America
Number of cross-listed securities
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Table 1.3: 
Table 1.3 presents the distribution of multiple cross-listings across 19 target (“host”) markets in selected years. Of 2,226 securities with cross-listings, three hundred seventy one 
(371) of these securities have cross-border listings on multiple target bourses. The cross-listing on multiple target markets has decreased over the last decade. There are a total of 
1,033 cross-listings with no other secondary listing on any other target bourses in 2001, and a total of 368 cross-listings with exactly 1 other secondary listing on other host 
markets, 172 secondary listings with 2 other cross-listings, 89 cross-listings with 3 other cross-listings, and 140 secondary listings with 4 or more other cross-listings in 2001. 
There are about the same number of secondary listings, 958, with no other cross-listing on any other host markets in 2010 compared to in 2001. In contrast to this, by 2010, there 
are only 179 cross-listings with 1 other secondary listing on other host markets, only a total of 42 secondary listings with 2 other cross-listings, 32 cross-listings with 3 other 
secondary listings, and lastly, only 10 cross-listings with 4 or more other secondary listings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of target markets
target market 2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010
Australia 36 35 44 9 7 7 3 3 . 1 1 1 1 2 .
Hong Kong 21 27 73 8 11 14 3 1 3 1 2 1 . 1 .
Singapore 18 18 20 . . . . . 1 . . . 1 . .
Taiwan . 2 22 . . 1 . . . . . . . . .
Tokyo 5 3 4 11 11 4 6 5 2 4 2 1 12 9 1
Lima 3 3 17 5 5 4 3 4 1 2 6 3 6 7 2
NASDAQ 126 123 103 10 8 3 3 2 1 1 . . 1 . .
New York 242 298 289 68 59 49 23 21 6 8 8 4 10 9 1
Toronto 28 29 57 1 1 8 . . 1 1 1 . 2 1 .
Euronext Amsterdam 15 8 10 19 12 6 20 12 3 10 12 5 19 17 1
Euronext Brussels 12 8 4 7 6 2 12 6 1 3 4 . 12 9 .
Euronext Lisbon . 2 4 . . . . . . . 1 1 1 . .
Euronext Paris 25 22 24 35 19 13 23 20 5 19 15 3 20 16 1
Europe Frankfurt 140 83 39 48 35 7 14 10 5 5 4 1 9 8 1
& Africa London 290 421 164 101 118 35 34 34 7 19 20 6 18 19 2
Luxembourg 20 18 15 12 9 6 5 2 . . . 1 5 3 .
Oslo 11 10 12 1 . . . . . . . . . . .
Swiss 31 32 25 31 34 11 22 21 6 15 17 5 23 21 1
Johannesburg 10 13 32 2 4 9 1 . . . . . . . .
Total 1,033 1,155 958 368 339 179 172 141 42 89 93 32 140 122 10
4 or more other target markets
Asia
America
no other target market 1 other target market 2 other target markets 3 other target markets
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Table 1.4: 
This table summarizes the average target market share of trading across 19 target (“host”) markets grouped by home market region and home country’s degree of economic 
development (developed vs. emerging). I use the list of developed and emerging countries from International Financial Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group. For each 
cross-listed security of firm i traded on target market j, the target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on target market j (in US dollars) to the 
total dollar amount traded (in US dollars). The total dollar amount traded is the sum of the dollar amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the home 
market for firm i. The target market share of trading is computed at weekly frequency, and these ratios are averaged over 1 year. The average values are calculated first by 
averaging over time for each cross-listing and then by computing the average within each target market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
target market Developed Developed Developed Developed Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging
target market share of trading Americas Asia Europe Middle East Africa Americas Asia Europe Middle East
Australia 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.29 . 0.00 . 0.00 . .
Hong Kong 0.30 0.10 0.27 0.13 . . 0.00 0.36 . .
Singapore 0.21 . 0.23 0.17 . . . 0.17 . .
Taiwan 0.51 . 0.54 0.01 . 0.14 . . . .
Tokyo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 . . . 0.01 . .
Lima 0.10 0.10 . 0.12 . . . . . .
NASDAQ 0.48 0.55 0.38 0.28 0.63 0.58 0.58 0.52 0.77 .
New York 0.36 0.42 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.51 0.54 0.25 0.75 0.27
Toronto 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.22 . 0.26 0.00 . . .
Euronext Amsterdam 0.06 0.02 . 0.09 . . . 0.00 . .
Euronext Brussels 0.09 0.00 . 0.11 0.61 0.00 . . . .
Euronext Lisbon 0.19 . . 0.19 . . . . . .
Euronext Paris 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.09 . 0.06 0.00 . . .
Europe Frankfurt 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.73 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.05
& Africa London 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.31 0.04 . 0.01 0.44 0.32
Luxembourg 0.01 . . 0.02 . 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Oslo 0.29 0.31 . 0.27 . . . . . .
Swiss 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 . 0.00 0.01 . . .
Johannesburg 0.28 0.09 0.17 0.35 . 0.31 . . . .
Asia
America
home market region
Average target market share of trading
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Table 1.5: Panel A 
This table reports the summary statistics. All mean values are calculated first by taking the time-series averages of the variables for each cross-listing and then by computing the 
average within each target (“host”) market. Panel A of Table 1.5 presents the mean values of firm-specific variables for each target market. For each cross-listed security of firm i 
traded on target market j, the target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on target market j (in US dollars) to the total dollar amount traded (in US 
dollars). The total dollar amount traded is the sum of the dollar amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market for firm i. The target market 
share of trading is computed at weekly frequency, and these ratios are averaged over 1 year. The bkl factor is estimated using equations [5], [6], and [7] in Section 1.3.5. Firm size 
is the firm’s annual average market capitalization in billions of US dollars from Datastream. The percentage of foreign sales data is drawn annually from the Worldscope (item 
WC08731). The relative industry capitalization is the difference between the percentage of global industry market capitalization for the firm’s industry in the target market and the 
percentage of global industry market capitalization for the firm’s industry in the home market. The relative industry capitalization variable is constructed using the Level 3 
Datastream industry indices data (10 industry groups). The home market analyst is the number of 1-year-ahead earnings-per-share (EPS) estimates for the home market security. 
Analyst EPS estimates are from the International Summary data of I/B/E/S, and the year-end values (December) are used. The volatility is the annual standard deviation of weekly 
home market security returns using data from Datastream. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
num. of target market rel. home mrkt.
target market cross-listings share of trading bkl size foreign sales industry cap. analyst volatility
Australia 106 0.22 2.112 2.1 54.6 -6.5 6.0 0.072
Hong Kong 103 0.30 1.883 25.8 23.4 -3.6 8.7 0.060
Singapore 31 0.21 1.968 2.7 60.6 -1.6 7.4 0.082
Taiwan 27 0.51 1.639 1.3 57.8 0.1 5.6 0.065
Tokyo 43 0.00 1.315 58.6 43.1 -3.5 22.9 0.049
Lima 44 0.10 2.325 65.4 55.4 -20.7 18.0 0.071
NASDAQ 197 0.48 2.222 2.7 56.4 48.6 7.3 0.079
New York 503 0.36 2.187 13.6 41.3 27.8 11.0 0.067
Toronto 129 0.15 2.488 4.0 47.3 -12.4 5.2 0.095
Euronext Amsterdam 110 0.06 1.983 35.1 48.5 -17.1 18.0 0.054
Euronext Brussels 54 0.09 2.290 27.7 56.4 -6.9 18.6 0.053
Euronext Lisbon 5 0.19 2.769 20.7 33.2 -1.3 19.5 0.050
Euronext Paris 159 0.07 1.962 28.2 51.6 -7.5 16.2 0.053
Europe Frankfurt 236 0.07 1.541 7.3 39.5 -11.5 10.8 0.066
& Africa London 880 0.09 1.538 14.9 44.6 -6.8 13.9 0.070
Luxembourg 60 0.01 1.484 12.7 32.9 -2.8 13.2 0.062
Oslo 30 0.29 2.960 0.8 40.3 -12.7 5.4 0.103
Swiss 167 0.01 1.949 45.9 52.3 -18.5 21.4 0.049
Johannesburg 48 0.28 3.109 4.9 76.4 -5.7 6.2 0.090
Average . 0.18 1.897 17.0 45.9 1.5 12.7 0.068
Asia
America
firm-specific factors
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Table 1.5: Panel B 
Panel B of Table 1.5 presents the mean values of market-specific variables for each target market. All mean values are calculated first by taking the time-series averages of the 
variables for each cross-listing and then by computing the average within each target (“host”) market. The geographical distance (in miles) is the distance between the target and 
the home market of the security. The relative investor protection is the difference between the investor protection index score of the target and that of the home market. The values 
of the investor protection index are drawn from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). The relative transaction cost is constructed using the institutional investor 
transaction costs data from Elkins McSherry. I take the annual average of quarterly commission, fees, and market impact costs in basis points for each market in the sample. I then 
subtract the yearly average transaction costs of trading in the home market from that of at the target market to generate the estimates for the relative transaction cost. The relative 
market turnover is defined as the difference in the yearly average scaled (scaled by total market capitalization) turnover of the target and that of the home market of the cross-listed 
security. Data for relative market turnover comes from Datastream. The details of variable construction are provided in Section 1.3.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
target market geo. distance rel. inv. protection rel. transaction cost rel. market turnover
Australia 6976 -1.11 -3.22 -0.04
Hong Kong 2036 3.46 -6.73 -1.31
Singapore 2713 0.70 -2.80 -0.38
Taiwan 1346 -2.43 11.42 0.97
Tokyo 5905 0.43 -12.60 -0.51
Lima 4014 -5.17 41.58 -2.57
NASDAQ 3298 2.66 -12.56 2.28
New York 3151 3.08 -13.93 2.39
Toronto 3921 1.36 -1.96 -1.34
Euronext Amsterdam 2097 -1.68 -3.05 0.39
Euronext Brussels 1151 -5.01 -1.88 -1.11
Euronext Lisbon 463 -1.41 -2.63 -0.71
Euronext Paris 2379 -1.89 -1.95 -0.21
Europe Frankfurt 2634 -6.73 -7.58 -2.06
& Africa London 3002 1.90 13.48 0.66
Luxembourg 3027 . -7.57 -1.13
Oslo 2517 -2.61 0.04 0.23
Swiss 2618 -3.17 1.23 -0.79
Johannesburg 5889 0.18 4.24 -0.46
Average 3122 0.38 -0.01 0.36
Asia
America
market-specific factors
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Table 1.5: Panel C 
Panel C of Table 1.5 presents the mean values of familiarity relative distance measures for each target market. All mean values are calculated first by taking the time-series 
averages of the variables for each cross-listing and then by computing the average within each target (“host”) market. The familiarity proxies considered are: bilateral trade, 
geographical distance, common language, colonial heritage, common legal origin, exchange trading rules, investor protection, accounting standards. For each of eight familiarity 
proxies, the relative distance measures are constructed using [2], [3], and [4] in Section 1.3.2, and Section 1.3.3 provides the details of variable construction. Intuitively, these 
relative distance variables measure how much “closer” institutional shareholder base is to the target compared to its counterpart home market. 
 
 
 
 
 
rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist.
target market (bilateral trade) (geo. distance) (language) (colony) (legal origin) (exchange rules) (inv. protection) (acct. standards)
Australia -0.13 -15.02 0.00 -7.51 0.07 -5.94 -37.63 -36.35
Hong Kong . -5.24 1.48 -4.64 1.35 -3.01 -1.38 5.86
Singapore -0.03 -1.80 0.39 -2.15 -0.64 -0.21 -3.72 -22.16
Taiwan 0.17 -0.70 -4.01 -2.22 -4.15 -0.60 -9.47 -15.42
Tokyo 0.17 -18.65 -27.47 -24.54 -25.82 -15.86 -64.98 -150.70
Lima -0.32 -14.25 -36.97 -34.27 -35.88 -25.83 -192.48 -1270.09
NASDAQ 1.89 4.10 5.70 10.57 1.08 3.52 30.34 67.08
New York 2.48 2.93 6.02 6.43 5.47 2.82 34.35 96.21
Toronto -0.17 1.73 0.15 -15.28 -0.06 -4.17 -0.95 -45.70
Euronext Amsterdam -0.05 -8.66 -28.18 -26.33 -26.24 -14.21 -124.05 -193.10
Euronext Brussels -0.08 -4.67 -15.48 -15.43 -18.88 -8.77 -201.08 -227.23
Euronext Lisbon 0.02 -0.11 -2.85 -2.81 0.00 -0.22 -6.14 -260.66
Euronext Paris 0.07 -4.99 -18.25 -16.63 -19.22 -8.46 -100.16 -25.24
Europe Frankfurt 0.34 -8.35 -25.35 -23.14 -26.83 -14.28 -264.61 -240.41
& Africa London 0.12 -3.91 0.33 -13.95 -0.13 -4.63 -24.14 -119.03
Luxembourg -0.10 0.51 -0.56 -1.80 . . . .
Oslo -0.16 -3.79 -13.44 -10.34 -12.41 -5.26 -50.60 -29.81
Swiss -0.38 -12.11 1.16 -33.06 -35.88 -12.38 -209.23 -98.07
Johannesburg -0.20 -5.31 0.26 -1.42 0.16 . -4.18 7.77
Average 0.66 -3.50 -3.29 -10.05 -6.32 -4.72 -47.91 -72.69
Asia
America
familiarity (proximity) measures
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Table 1.6: Baseline regression results 
Table 1.6 reports the baseline regression results. The annual panel includes 9,362 observations (security-target market-year) for 
1,953 cross-listed securities ranging from 2001 to 2011.The regressions are estimated using pooled OLS method. The dependent 
variable in the regressions is the logistic transformation of weekly target market share of trading averaged over 1 year. The 
target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on the target market (in US dollars) to the total 
dollar amount traded (in US dollars). For each firm, the total dollar amount traded is the sum of the dollar amount traded on all 
target markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market. Model (1), (2), (3), and (4) are estimated using the entire 
sample. Models (1) through (4) only differ by the inclusion and exclusion of year and target market fixed-effects. Model (2) is the 
base case regression. Model (5) is the estimates on the sample of securities with 1 target market in a given year. The estimation 
result using only the sample of securities with cross-listings on more than 1 target market in a given year is labeled model (6). 
Model (7) reports the estimation result for US cross-listings, and model (8) shows the result for non-US cross-listings. The 
institutional ownership enters regressions as a control. For each firm, the institutional ownership is the percentage of the 
company’s market capitalization (in US dollars) owned by institutions. The independent variable description is provided in 
Section 1.3.5 and 1.3.6. The standard errors are robust to clustering by firm and by year. 
 
 
 
 
Baseline regression results
All All All All 1 target >1 target US target non-US target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
bkl 0.159*** 0.118*** 0.090*** 0.063*** 0.090** 0.179*** 0.034*** 0.146***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.021] [0.020] [0.042] [0.036] [0.010] [0.038]
rel. industry cap. 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.004 0
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006]
size -0.243*** -0.323*** -0.224*** -0.301*** -0.262*** -0.180** -0.087*** -0.442***
[0.071] [0.070] [0.057] [0.056] [0.090] [0.090] [0.033] [0.097]
home mrkt. analyst -0.062*** -0.041** -0.036*** -0.018 -0.076*** -0.022 -0.004 -0.029
[0.018] [0.017] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.022] [0.007] [0.027]
volatility 10.043*** 7.623** 7.169*** 5.937** 7.365** 7.365 6.150*** 4.502
[3.138] [3.454] [2.519] [2.411] [3.473] [4.828] [1.511] [4.148]
geo. distance -0.127* -0.130* -0.317*** -0.330*** -0.138* -0.014 -0.217*** -0.121
[0.066] [0.068] [0.053] [0.054] [0.079] [0.098] [0.070] [0.076]
rel. market turnover 0.336*** 0.317*** 0.378*** 0.293** 0.247*** 0.477*** 0.554*** 0.192
[0.077] [0.067] [0.133] [0.123] [0.063] [0.110] [0.089] [0.130]
rel. transaction cost -0.059*** -0.057*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.065*** -0.044*** -0.019*** -0.061***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] [0.009] [0.008] [0.004] [0.010]
rel. inv. protection 0.066 0.055 0.039 0.038 -0.006 0.074 0.055** 0.011
[0.044] [0.043] [0.034] [0.032] [0.042] [0.058] [0.025] [0.059]
institutional ownership 0.002 0.001 -0.009*** -0.011*** 0.005 0 0.019*** -0.031***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004]
Constant -4.568*** -4.838*** -1.744*** -2.432*** -4.401*** -6.547*** -3.081*** -4.843***
[0.795] [0.752] [0.614] [0.577] [0.783] [1.064] [0.578] [0.721]
Year fixed-effect No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target fixed-effect No No Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 9362 9362 9362 9362 5471 3891 3176 6186
R-squared 0.58 0.6 0.68 0.7 0.62 0.5 0.47 0.47
Standard errors robust to clusterings by firm and by year.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.7: Familiarity bias regression results 
Table 1.7 reports the regression estimations for the familiarity bias hypothesis. The regressions are estimated using pooled OLS 
method. The dependent variable in the regressions is the logistic transformation of weekly target market share of trading 
averaged over 1 year. The target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on the target market (in 
US dollars) to the total dollar amount traded (in US dollars). For each firm, the total dollar amount traded is the sum of the dollar 
amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market. Models (1) through (8) include eight 
proxies that measure geographical, cultural, economic, and market governance proximity: geographical distance (geographical 
proximity); language, colonial heritage, legal origin (cultural proximity); bilateral trade (economic proximity); exchange trading 
rules, investor protection, and accounting standards (market rules proximity), respectively. For each of eight proximity proxies, 
the relative distance measures are constructed using [2], [3], and [4] in Section 1.3.2, and Section 13.3 provides the details of 
variable construction. The relative distance measures are the key variables of interest. Intuitively, these relative distance 
variables measure how much “closer” institutional shareholder base is to the target compared to its counterpart home market. The 
standard errors are robust to clustering by firm and by year. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
bkl 0.120*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.116*** 0.122*** 0.089*** 0.115*** 0.112***
[0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.032] [0.033] [0.030] [0.033] [0.031]
rel. industry cap. 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.042***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
size -0.339*** -0.313*** -0.298*** -0.309*** -0.404*** -0.303*** -0.317*** -0.309***
[0.062] [0.069] [0.069] [0.070] [0.058] [0.071] [0.073] [0.069]
home mrkt. analyst -0.034** -0.040** -0.041** -0.040** -0.024 -0.039** -0.039** -0.041**
[0.016] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.015] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017]
volatility 7.026** 7.327** 6.303* 7.134** 7.481** 7.569** 7.167** 7.311**
[3.345] [3.363] [3.242] [3.375] [3.287] [3.629] [3.417] [3.326]
geo. distance -0.137** -0.089 -0.122* 0.083 -0.12 -0.117* -0.123*
[0.068] [0.074] [0.067] [0.062] [0.074] [0.068] [0.072]
rel. market turnover 0.286*** 0.291*** 0.286*** 0.299*** 0.353*** 0.338*** 0.319*** 0.290***
[0.069] [0.063] [0.068] [0.067] [0.068] [0.070] [0.055] [0.063]
rel. transaction cost -0.055*** -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.050***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007]
rel. inv. protection 0.024 0.006 -0.001 0.009 0.043 -0.002 0.009
[0.045] [0.047] [0.045] [0.042] [0.031] [0.050] [0.045]
rel. dist. (geo. distance) 0.036***
[0.009]
rel. dist. (language) 0.018***
[0.004]
rel. dist. (colony) 0.026***
[0.003]
rel. dist. (legal origin) 0.013***
[0.004]
rel. dist. (bi-trade) 0.154***
[0.020]
rel. dist. (exchange rules) 0.028***
[0.007]
rel. dist. (inv. protection) 0.001**
[0.001]
rel. dist. (acct. stds.) 0.002***
[0.000]
Constant -5.617*** -4.627*** -4.660*** -4.741*** -6.735*** -4.669*** -4.808*** -4.685***
[0.357] [0.713] [0.773] [0.728] [0.581] [0.787] [0.738] [0.760]
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9362 9362 9362 9362 8651 9081 9362 9362
R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.6 0.61
Standard errors robust to clusterings by firm and by year.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Familiarity bias regression results
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Table 1.8: Ambiguity aversion 
Table 1.8 reports the regression estimations for the ambiguity aversion hypothesis. The regressions are estimated using pooled 
OLS method. The dependent variable in the regressions is the logistic transformation of weekly target market share of trading 
averaged over 1 year. The target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on the target market (in 
US dollars) to the total dollar amount traded (in US dollars). For each firm, the total dollar amount traded is the sum of the dollar 
amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market. Models (1) through (3) include three 
market rule measures: exchange trading rules, investor protection law, and accounting standards, respectively. Using each of 
three market rule measures, target markets are lumped into two groups: the markets with detailed market rules and the markets 
with ambiguous rules. The target market dummy variables (tm low (exchange rules), tm low (investor protection), and tm low 
(accounting standards)) are as defined in Section 1.3.4. The variable description of relative distance measures is in Section 1.3.2 
and Section 1.3.3. The interaction term (exchange rules) is the interaction term between tm low (exchange rules) and relative 
distance (exchange rules). The interaction term (investor protection) is the interaction term between tm low (investor protection) 
and relative distance (investor protection). The interaction term (accounting standards) is the interaction term between tm low 
(accounting standards) and relative distance (accounting standards). The target market dummies and the interaction terms are 
the key variables. Model (4), (5), and (6) include relative distance (bilateral trade) as an additional control. All regressions 
include known market- and firm-specific factors from model (2) in Table 1.6, but the coefficient estimates for known factors are 
not shown in Table 1.8 to conserve space. The standard errors are robust to clustering by firm and by year. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rel. dist. (bi-trade) 0.187*** 0.166*** 0.142***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.019]
rel. dist. (exchange rules) 0.052*** 0.077***
[0.011] [0.009]
tm low (exchange rules) -1.511*** -1.451***
[0.387] [0.364]
interact term. (exchange rules) -0.045*** -0.054***
[0.010] [0.009]
rel. dist. (inv. protection) 0.008*** 0.009***
[0.001] [0.001]
tm low (inv. protection) -0.930** -0.421
[0.391] [0.384]
interact. term (inv. protection) -0.009*** -0.009***
[0.001] [0.001]
rel. dist. (acct. stds.) 0.005*** 0.006***
[0.001] [0.001]
tm low (acct. stds.) -1.326*** -1.925***
[0.317] [0.441]
interact. term (acct. stds.) -0.004*** -0.005***
[0.001] [0.001]
Constant -4.161*** -4.137*** -3.442*** -6.442*** -6.565*** -5.125***
[0.650] [0.921] [0.742] [0.521] [0.752] [0.746]
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9081 9362 9362 8374 8651 8651
R-squared 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.65
Ambiguity aversion regression results
Standard errors robust to clusterings by firm and by year.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.9: MiFID event study 
This table reports the regression results for MiFID (the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments) event study. Only the 
observations between 2004 and 2011 are used for all regression in Table 1.9. The regressions are estimated using pooled OLS 
method. Model (1), (3), (5), and (7) include year-fixed effects. Model (2), (4), (6), and (8) include both year- and target market-
fixed effects. The dependent variable in the regressions is the logistic transformation of weekly target market share of trading 
averaged over 1 year. The target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on the target market (in 
US dollars) to the total dollar amount traded (in US dollars). For each firm, the total dollar amount traded is the sum of the dollar 
amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market. The year 2008~2011 dummy takes the 
value 1 for years, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011, and 0 otherwise: the year 2008~2011 dummy takes the value 1 for the period after 
the implementation of MiFID. The tm & hm MiFID indicator variable takes the value 1 if both the target and the home market of 
the security are MiFID exchanges, and 0 otherwise. If the target market is a MiFID exchange and the home market is not, then 
the tm MiFID & hm not takes the value 1, and 0 otherwise. The tm not & hm MiFID takes the value 1 if the home market is a 
MiFID exchange and the target is not, and 0 otherwise. The tm not & hm not takes the value 1 if both the target and the home 
market are non-MiFID exchanges, and 0 otherwise. The interaction term (tm & hm MiFID) is the interaction term between tm & 
hm MiFID and year 2008~2011 dummy. The rest of the interaction terms are defined similarly. All regressions include known 
market- and firm-specific factors from model (2) in Table 1.6, but the coefficient estimates for known factors are not shown in 
Table 1.9 to conserve space. The standard errors are robust to clustering by firm and by year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MiFID event study 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tm & hm MiFID -3.652*** -3.380***
[0.200] [0.436]
interact. term (tm & hm MiFID) 1.185*** 1.527***
[0.238] [0.268]
tm MiFID & hm not -0.652** 2.571***
[0.298] [0.635]
interact. term (tm MiFID & hm not) 0.14 0.969**
[0.319] [0.409]
tm not & hm MiFID 1.170*** 0.281
[0.319] [0.336]
interact. term (tm not & hm MiFID) -0.748*** -0.792***
[0.214] [0.192]
tm not & hm not 2.323*** 0.969***
[0.226] [0.325]
interact. term (tm not & hm not) -1.494*** -1.702***
[0.217] [0.159]
Constant 0.562 0.313 -5.475*** 0.299 -4.691*** -3.257*** -5.947*** -3.354***
[0.577] [0.766] [0.857] [0.832] [0.883] [0.560] [0.672] [0.667]
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target fixed-effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 7933 7933 7933 7933 7933 7933 7933 7933
R-squared 0.65 0.7 0.6 0.69 0.6 0.68 0.63 0.68
Standard errors robust to clusterings by firm and by year.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.10: MiFID event study continued 
This table reports the regression results for MiFID (the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments) event study. A sample of 
securities with both non-MiFID home and target markets from 2004 to 2011 is used for all regression analyses in Table 1.10. The 
regressions are estimated using pooled OLS method. Model (1) includes year-fixed effects. Model (2) includes both year- and 
home market-fixed effects. The dependent variable in the regressions is the logistic transformation of weekly target market share 
of trading averaged over 1 year. The target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on the target 
market (in US dollars) to the total dollar amount traded (in US dollars). For each firm, the total dollar amount traded is the sum of 
the dollar amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market. The year 2008~2011 dummy 
takes the value 1 for years, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011, and 0 otherwise: the year 2008~2011 dummy takes the value 1 for the 
period after the implementation of MiFID. The dummy variable, tm low (non-MiFID tm), is defined exactly the same as tm low 
(exchange rules) in Section III. The indicator variable MiFID ownership equals 1 if the stock has greater than the median MiFID 
institutional ownership of 3.6%, and 0 otherwise. The three-way interaction term among tm low (non-MiFID tm), MiFID 
ownership, and year 2008~2011 is denoted as interaction term (tm low & MiFID ownership & year 2008~2011). The interaction 
term interaction term (tm low & MiFID ownership & year 2008~2011) is the key variable of interest. All regressions include 
known market- and firm-specific factors from model (2) in Table 1.6, but the coefficient estimates for known factors are not 
shown in Table 1.10 to conserve space. The standard errors are robust to clustering by firm and by year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MiFID event study 2
(1) (2)
[0.037] [0.208]
year 2008~2011 -0.922*** -0.168
[0.292] [0.289]
MiFID ownership -0.059 -0.024
[0.132] [0.124]
tm low (non-MiFID tm) -3.195*** -2.830***
[0.674] [1.082]
interact. term (tm low & year 2008~2011) 4.793*** 2.887**
[0.797] [1.190]
interact. term (MiFID ownership & year 2008~2011) 0.572*** 0.484***
[0.187] [0.163]
interact. term (tm low & MiFID ownership) -0.25 0.96
[0.664] [1.135]
interact. term (tm low & MiFID ownership & year 2008~2011) -1.563** -2.114*
[0.758] [1.143]
Constant 0.891 0.715
[0.544] [1.916]
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes
Home fixed-effect No Yes
Observations 2820 2820
R-squared 0.66 0.72
Standard errors robust to clusterings by firm and by year.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.11: 
This table tabulates correlation coefficient of all variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
target market rel. home mrkt. rel. rel. rel.
share of trading bkl size foreign sales industry cap. analyst volatility geo. distance inv. protectiom transaction cost market turnover
target share of trading 1
bkl 0.17 1
size -0.16 -0.03 1
foreign sales 0.06 0.06 0.05 1
relative industry cap. 0.45 0.11 -0.23 0.10 1
home mrkt analyst -0.30 -0.01 0.36 0.17 -0.12 1
volatility 0.22 0.04 -0.19 0.02 0.09 -0.20 1
geo. distance -0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.15 -0.06 -0.16 0.02 1
rel. inv. protectiom 0.29 0.03 -0.19 0.03 0.61 0.05 0.04 -0.09 1
rel. transaction cost -0.42 -0.07 0.10 -0.07 -0.48 0.22 -0.15 0.00 -0.12 1
rel. market turnover 0.50 0.06 -0.23 0.01 0.63 -0.11 0.10 -0.04 0.72 -0.34 1
rel. dist. (bilateral trade) 0.21 0.04 -0.11 0.01 0.29 -0.12 0.01 -0.26 0.03 -0.11 0.26
rel. dist. (geo. distance) 0.34 0.07 -0.18 0.05 0.63 -0.09 0.10 -0.15 0.64 -0.26 0.61
rel. dist. (language) 0.30 0.07 -0.16 0.00 0.39 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.59 -0.10 0.51
rel. dist. (colony) 0.40 0.08 -0.19 0.08 0.71 -0.08 0.13 -0.05 0.68 -0.33 0.64
rel. dist. (legal origin) 0.29 0.05 -0.20 0.00 0.47 -0.06 0.10 -0.07 0.72 -0.07 0.60
rel. dist. (exchange rules) 0.37 0.07 -0.20 0.07 0.64 -0.08 0.13 -0.10 0.70 -0.27 0.62
rel. dist. (inv. protection) 0.35 0.06 -0.17 0.04 0.56 -0.06 0.10 -0.10 0.77 -0.16 0.64
rel. dist. (acct. standards) 0.34 0.07 -0.19 0.01 0.55 -0.10 0.10 -0.01 0.54 -0.43 0.57
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Table 1.11: continued 
This table tabulates correlation coefficient of all variables. 
 
 
rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist. rel. dist.
(bilateral trade) (geo. distance) (language) (colony) (legal origin) (exchange rules) (inv. protection) (acct. standards)
rel. dist. (bilateral trade) 1
rel. dist. (geo. distance) 0.13 1
rel. dist. (language) 0.06 0.57 1
rel. dist. (colony) 0.01 0.88 0.58 1
rel. dist. (legal origin) 0.12 0.67 0.79 0.70 1
rel. dist. (exchange rules) 0.03 0.89 0.74 0.93 0.78 1
rel. dist. (inv. protection) 0.12 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.92 0.86 1
rel. dist. (acct. standards) 0.07 0.66 0.62 0.72 0.55 0.77 0.63 1
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CHAPTER 2 
WHERE IS THE MARKET?: 
AFTERMATH OF MORRISON vs. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
On June 24, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued a ruling that is of great consequence 
to global investors. The Morrison vs. National Australia Bank Ltd. (Morrison hereafter) involved 
a large Australian bank with common shares trading in Australia and in several other countries 
and ADR trading in the US market. The fraud took place in a wholly-owned Florida subsidiary. 
The United States District Court of Appeals dismissed the fraud claim by a class made up solely 
of foreign investors who purchased common stocks in Australia. But, more importantly, the 
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that civil liability for securities fraud applies (Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5) only to securities listed in the US 
markets and to securities transactions taken place in the US; the oral argument before the 
Supreme Court occurred on March 29, 2010, and the Supreme Court’s decision was announced 
to the public on June 24, 2010.14 The Supreme Court’s decision on the Morrison clearly 
communicates that the protection of the US securities laws does not cover the transactions of 
stocks that are listed in non-US exchanges. As a result of this decision, non-US firms with cross-
listings on US markets were suddenly shielded from civil liability claims by the US investors 
who purchased their shares in the counterpart home markets. Furthermore, investors who 
purchased shares of US companies in non-US markets can no longer be protected by fraud-
                                                          
14 See Robert Morrison et al., Petitioners, v. National Australia Bank Ltd., et al., the Supreme Court of the 
United States, No. 08-1191, decided June 24, 2010. Associate Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the 
opinion of the Court. 
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related provisions of US securities laws. Such a massive abrupt change in the securities fraud law 
is nearly unprecedented.  
 
Many firms around the world choose to cross-list their shares globally. Managers at corporations, 
investors, and academics have studied and weighed various sources of cross-listing benefits 
[Karolyi (2006); Gagnon and Karolyi (2012)]. According to Mittoo (1992), Fanto and Karmel 
(1997), and Bancel and Mittoo (2001), both investors and corporate managers often quoted 
enhanced trading environment as one of the primary motivations and benefits for listing shares 
on overseas markets. Empirical evidence suggests that there is dramatic increase in trading 
volume and turnover rates both at the home and at the US market around the US listing of 
foreign shares [Smith and Sofianos (1997); Foerster and Karolyi (1998); Halling, Pagano, Randl, 
and Zechner (2008)]. An important issue is whether trading activity of cross-listed shares on the 
overseas markets persists after the cross-listing and what determines where stock trading is likely 
to take place between the home market and the new “host” (or target) market. These issues are 
relevant to all corporate managers who already listed their shares and are looking to cross-list on 
foreign markets, to stock exchanges, which compete with one another for order flow among 
existing listings and for new listings, and to broker dealers who have commercial interests in 
facilitating trades of existing and newly listed shares. 
 
The Morrison ruling has important implications to multimarket trading dynamics and liquidity of 
cross-listed securities and global market participants. The key question is whether or not 
investors would purchase foreign securities more through foreign direct listing and the ADR 
markets in the US for the protection of the US security laws. Would investors eliminate or 
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reduce their holdings of securities listed in the home market (outside of the US) and re-purchase 
substitute securities in the ADR markets for the US legal protection? As a result of investor 
reactions to the Morrison decision, would location of stock trading for US cross-listed firms 
influenced?  
 
In this paper, we examine whether and how the trading volume distribution of US cross-listed 
securities has changed around the Morrison ruling. Additionally, we investigate whether 
multimarket trading dynamics of cross-listed securities (on non-US “host” markets) of US firms 
have materially changed around the Morrison decision.  Lastly, for US cross-listings, we study 
whether the US share of trading volume were differentially affected depending on the degree of 
investor protection in the firm’s country of domicile (home country) as a result of the US 
Supreme Court’s decision on the Morrison case. 
 
Using a sample of 641 securities cross-listed on US and non-US target markets, we document 
that for US cross-listed foreign firms, the US market share of trading volume has increased by 
28% after the Morrison decision. Furthermore, among the US cross-listed firms, the US share of 
trading volume is higher by additional 12% for firms with the home markets that feature poor 
investor protection laws after the Morrison ruling. However, unlike cross-listed securities on US 
markets, the multimarket trading dynamics of cross-listed stocks on non-US target markets for 
US firms are largely unaffected by the Morrison ruling. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to examine whether and how the trading 
volume distribution and liquidity of US cross-listed shares are impacted by the Morrison ruling. 
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There are other papers that investigate the impact of the Morrison decision. One paper that 
studies the ramifications of the Morrison is Licht, Li, and Siegel (2011). Licht, Li, and Siegel 
(2011) test the legal boding hypothesis by analyzing markets’ reactions to a sudden change in the 
law governing US-listed foreign firms. They examine abnormal returns of foreign cross-listed 
stocks around two distinct announcements by the Supreme Court of the United States regarding 
the Morrison. They find that US-listed foreign shares in both home and US markets experience 
positive abnormal returns around the announcements related to the Morrison; these abnormal 
returns are higher the greater the percentage of firm’s capital listed on non-US exchanges but are 
unrelated to the corporate governance and legal environment in foreign issuers’ home country. 
They interpret their results to be a challenge to the legal bonding hypothesis, and they conclude 
that the US civil liability regime as currently designed may not have been viewed as a source of 
economic value for outside investors.  
 
On the other hand, Gagnon and Karolyi (2012) shows that the price deviations between the 
cross-listed and underlying home-market shares widened more dramatically for those companies 
with a lower presence in the U.S. as measured by the fraction of global trading that takes place in 
U.S. markets. Consequently, Gagnon and Karolyi (2012) concludes that the market’s revaluation 
of the cross-listed shares around the decision is consistent with the idea of legal bonding 
hypothesis. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses sampling process and 
describes the sample. Section 2.3 discusses variable construction. Section 2.4 reports the 
summary statistics. Section 2.5 reports the empirical results. Section 2.6 concludes. 
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2.2 Sample construction & description 
In this section, we discuss our sample construction process and describe our sample. Our goal is 
to analyze the effects of the Morrison decision on the multimarket trading dynamics of US cross-
listed securities. We draw our US sample from cross-listings on the New York Stock Exchange 
and the NASDAQ. The New York Stock Exchange sample includes listings on AMEX. We 
ignore cross-listed securities traded on US OTC markets. Furthermore, the World Federation of 
Exchanges provides statistics on the number of foreign listings for stock exchanges around the 
world. In selecting non-US target (or “host”) markets, we pick out stock exchanges that list 
larger number of foreign securities for each of the four regions, Africa, Americas, Asia, and 
Europe. This process results in 17 target stock exchanges from 2009 to 2011. These 17 target 
markets include Johannesburg (Africa), Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Tokyo 
(Asia), Lima, Toronto (Americas), Euronext Amsterdam, Euronext Brussels, Euronext Lisbon, 
Euronext Paris, Frankfurt, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, and Swiss (Europe). We only consider 
exchange listed securities. The London Stock Exchange listings include foreign listings on 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) but not SEAQ International as securities traded on SEAQ 
are not exchange listed securities. The Singapore Stock Exchange data includes listings on 
SESDAQ. The listings on the TSX Venture are a part of the Toronto market sample. Our 
Euronext samples include listings on Alternext markets. For the Frankfurt sample, we only 
consider foreign securities listed under prime standard, general standard, and entry standard. We 
ignore all foreign listings on OTC markets.  
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We use Datastream stock universe to construct the sample of cross-listed securities. We exclude 
all securities of special types, such as preferred shares, royalty trusts, and investment funds. We 
also drop all company stocks domiciled in tax havens. We then identify foreign securities based 
on the country of incorporation. To seek out cross-listings, we manually match securities listed 
on target markets with the home market securities using company name, security name, and ISIN 
codes. The cross-listed securities sample is further restricted by the availability of weekly price 
and trading volume data from Datastream. We limit our sample period to be between July 1, 
2009 and March 31, 2011 (three quarters before and after the Morrison decision). Lastly, we 
exclude all cross-listed securities that are newly listed during the period between July 1, 2008 
and March 31, 2011 as Halling et al. (2008) documents that the target market share of trading 
volume is much higher during the cross-listing year than the subsequent period. We also drop all 
delisted cross-listings during our sample period. After applying our exclusion criteria, our US 
sample (treated group) consists of 426 cross-listings. For our sample of cross-listed stocks on 
non-US target markets (control group), we are left with the final sample of 513 cross-listings on 
17 non-US target markets. 
 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of cross-border listings across 19 target exchanges (2 US and 17 
non-US target markets) grouped by home region and home country’s degree of economic 
development (developed vs. emerging). We use the list of developed and emerging countries 
from International Financial Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group. The New Stock 
Exchange hosts 329 cross-listed securities, and the NASDAQ lists 97 cross-listings. Among 17 
non-US target markets, the London Stock Exchange hosts the largest number of cross-listings, 
163. The Euronext Lisbon and the Taiwan stock Exchange are the smallest host market with only 
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2 cross-listings, respectively. Most target markets draw a larger number of cross-listings from 
countries geographically close. This is consistent with the findings of Sarkissian and Schill 
(2004). Sarkissian and Schill (2004) finds that geographical proximity plays an important role in 
the choice of overseas listing venues. Furthermore, approximately 74% (695 out of 939) of cross-
listings come from companies domiciled in developed countries. We note that firms domiciled in 
developed Americas are over-represented in our US sample compared to the non-US sample 
(38% versus 28%).  Firms from developed Europe are under-represented in the US sample (23% 
versus 35%). The majority of cross-border listings from the developing world originates from 
companies domiciled in emerging Americas and emerging Asia. Companies from emerging 
Americas mainly cross-list their shares on the New York Stock Exchange. Firms domiciled in 
emerging Americas are over-represented in our US sample compared to the sample cross-listings 
on non-US target markets (17% versus 0.4%). Table 2.2 presents the distribution of cross-listed 
securities across 19 target exchanges (2 US and 17 non-US target markets) grouped by 10 
industries. We use the Level 3 Datastream industry classification (10 industry groups). 
 
2.3 Variable construction 
In this section, we describe the construction of dependent variable, target market share of 
trading. Known firm (bkl information factor, size, relative industry capitalization, home market 
analyst, volatility) and market level control variables (geographical distance, relative investor 
protection, relative transaction cost, relative market turnover) are based on the theories of 
Pagano (1989), Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), Admati and Pfleifer (1988), and Baruch et al. 
(2007). We also include several known firm and market level explanatory variables from an 
empirical paper on multimarket trading, Halling et al. (2008).  
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2.3.1 target market share of trading 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how the trading volume distribution of 
cross-listed securities is influenced by an abrupt change in the US investor protection laws. We 
measure the intensity of trading activity in terms of the dollar value of transaction amount (the 
number of shares traded times the closing price).15 For each cross-listed security of firm i traded 
on target market j, we define target market share of trading as the ratio of dollar amount traded 
on target market j (in US dollars) to the total dollar amount traded (in US dollars). The total 
dollar amount traded is the sum of the dollar amount traded on all target markets and the dollar 
amount traded on the home market for firm i.  
 
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗
= 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑗  × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑗
∑ [𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑙  × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑙] +  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒ℎ𝑚 × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑙    [1] 
 
where tmj denotes target market j, and hm indicates home market. Using data from Datastream, 
we compute the target market share of trading at weekly frequency, and these ratios are 
averaged over each quarter during the sample period. We then take the natural log of these 
annually averaged ratios. Our measure of trading volume share improves upon those of Baruch et 
al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008). Both Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008) only 
include the trading volume of US markets and that of home market. They ignore trading 
activities in other target markets (non-US host markets).  
                                                          
15 This definition resolves any complications arising from ADR and GDR bundling ratios in measuring 
trading volume as the price of ADR and GDR account for bundling ratios. 
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2.3.2 Known firm-specific factors 
bkl factor 
Baruch et al. (2007) develops a multimarket trading model (the BKL model hereafter) to explain 
cross-sectional variations in the foreign share of trading activity of cross-listed stocks. 
Empirically, the bkl information factor represents the incremental contribution of target market 
returns in explaining the firm’s stock returns over and above the portion captured by the firm’s 
home market returns. I adjust bkl factor estimation to account for the cases where a firm’s stock 
is cross-listed on multiple target markets. For securities with cross-border listings on multiple 
host markets, the bkl factor measures the incremental contribution of host market returns in 
explaining the firm’s stock return variations in addition to the firm’s stock return information 
contained in the firm’s home and other host market returns. To compute bkl measures, for each 
cross-listed security of firm i traded on target market j, I estimate the following two time-series 
regressions: 
 
[Restricted model (R)]:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + � 𝛽𝑖,ℎ𝑚,𝑡+𝑘𝑅ℎ𝑚,𝑡+𝑘 + � � 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑚~𝑗,𝑡+𝑘𝑅𝑡𝑚~𝑗,𝑡+𝑘+1
𝑘=−1~𝑗  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡+1𝑘=−1       [2] 
 
and 
[Unrestricted model (UR)]: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + � 𝛽𝑖,ℎ𝑚,𝑡+𝑘𝑅ℎ𝑚,𝑡+𝑘 + � � 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑚~𝑗,𝑡+𝑘𝑅𝑡𝑚~𝑗,𝑡+𝑘+1
𝑘=−1~𝑗  + � 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑚𝑗,𝑡+𝑘𝑅𝑡𝑚𝑗,𝑡+𝑘+1𝑘=−1  +  +1𝑘=−1 𝜀𝑖𝑡        [3] 
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where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the total return (measured in US dollars) of firm i in period t, 𝑅ℎ𝑚,𝑡+𝑘 is the total 
return (measured in US dollars) on the market index in the firm i’s home country in period t+k, 
𝑅𝑡𝑚𝑗,𝑡+𝑘 is the total market index return (measured in US dollars) of target market j in period t+k, 
and  𝑅𝑡𝑚~𝑗,𝑡+𝑘 is the total market index return (measured in US dollars) on other target markets 
(other than target market j) with firm i’s cross-listings in period t+k. The lead and lag terms are 
included in the above time-series regressions to account for nonsynchronous trading across 
markets located in different time zones. The bkl measure is an F-statistic that quantifies the 
explanatory power of the unrestricted model (UR) relative to that of the restricted model (R). The 
bkl factor is defined as: 
 
𝑏𝑘𝑙 =  (𝑅𝑈𝑅2 − 𝑅𝑅2)/3(1 − 𝑅𝑈𝑅2 )/(𝑛 − 𝑝 + 1)                     [4] 
 
where n is the number of observations, and p is the number of parameters to be estimated in the 
unrestricted model (UR). The bkl factor is computed using weekly total return series from 
Datastream. We use the total return series of Datastream country index for home and target 
market returns. For each sample quarter and for each security with up to 2 secondary listings, we 
require at least 120 weeks of past total return data in computing bkl. To obtain reasonably precise 
estimates of the bkl factor for cross-listed shares with 3 to 4 secondary listings, we require a 
minimum of 160 weekly past total return data. The BKL model predicts that the higher the return 
correlation of the cross-listed security with other securities listed on the target market, the larger 
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the target market share of trading volume. We expect the bkl factor to be positively associated 
with the target market share of trading. 
 
2.3.2 Known firm-specific factors (cont’d) 
{size, relative industry capitalization, home market analyst, volatility, institutional ownership} 
Firm level information environment is likely to influence the trading volume distribution of 
cross-listed shares. Firm size may proxy for the visibility of the firm to target market investors. 
Larger market capitalization may indicate that the firm is better known to the investors in the 
target market. We control for firm size using the natural logarithm of the stock’s quarterly 
average market capitalization in US dollars from Datastream. As another proxy for the firm 
visibility to the target market investors, we include the difference between the percentage of 
global industry market capitalization for the firm’s industry in the target market and the 
percentage of global industry market capitalization for the firm’s industry in the home market 
(relative industry capitalization) [Baruch et al. (2007)]. The relative industry capitalization 
variable is constructed using the Level 3 Datastream industry indices data (10 industry groups). 
We expect the proxies for firm visibility to be positively related to the target market share of 
trading.16 
 
Furthermore, higher analyst coverage in the home market may lower information acquisition cost 
for foreign investors trading in the home market [Baruch et al. (2007)]. This reasoning predicts a 
negative association between the home market analyst coverage and the trading volume share of 
                                                          
16 There is little empirical support for the aforementioned hypothesis. In fact, both Baruch et al. (2007) 
and Halling et al. (2008) find that firm size is negatively related to the trading activity in target market. 
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target market.17 Following Baruch et al. (2007), I measure the extent of home market analyst 
coverage using the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 1-year-ahead earnings-per-share 
(EPS) estimates for the home market security. Analyst EPS estimates are from the International 
Summary data of I/B/E/S, and I use the quarter-end values. 
 
Halling et al. (2008) shows that the sensitivity to private information affects the distribution of 
target market share of trading activity. If private information originates in the target market, then 
investors in the target market may have informational advantage, leading to larger share of 
trading in the target market. It is shown that firms with higher return volatility are more sensitive 
to private information. Halling et al. (2008) find a positive association between return volatility 
and the target market trading share. We estimate the return volatility as the quarterly standard 
deviation of weekly home market security returns using data from Datastream. 
 
Lastly, we control for institutional ownership as global institutional investors’ selection of 
trading venues in trading cross-listed securities may influence the target market share of trading 
volume. It would be ideal to have global institutional investor trading record at the transaction 
level. However, transaction level datasets are often proprietary in nature. We instead use FactSet 
Global Institutional Ownership database.18 One notable advantage of using FactSet Global 
Institutional Ownership database is that FactSet Global Institutional Ownership database has a 
comprehensive coverage of global institutional ownership around the world unlike Thomson 
                                                          
17 The extent of analyst coverage in the home market may also proxy for the amount of information 
available to the general public. This interpretation makes the relationship between the analyst coverage in 
the home market and the target market share of trading rather unclear. 
18 FactSet Global Institutional Ownership dataset is only used in a few studies: Bartram, Griffin, and Ng 
(2010) and the papers co-authored mainly by Ferreira and Matos. 
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Financial’s 13F database, which only includes US institutional ownership.19 For each firm i and 
each sample quarter t, we compute the institutional ownership as the percentage of the 
company’s total market capitalization (in US dollars) owned by institutions. 
 
2.3.3 Known market-specific factors 
{geographical distance, hm low investor protection, relative transaction cost, relative market 
turnover} 
Literature has shown that geographical proximity plays an important role in information flows 
[Prinsky and Wang (2006); Coval and Moskowitz (2001); Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999); 
Sarkissian and Schill (2004); Baruch et al. (2007); Halling et al. (2008)]. Baruch et al. (2007) and 
Halling et al. (2008) demonstrate that the closer the US markets to the home market of the firm, 
the higher the US share of trading activity. We measure geographical proximity in terms of 
geographical distance (in miles) between the target and the home market of the security. We 
expect a negative relation between the target market share of trading volume and the 
geographical distance. 
 
Halling et al. (2008) argue that investors would prefer to trade on the stock exchanges with 
stricter and better enforced rules against insider trading as better legal protection against insider 
trading reduces adverse selection costs for market participants. If this is the case, then we would 
expect to observe a larger target market share of trading for target markets with better investor 
protection. Furthermore, if the home market features poor investor protection, then foreign 
investors may divert their trading of cross-listed stocks away from the home market to a foreign 
                                                          
19 Bartram, Griffin, and Ng (2010) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) provide detailed discussions on the 
institutional investor coverage of the FactSet Global Institutional Ownership database. 
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target market. To measure investor protection of home markets, we create an indicator variable, 
hm low investor protection, that takes the value 1 if the investor protection index score of a home 
market is less than 4 (scale from 0 to 10, 10 being the highest score) and 0 otherwise. The values 
of the investor protection index are drawn from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006).      
 
Transaction costs and liquidity play an important role in the ability of markets to attract trading 
volume [Chowdhry and Nanda (1991); Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998)]. Those target 
markets with lower transaction costs would host a larger portion of trading activity. To account 
for this, we measure the relative transaction cost between the target and the home market using 
the institutional investors’ transaction costs data from Elkins McSherry. Elkins McSherry’s 
transaction costs consist of quarterly commission, fees, and market impact costs in basis points. 
We then subtract the quarterly transaction costs of trading in the home market from that of at the 
target market to generate the estimates for the relative transaction cost. We expect a negative 
relation between the relative transaction cost and the trading volume share of target market.  
 
Furthermore, we control for the difference in the level of overall market trading activity in 
regression analyses. We measure the level of overall market trading activity in terms of total 
turnover scaled (in US dollars) by total market capitalization (in US dollars). We take the 
quarterly average of the scaled weekly market turnover. The relative market turnover is defined 
as the difference in the quarterly average scaled turnover of the target and that of the home 
market of the cross-listed security. We use the Datastream country index data to compute the 
relative market turnover. 
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2.4 Summary statistics 
We present the trading volume distribution of cross-listed securities across 19 target markets (2 
US and 17 non-US host markets) in Table 2.3. The target market share of trading is the ratio of 
weekly dollar amount traded on target market (in US dollars) to the weekly total dollar amount 
traded (in US dollars) averaged over one quarter. The total dollar amount traded is the sum of the 
dollar amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market of 
the firm. Table 2.3 summarizes the average target market share of trading for each of the 19 
target markets around the Morrison ruling. We define “Morrison quarter” to be the second 
quarter of 2010 as the US Supreme Court ruled on the Morrison case on June 24, 2010. 
Furthermore, we define “before Morrison” period to be the three quarters preceding the 
“Morrison quarter” (the third quarter of 2009, the fourth quarter of 2009, and the first quarter of 
2010), and “after Morrison” period to be the three quarters following the “Morrison quarter” (the 
third quarter of 2010, the fourth quarter of 2010, and the first quarter of 2011). The average 
values are calculated first by averaging over time for each cross-listing and then by computing 
the average within each target market. The overall mean value for the target market share of 
trading is 31%. However, there are substantial variations in the target market share of trading 
across target bourses. Among the target exchanges that host larger number of cross-listings, US 
markets grab larger share of trading than the others. The London Stock Exchange, which hosts 
the largest number of cross-listings among the non-US target markets, attracts only 23% of 
global trading volume. In fact, most non-US target bourses host relatively small share of global 
trading volume. 
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Table 2.3 also reports the mean values of target market share of trading before, during, and after 
the “Morrison quarter” by target markets. For US markets, before the “Morrison quarter,” the 
average target market share of trading is 45%. During and also after the “Morrison quarter,” the 
average US market share of trading volume increases to 48%. The increase in the US share of 
trading volume is only about 7% comparing before and after the “Morrison quarter.” On the 
other hand, we observe that the average target market share of trading virtually unchanged 
around 19% before, during, and after the “Morrison quarter” for non-US target markets. Table 4 
Panel A and B tabulate the summary statistics of known control variables grouped by target 
markets. All mean values in Table 3 are calculated first by taking the time-series averages of the 
variables for each cross-listing and then by computing the average within each target market.    
 
2.5 Multivariate analyses 
In this section, we examine the impact of the Morrison ruling on the US share of trading volume 
for US cross-listed stocks through difference-in-differences regression analyses, while 
controlling for known determinants that explain the distribution of target market share of trading 
volume. The dependent variable in regressions is the logistic transformation of weekly target 
market share of trading averaged over one quarter (defined in [1], section III).20 The quarterly 
panel includes 4,485 observations (security-target market-quarter) for 641 cross-listed securities 
(338 cross-listings on US markets and 303 cross-listings on non-US target markets) ranging from 
the third quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2011 (three quarters before and after the Morrison 
                                                          
20 The target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on the target market 
(in US dollars) to the total dollar amount traded (in US dollars). For each firm, the total dollar amount 
traded is the sum of the dollar amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the 
home market. We compute the target market share of trading at weekly frequency, and these ratios are 
averaged over 1 quarter. We then take the natural log of these quarterly averaged ratios. 
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ruling). We do not allow securities to enter and exit the panel over time due to new listing or 
delisting. Following Baruch et al. (2007) and Halling et al. (2008), all explanatory variables are 
lagged by one quarter in regressions. We estimate pooled ordinary least squares (pooled OLS) 
regressions with robust standard errors. In all regression specifications, standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, we cluster standard errors by firm. This allows for potential 
correlation among observations of the same firm across different quarters. 
 
The difference-in-differences regression assesses the effect of the Morrison by using a control 
group to subtract other changes around the Morrison ruling, assuming these other changes were 
identical between the treatment group (cross-listings on US markets) and the control group 
(cross-listings on 17 non-US target markets). For our difference-in-differences regression 
analyses, we define the following indicator variables. The morrison indicator variable takes the 
value 1 for the second quarter of 2010 (in which the Supreme Court ruling on the Morrison case 
took place) and 0 otherwise. The after morrison dummy takes the value 1 for each quarter 
subsequent to the second quarter of 2010 (the third quarter of 2010, the fourth quarter of 2010, 
and the first quarter of 2011). Furthermore, we create an indicator variable for cross-listed stocks 
on US market, US target, which is 1 for US cross-listings and 0 otherwise. The US home dummy 
takes the value 1 for cross-listings with US home markets and 0 otherwise. Lastly, we interact 
both US target and US home with morrison and after morrison, respectively. 
 
2.5.1 Baseline results 
Table 2.5 reports the baseline regression estimation results. In Table 2.5, model (1), (2), (3), and 
(4) are estimated using the entire sample. Model (1) and (2) examine whether and how the US 
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share of trading volume for US cross-listed stocks has changed around the Morrison ruling. 
Model (1) and (2) differ only by the inclusion of quarter-fixed effects in model (2). The 
interaction variables, interaction term (morrison & US target) and interaction term (after 
morrison & US target), are the key variables. The estimation results in model (1) serves as our 
base case. 
 
In model (1), the coefficients on interaction term (morrison & US target) and interaction term 
(after morrison & US target) are both positive, and they are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The coefficient associated with interaction term (morrison & US target) is 0.326, and this 
states that during the quarter of the Morrison ruling, the US share of trading volume of cross-
listed stocks on US markets is larger by 38% (=exp(0.326)-1) compared to that of cross-listed 
stocks on non-US target markets. Furthermore, after the Morrison decision, the US share of 
trading volume for cross-listed stocks on US markets is higher by 28% (=exp(0.251)-1) 
compared to the trading volume share of cross-listed securities on non-US target markets. Model 
(2) includes quarter fixed-effects, and there is no material difference in the size of the 
coefficients in model (1) and (2).  
 
Model (3) and (4) examine whether multimarket trading dynamics of cross-listed securities of 
US firms have materially changed around the Morrison decision. We observe that the estimated 
coefficient of US home is negative, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient value, -2.312, on US home indicates that the target market share of trading volume for 
US firms is significantly smaller, by 90%. The coefficients for both interaction term (morrison & 
US home) and interaction term (after morrison & US home) are negative, but they are not 
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statistically significant. Unlike cross-listed securities on US markets, multimarket trading 
dynamics of cross-listed stocks for US firms on non-US target markets are largely unaffected by 
the Morrison ruling. 
 
The coefficient estimates of control variables in the base case specification are mostly consistent 
with our hypotheses. All coefficients of statistically significant independent variables have the 
expected signs. The estimated coefficient on bkl is positive indicating that the target market share 
of trading is larger if the target market contributes more to price discovery. A one standard 
deviation (3.36) increase in bkl results in a 21% (=exp(0.058*3.36)-1) increase in trading volume 
share of the target market. The estimated coefficient on relative market turnover is positive and 
significant indicating that the level of overall target market trading activity matters. A one 
standard deviation (2.72) increase in relative market turnover leads to a 190% 
(=exp(0.391*2.72)-1) increase in the target market share of trading. The indicator variable, hm 
low investor protection, is statistically insignificant in model (1). 
 
2.5.2 Results on U.S. cross-listings 
In this section, we report the estimation results on the sample of US cross-listed stocks. The 
regression estimates are reported in Table 2.6. To examine whether the impact of the Morrison 
ruling is different in magnitude for US cross-listed stocks with home markets that feature poor 
investor protection, we create interaction terms, interaction term (morrison & hm low investor 
protection) and interaction term (after morrison & hm low investor protection). The estimation 
results in models (5) through (8) are based on the sample of US cross-listed stocks. Model (6) 
and (8) include quarter fixed-effects. From model (5), we note that the coefficient of hm low 
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investor protection is positive, and it is statistically significant at the 1 % level. The coefficient of 
0.385 for hm low investor protection indicates that the US share of trading volume for firms with 
home markets that have poor investor protection is larger by 47% (=exp(0.385)-1). Furthermore, 
in model (7), the coefficient associated with interaction term (after morrison &hm low investor 
protection) is 0.117, statistically significant at the 5% level, which indicates that the US share of 
trading volume for firms with home markets that feature poor investor protection is larger by 
additional 12% (=exp(0.117)-1). 
 
We investigate whether our results on firms from home markets with poor investor protection is 
driven mainly by US cross-listed firms from emerging economies. We define an indicator 
variable, hm emerging market, which takes the value 1 when the home country of a US cross-
listed firm is classified as an emerging economy (under International Financial Corporation 
(IFC) of the World Bank Group classification) and 0 otherwise. We interact hm emerging market 
with indicators variables, morrison and after morrison. The estimation results are shown in Table 
2.6, model (9) and (10). Model (10) includes quarter fixed-effects. In model (9), the estimated 
coefficient on hm emerging market is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
estimated coefficient of 0.456 shows that the US share of trading volume for firms from 
emerging economies is higher by 57%. However, the coefficient of interaction term (after 
morrison & hm emerging market) is negative, -0.132, which translates to lower US share of 
trading volume of 12% after the Morrison ruling for firms domiciled in emerging countries. This 
implies that our results on firms from home markets with poor investor protection in model (7) 
and (8) are not driven by emerging market firms with US cross-listings. 
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In summary, our results indicate that for US cross-listed foreign firms, the US market share of 
trading volume has increased by 28% after the Morrison decision. Furthermore, among the US 
cross-listed firms, the US share of trading volume is higher by additional 12% for firms with the 
home markets that feature poor investor protection laws after the Morrison ruling. Lastly, the 
multimarket trading dynamics of US firms with cross-listing on non-US target markets is largely 
unaffected by the Morrison decision.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
We study the impact of abrupt change in the US investor protection laws on the location of stock 
trading for firms with US cross-listings. The US Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of Morrison 
vs. National Australia Bank in June 2010 communicates that civil liability for securities fraud 
applies only to securities listed on US markets and to security transactions taken place in the US. 
As a result of this decision, non-US firms with cross-listings on US markets were suddenly 
shielded from civil liability claims by the US investors who purchased their shares in the 
counterpart home markets. Furthermore, investors who purchased shares of US companies in 
non-US markets can no longer be protected by fraud-related provisions of US securities laws. 
 
Using a sample of 641 cross-listed stocks on US and non-US host markets around the world, we 
investigate whether and how the multimarket trading dynamics of US cross-listed stocks changed 
around the US Supreme Court’s ruling on the Morrison case. Our results indicate that for US 
cross-listed foreign firms, the US market share of trading volume has increased by 28% after the 
Morrison decision. Furthermore, among the US cross-listed firms, the US share of trading 
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volume is higher by additional 12% for firms with the home markets that feature poor investor 
protection laws after the Morrison ruling. 
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Table 2.1: 
This table reports the distribution of cross-border listings across 2 US and 17 non-US target (“host”) exchanges grouped by home market region and home country’s degree of 
economic development (developed vs. emerging). We use the list of developed and emerging countries from International Financial Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group. 
Each cell in the table represents the number of cross-listings. There are 939 cross-listed securities (secondary listings) during the period between the third quarter of 2009 and the 
first quarter of 2011.  
 
 
Developed Developed Developed Developed Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging
target market Americas Asia Europe Middle East Africa Americas Asia Europe Middle East total
NASDAQ 37 4 18 27 1 7 2 1 . 97
New York 127 11 79 3 5 67 34 2 1 329
US Total 164 15 97 30 6 74 36 3 1 426
Australia 10 17 7 . 1 . . . . 35
Hong Kong 3 1 2 . . . 58 . . 64
Singapore . 11 . . . . 4 . . 15
Taiwan . 1 . . 1 . . . . 2
Tokyo 6 . 1 . . . 2 . . 9
Lima 14 . 3 . . . . . . 17
Toronto 14 13 6 . 1 . . . . 34
Euronext Amsterdam 5 . 17 . . . . . . 22
Euronext Brussels 2 . 3 1 1 . . . . 7
Euronext Lisbon . . 2 . . . . . . 2
Euronext Paris 13 . 10 . 3 1 . . . 27
Europe Frankfurt 13 . 23 . . . . . . 36
& Africa London 38 16 70 . 6 . 10 21 2 163
Luxembourg . . 4 . . . 10 . . 14
Oslo 4 . 2 . . . . . . 6
Swiss 16 . 11 . . 1 . . . 28
Johannesburg 8 2 20 . 2 . . . . 32
Non-US Total 146 61 181 1 15 2 84 21 2 513
Number of cross-listed securities
home market region
Asia
Americas
US
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Table 2.2:  
Table 2.2 presents the distribution of cross-listed securities across 19 target exchanges (2 US and 17 non-US target markets) grouped by 10 industries during the period between 
the third quarter of 2009 and the first quarter of 2011. We use the Level 3 Datastream industry classification (10 industry groups). Each cell in the table represents the number of 
cross-listings. 
 
 
 
 
Basic Consumer Health Consumer
target market Oil & Gas Materials Industrials Goods Care Services Telecom Utilities Financials Technology total
NASDAQ 7 5 9 5 18 7 5 . 4 37 97
New York 38 93 25 29 12 21 34 14 48 15 329
US Total 45 98 34 34 30 28 39 14 52 52 426
Australia 4 11 3 1 5 6 2 . 3 . 35
Hong Kong 3 12 21 3 2 5 . 4 10 4 64
Singapore . 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 15
Taiwan . . . . 1 . . . . 1 2
Tokyo . 2 . . . . 1 1 5 . 9
Lima . 9 2 . . 1 1 . 3 1 17
Toronto 3 28 . 1 1 . . . . 1 34
Euronext Amsterdam 2 . 3 1 . . 3 1 5 7 22
Euronext Brussels 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . 1 . 7
Euronext Lisbon . . . . . . . . 2 . 2
Euronext Paris 1 6 4 6 2 2 1 . 3 2 27
Europe Frankfurt . 6 10 6 3 2 . 1 3 5 36
& Africa London 16 43 24 17 5 12 8 2 24 12 163
Luxembourg 1 3 2 2 1 . 1 . 2 2 14
Oslo 2 1 . . 1 2 . . . . 6
Swiss 2 6 5 5 5 . . 1 3 1 28
Johannesburg . 20 3 3 . . . 1 5 . 32
Non-US Total 35 149 81 47 28 32 18 12 73 38 513
Number of cross-listed securities
US
Asia
America
industry
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Table 2.3: 
This table summarizes the average target market share of trading across 2 US and 17 non-US target (“host”) exchanges around the Morrison ruling in June 2010. For each cross-
listed security of firm i traded on target market j, the target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on target market j (in US dollars) to the total 
dollar amount traded (in US dollars). The total dollar amount traded is the sum of the dollar amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market 
for firm i. The target market share of trading is computed at weekly frequency, and these ratios are averaged over 1 quarter. The average values are calculated first by averaging 
over time for each cross-listing and then by computing the average within each target market. We define “Morrison quarter” to be the second quarter of 2010 as the US Supreme 
Court ruled on the Morrison case on June 24, 2010. Furthermore, we define “before Morrison” period to be the three quarters preceding the “Morrison quarter” (the third quarter of 
2009, the fourth quarter of 2009, and the first quarter of 2010), and “after Morrison” period to be the three quarters following the “Morrison quarter” (the third quarter of 2010, the 
fourth quarter of 2010, and the first quarter of 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average target market share of trading
num. of before after
target market cross-listings average Morrison Morrison Morrison
NASDAQ 97 0.58 0.55 0.59 0.59
New York 329 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.43
US mean 426 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.48
Australia 35 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25
Hong Kong 64 0.31 0.30 0.34 0.31
Singapore 15 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10
Taiwan 2 0.64 0.52 0.64 0.75
Tokyo 9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lima 17 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.15
Toronto 34 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.15
Euronext Amsterdam 22 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Euronext Brussels 7 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.33
Euronext Lisbon 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Euronext Paris 27 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10
Europe Frankfurt 36 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05
& Africa London 163 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.24
Luxembourg 14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Oslo 6 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.51
Swiss 28 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Johannesburg 32 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23
non-US mean 513 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19
Overall 939 0.31
Asia
Americas
US
target market share of trading volume
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Table 2.4: Panel A 
This table reports the summary statistics. All mean values are calculated first by taking the time-series averages of the variables for each cross-listing and then by computing the 
average within each target (“host”) market. Panel A of Table 2.4 presents the mean values of firm-specific variables for each target market. The bkl factor is estimated using 
equations [2], [3], and [4] in Section 2.3.2. Firm size is the firm’s quarterly average market capitalization in billions of US dollars from Datastream. The relative industry 
capitalization is the difference between the percentage of global industry market capitalization for the firm’s industry in the target market and the percentage of global industry 
market capitalization for the firm’s industry in the home market. The relative industry capitalization variable is constructed using the Level 3 Datastream industry indices data (10 
industry groups). The home market analyst is the number of 1-year-ahead earnings-per-share (EPS) estimates for the home market security. Analyst EPS estimates are from the 
International Summary data of I/B/E/S, and the quarter-end values are used. The volatility is the quarterly standard deviation of weekly home market security returns using data 
from Datastream. For each firm i and each sample quarter t, we compute the institutional ownership as the percentage of the company’s total market capitalization (in US dollars) 
owned by institutions. We use FactSet Global Institutional Ownership database for the institutional ownership variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rel. home mrkt. instituional
target market bkl size industry cap. analyst volatility ownership
NASDAQ 3.5 4.1 0.45 6.0 6.6 33.1
New York 3.4 20.7 0.22 8.2 5.5 32.0
US mean 3.4 16.9 0.27 7.8 5.7 32.2
Australia 2.3 3.8 -0.07 5.5 6.5 20.1
Hong Kong 2.3 24.3 0.00 6.5 5.0 10.6
Singapore 2.3 1.3 -0.01 4.3 6.0 4.2
Taiwan 1.2 0.0 0.05 1.9 6.4 23.2
Tokyo 1.6 70.4 -0.09 9.7 5.2 46.3
Lima 3.2 42.1 -0.16 12.2 7.0 27.9
Toronto 3.4 0.7 -0.06 3.1 9.2 22.2
Euronext Amsterdam 3.7 59.1 -0.13 16.5 5.4 22.2
Euronext Brussels 2.8 52.2 -0.10 8.5 4.1 20.2
Euronext Lisbon 1.9 59.6 -0.03 18.1 6.2 10.9
Euronext Paris 2.5 47.0 -0.14 9.1 4.4 39.6
Europe Frankfurt 3.6 9.6 -0.10 8.0 5.9 26.2
& Africa London 2.4 17.7 0.01 6.9 6.9 16.8
Luxembourg 1.8 27.6 -0.03 12.4 5.1 11.5
Oslo 2.4 1.5 -0.13 6.1 10.8 22.4
Swiss 3.2 44.2 -0.20 13.0 4.7 50.0
Johannesburg 3.5 9.3 -0.07 6.0 7.7 19.6
non-US mean 2.7 22.0 -0.05 7.8 6.3 21.3
Overall 3.0 19.7 0.10 7.8 6.1 26.4
firm-specific factors
US
Asia
Americas
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Table 2.4: Panel B 
Panel B of Table 2.4 presents the mean values of market-specific variables for each target market. All mean values are calculated first by taking the time-series averages of the 
variables for each cross-listing and then by computing the average within each target (“host”) market. The geographical distance (in miles) is the distance between the target and 
the home market of the security. The home market investor protection is the investor protection index score of the counterpart home market. The values of the investor protection 
index are drawn from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). The relative transaction cost is constructed using the institutional investor transaction costs data from 
Elkins McSherry. We use the quarterly commission, fees, and market impact costs in basis points for each market in the sample. We then subtract the quarterly transaction costs of 
trading in the home market from that of at the target market to generate the estimates for the relative transaction cost. The relative market turnover is defined as the difference in 
the quarterly average scaled (scaled by total market capitalization) turnover of the target and that of the home market of the cross-listed security. Data for relative market turnover 
comes from Datastream. The details of variable construction are provided in Section 2.3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
geo. home market rel. rel.
target market distance inv. protection transaction cost market turnover
NASDAQ 3425 7.2 -14.0 3.64
New York 3344 6.8 -14.5 3.50
US mean 3362 6.9 -14.4 3.53
Australia 5947 7.7 -3.3 0.28
Hong Kong 1182 4.2 -18.7 -1.99
Singapore 2246 6.9 -4.6 -0.58
Taiwan 4599 8.0 12.2 0.72
Tokyo 5690 8.7 -6.0 -1.74
Lima 4164 9.3 35.7 -2.85
Toronto 4726 8.3 1.5 -1.66
Euronext Amsterdam 1186 5.5 -4.3 -0.03
Euronext Brussels 2213 7.4 -4.8 -0.52
Euronext Lisbon 313 6.0 -1.7 -1.16
Euronext Paris 2720 8.4 -8.2 -1.54
Europe Frankfurt 2052 5.8 -0.3 -2.65
& Africa London 3227 7.0 5.6 -0.38
Luxembourg 3372 5.9 -12.2 -0.85
Oslo 2622 8.6 -4.1 0.05
Swiss 2639 7.1 -0.7 -1.56
Johannesburg 6038 8.1 0.7 -0.14
non-US mean 3226 6.8 -0.8 -1.00
Overall 3288 6.9 -7.0 1.07
US
Asia
Americas
market-specific factors
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Table 2.5 
Table 2.5 reports the baseline regression results. The quarterly panel includes 4,485 observations (security-target market-quarter) 
for 641 cross-listed securities ranging from the third quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2011.The regressions are estimated 
using pooled OLS method. The dependent variable in the regressions is the logistic transformation of weekly target market share 
of trading averaged over 1 quarter. The target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on the target 
market (in US dollars) to the total dollar amount traded (in US dollars). For each firm, the total dollar amount traded is the sum of 
the dollar amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market. Model (1), (2), (3), and (4) are 
estimated using the entire sample. The morrison indicator variable takes the value 1 for the second quarter of 2010 (in which the 
Supreme Court ruling on the Morrison case took place) and 0 otherwise. The after morrison dummy takes the value 1 for each 
quarter subsequent to the second quarter of 2010 (the third quarter of 2010, the fourth quarter of 2010, and the first quarter of 
2011). Furthermore, we create an indicator variable for cross-listed stocks on US market, US target, which is 1 for US cross-
listings and 0 otherwise. The US home dummy takes the value 1 for cross-listings with US home markets and 0 otherwise. Lastly, 
we interact both US target and US home with morrison and after morrison, respectively. The independent variable description is 
provided in Section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. The standard errors are robust to clustering by firm. 
 
Baseline regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
bkl 0.058** 0.059** 0.056** 0.056**
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
rel. industry cap. 2.442*** 2.379*** 2.143*** 2.088***
[0.619] [0.617] [0.540] [0.541]
size -0.077 -0.067 -0.049 -0.043
[0.064] [0.064] [0.061] [0.061]
home market analyst -0.995*** -1.011*** -1.080*** -1.086***
[0.176] [0.176] [0.173] [0.173]
volatility -0.001 0.008 0.001 0.008
[0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016]
geo. distance -0.336*** -0.334*** -0.197*** -0.202***
[0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073]
rel. transaction cost -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.021***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
rel. mrkt. turnover 0.391*** 0.415*** 0.366*** 0.380***
[0.072] [0.073] [0.056] [0.057]
hm low inv. protection -0.297 -0.308 -0.308 -0.314
[0.295] [0.293] [0.290] [0.289]
institutional ownership -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.007** 0.006*
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
morrison -0.189** -0.256*** 0.053 -0.018
[0.085] [0.092] [0.047] [0.052]
after morrison -0.021 -0.009 0.156*** 0.167***
[0.079] [0.080] [0.045] [0.046]
US target 0.616 0.524
[0.417] [0.421]
int. (morrison & US target) 0.326*** 0.331***
[0.086] [0.086]
int. (after morrison & US target) 0.251*** 0.257***
[0.087] [0.087]
US home -2.312*** -2.216***
[0.586] [0.589]
int. (morrison & US home) -0.229 -0.227
[0.236] [0.236]
int. (after morrison & US home) -0.252 -0.255
[0.193] [0.191]
Constant 0.398 0.445 -0.459 -0.379
[0.666] [0.668] [0.654] [0.655]
Quarter Fixed-Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 4,485 4,485 4,485 4,485
Adj R-Squared 0.512 0.514 0.526 0.528
Standard errors robust to clustering by firm; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
89 
 
Table 2.6 
Table 2.6 reports the regression estimations for the familiarity bias hypothesis. The regressions are estimated using pooled OLS 
method. The dependent variable in the regressions is the logistic transformation of weekly target market share of trading 
averaged over 1 quarter. The target market share of trading is defined as the ratio of dollar amount traded on the target market (in 
US dollars) to the total dollar amount traded (in US dollars). For each firm, the total dollar amount traded is the sum of the dollar 
amount traded on all target markets and the dollar amount traded on the home market. The estimation results in models (5) 
through (10) are obtained by using the sample of US cross-listings. The indicator variable, hm low investor protection, that takes 
the value 1 if the investor protection index score of a home market is less than 4 (scale from 0 to 10, 10 being the highest score) 
and 0 otherwise. The values of the investor protection index are drawn from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). The 
indicator variable, hm emerging market, which takes the value 1 when the home country of a US cross-listed firm is classified as 
an emerging economy (under International Financial Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group classification) and 0 otherwise. 
The standard errors are robust to clustering by firm. 
 
 
Regression results on US cross-listings
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
bkl 0.028*** 0.025** 0.028*** 0.025** 0.022** 0.019**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
rel. industry cap. 0.299 0.336 0.298 0.335 0.348 0.377
[0.292] [0.284] [0.292] [0.284] [0.291] [0.283]
size -0.017 0.012 -0.017 0.011 -0.013 0.014
[0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035]
home market analyst -0.319*** -0.309*** -0.319*** -0.309*** -0.250*** -0.243***
[0.090] [0.087] [0.090] [0.087] [0.096] [0.093]
volatility 0.013 0.035** 0.013 0.034** 0.015 0.037***
[0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013]
geo. distance -0.144** -0.152** -0.143** -0.152** -0.178*** -0.187***
[0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.068] [0.067]
rel. transaction cost -0.014*** -0.012** -0.014*** -0.012** -0.007* -0.007
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
rel. mrkt. turnover 0.289*** 0.497*** 0.290*** 0.498*** 0.328*** 0.534***
[0.050] [0.068] [0.050] [0.069] [0.050] [0.069]
institutional ownership 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
morrison 0.222*** 0.163*** 0.207*** 0.144*** 0.265*** 0.212***
[0.031] [0.033] [0.035] [0.037] [0.038] [0.038]
after morrison 0.244*** 0.308*** 0.226*** 0.287*** 0.279*** 0.360***
[0.034] [0.038] [0.037] [0.040] [0.041] [0.044]
hm low inv. protection 0.385*** 0.289** 0.320** 0.214*
[0.133] [0.121] [0.140] [0.129]
int. (morrison & hm low inv. protection) 0.095 0.115*
[0.061] [0.065]
int. (after morrison & hm low inv. protection) 0.117** 0.134**
[0.055] [0.057]
hm emerging mrkt 0.456*** 0.435***
[0.142] [0.144]
int. (morrison & hm emerging mrkt) -0.108** -0.152***
[0.047] [0.054]
int. (after morrison & hm emerging mrkt) -0.132** -0.181***
[0.051] [0.056]
Constant -1.820*** -2.526*** -1.813*** -2.519*** -1.815*** -2.519***
[0.486] [0.499] [0.486] [0.499] [0.499] [0.515]
Quarter Fixed-Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,179 2,179 2,179 2,179 2,186 2,186
Adj R-Squared 0.411 0.448 0.411 0.448 0.411 0.451
Standard errors robust to clustering by firm; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND EXCESS COMOVEMENT IN RETURNS: 
EVIDENCE FROM CROSS-LISTED STOCKS AROUND THE WORLD 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Classical finance theories predict that security return comovement is fully explained by common 
variation in cash flows and discount rates. Recent studies show that security prices comove in 
excess of common fundamental factors. Extensive empirical literature shows that in many 
countries and in many markets, stocks tend to comove more with index stocks after they are 
added to an index [Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002); Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004); 
Greenwood (2008)]. The presence of such asset-class effects has been documented for stocks, 
sovereign bonds, and commodity futures [Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005); Boyer (2011); 
Rigobon (2002); Tang and Xiong (2012)]. In interpreting this evidence, some have suggested 
that excess comovement of stock returns may be due to the price impact of correlated investor 
demand or common liquidity shocks [Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993); Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler 
(1991); Froot and Dabora (1999); Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000); Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk 
(2012)].  
 
There is a growing body of empirical evidence that common variation in security returns is 
associated with particular trading patterns of certain investor groups, which is consistent with 
excess comovement in stock returns driven by commonality in investor demand [Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005)]. Boyer (2011) shows that style-related (value vs. growth stocks) 
correlated trading patterns induce excess covariation in returns among stocks with similar book-
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to-market ratios. Kumar and Lee (2006) finds that correlated trades of retail investors are related 
to patterns of comovement in certain stock returns.   
 
A comprehensive sample of globally cross-listed securities provides an ideal setting in which to 
study excess comovement and also the sources of excess comovement in security returns. Cross-
listed shares on foreign hosting (“target”) markets typically are direct claims or represent claims 
against the same set of risky cash flows as ordinary share listed on the home market. An 
important distinguishing characteristic of markets for cross-listed stocks is that trading of these 
near perfect substitute securities is distributed across multiple markets, the target and the 
counterpart home market, and also across investors in respective markets. Multiple studies have 
found that security prices are affected by the location of trading [Chan, Hameed, and Lau (2003); 
Froot and Dabora (1999); de Jong, Rosenthal, and van Dijk (2009); Gagnon and Karolyi (2009, 
2010)]. In particular, Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) shows that returns on U.S. cross-listed stocks 
have higher systematic comovements with the U.S. market index and lower systematic 
comovements with home market index compared to their counterpart home market shares.       
 
In this paper, we focus on the role of global institutional investors in examining excess return 
comovements of cross-listed and its equivalent home market shares with the target market and 
the counterpart home market, respectively. Our empirical tests are based on the theory developed 
by Basak and Pavlova (2013). Basak and Pavlova (2013) notes that institutional investors’ 
compensation may be closely tied to relative performance of their own portfolio vis-à-vis some 
benchmark stock index. Compensation-induced incentives lead institutional investors to demand 
stocks that compose their benchmark stock index or stocks that are highly correlated with some 
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benchmark index. Consequently, because of coordinated demand or trading driven by 
institutional investors, the returns of stocks with high institutional ownership are more correlated 
amongst themselves.  
 
Using 1,666 cross-listed-home-market-share pairs on 19 target markets with 60 different home 
markets between 2001 and 2010, we document that the return differential between the cross-
listed and its counterpart home market share is small, 0.8 basis points, on average. However, we 
find that the return differentials between the cross-listed and its ordinary home market share, 
though small, exhibit excess return comovements relative to market index returns, the home and 
the target market returns. Furthermore, we test whether the presence of institutional investors 
contribute to excess return comovements of cross-listed and its home market share with the 
respective markets, the target and the counterpart home market. We find that, in general, 
institutional investors domiciled in the home country intensify the excess comovement in the 
long (a cross-listed share)-short (the equivalent number of home market shares) pair returns with 
the home market returns. For U.S. cross-listed securities, unlike those secondarily listed on other 
target markets, stronger presence of home country institutional investors reduces the intensity of 
excess comovement in the long-short pair returns with the home market returns. Our results on 
excess comovement in returns with respect to target market returns are weaker. Target country 
institutional investors do not exert significant influence on the return dynamics of the long-short 
position. However, there is an important exception. For the cross-listed-home-market-share pairs 
with synchronous trading hours between the target and its counterpart home market, we find that 
institutional investors domiciled in target country exacerbate the excess comovement in the long-
short position returns with the target market returns. 
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that links global institutional investors to 
excess return comovements observed in markets for cross-listed stocks. Many papers 
documented excess return comovements of U.S. cross-listed and its home market share with the 
respective markets, the U.S. market and the counterpart home market. These previous studies 
attributed the sources of these excess comovements to country, industry, and firm-specific 
factors that reflect impediments to arbitrage and market segmentation. We mainly focus on 
uncovering global institutional investors’ influence on excess return comovements in global 
markets for cross-listings after controlling for barriers to arbitrage. Although our main focus in 
this paper is different from previous papers, we consider many variables that represent 
impediments to inter-market arbitrage activities, which are identified by important previous 
studies.  
 
We offer another important contribution. Our paper includes comprehensive analyses on the 
return differentials between non-U.S. cross-listed and its counterpart home market share. The 
Literature has primarily examined U.S. cross-listed securities. Our sample consists of both U.S. 
and non-U.S. target cross-listings. Specifically, in addition to U.S. cross-listed securities, we also 
examine cross-listed stocks on 17 non-U.S. target markets. Our sample provides an ideal 
experimental setting with a large cross-section of firms, target and home markets from around 
the world. Earlier studies by Maldonado and Saunders (1983), Kato et al. (1991), Wahab et al. 
(1992), and Park and Tavokkol (1994) employed a small sample of ADRs from select countries, 
such as Australia, Japan and the U.K., and usually with weekly observed prices. Rosenthal and 
Young (1990), Froot and Dabora (1999), Bedi, Richards, and Tennant (2003), and de Jong, 
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Rosenthal, and van Dijk (2009) study dual-listed companies (“Siamese twins”). Each of these 
studies finds large and systematic deviations from twin price parity, which they attribute to 
difference in tax, accounting, regulatory, governance and trading attributes. Furthermore, more 
recent papers use special intraday data for country-specific studies of relative price discovery in 
cross-listed and home-market shares, such as Grammig, Melvin, and Schlag (2004) for three 
stocks in Germany and Eun and Sabberwal (2002) in Canada. Lastly, Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) 
studies inter-market arbitrage using a sample of 506 U.S. cross-listed stocks from 35 different 
countries. None of these studies investigate the breadth of scope in our study of 1,666 cross-
listed securities on 19 target markets from 60 different home countries. 
  
3.2 Empirical design 
In an integrated and frictionless global stock market, arbitrage should ensure the return 
deviations between the cross-listed (target market) security and its counterpart home market 
security is zero. If the arbitrage is perfect, then not only is the return differential between the 
cross-listed and its home market share zero, but also the return difference is not exposed to any 
systematic risks. However, a number of studies uncovered systematic components related to 
market returns and exchange rate changes in the returns of arbitrage portfolios [Froot and Dabora 
(1999); Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005); Greewood (2008); de Jong, Rosenthal, and van 
Dijk (2009); Gagnon and Karolyi (2010)]. To capture potential systematic comovement in the 
return differentials between the target market share and its counterpart home market share with 
the returns of respective market index (the home and the target market) and with exchange rate 
changes, we consider a time series regression model of the daily return differentials between the 
target and the home market security on the contemporaneous, leading and lagged daily returns of 
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the target market index, the home market index, and the relevant exchange rate. From Rosenthal 
and Young (1990), Kato et al. (1991), Wahab et al. (1992), Park and Tavokkol (1994), Froot and 
Dabora (1999), Bedi at al. (2003), de Jong et al. (2009), and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010), for 
each cross-listed security on target market l of firm i, we have: 
      
𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑙 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑀𝑙𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝑇𝑀𝑙𝑗=+1𝑗=−1  +   ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐻𝑀𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝐻𝑀𝑗=+1𝑗=−1  +   ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐹𝑋𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝐹𝑋𝑗=+1𝑗=−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑙,𝑡  (1) 
 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 is the daily return difference between the target market (cross-listed) security 
and its counterpart home market security in terms of target country currency, 𝑟𝑡+𝑗
𝑇𝑀𝑙 indicate the 
target market index daily return (denominated in target country currency), 𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝐻𝑀 is the home 
market index return (denominated in home country currency), and 𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝐹𝑋  is the currency return for 
the home country of firm i relative to the target country currency.21 To account for asynchronous 
and non-synchronous trading hours between the target and the home market, the above time 
series regression model allows the return difference between the target market and its counterpart 
home market shares to covary with one-day lagged and leading currency and market returns in 
addition to coincident currency and market returns in (1).  
 
The target country currency denominated return of home market index return can be decomposed 
as the sum of the home country currency return and the exchange rate change. We use this 
additive decomposition to assign each the home market index and currency factor its own 
regression coefficient in (1). The reason for separating out the two factors is to keep any 
                                                          
21 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 =  [ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑀𝑙 ) −  ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝐻𝑀 )] × 100 
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measurement error in one of the variables from affecting the coefficient of home market index 
returns and of the other currency change. The measurement error that we are primarily concerned 
about may stem from the cases where the exchange rate and the security prices denominated in 
the home country currency are recorded at different times during the day, and this could induce 
measurement error in the security prices denominated in the target country currency.  
 
To accurately measure deviations between the returns of the target market security and its 
counterpart home market security, we need to match prices on each of the security pairs that are 
synchronous in time. In many occasions, the trading hours for most of target markets and home 
markets are different. Major European markets have synchronized trading hours, but these are 
the exceptions. For the two competing markets, the target and the home market, with non-
synchronous but overlapping trading hours, it would be ideal to use intraday prices and quotes in 
obtaining computed returns based on synchronous time horizons, but we do not have intraday 
price and quote data for most of the markets in our sample, only their closing prices. An 
additional structural limitation results in non-synchronization of security return observations in 
the two competing markets. Some target and home markets in our sample have asynchronous 
trading hours. For instance, the cross-listed and its home market security pairs with Asian home 
markets and US target markets have completely non-synchronous trading hours. In addition to 
non-synchronous and asynchronous trading hours between the two competing markets, non-
synchronous trading problem may arise when either the target market or the home market shares 
are traded only intermittently. Stocks that are less actively traded in the target or home market 
may have stale closing prices. Non-synchronous trading that stems from either non-synchronized 
trading hours or infrequent trading may affect return observations and, thus, can induce spurious 
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cross-autocorrelations in cross-listed and home market share returns. This would artificially 
result in a mean-reverting structure in the return differentials between the cross-listed and its 
home market security [Froot and Dabora (1999)]. 
 
To incorporate potential mean-reverting structure, we include one-day lag term of the return 
difference between the target market and its home market shares in (1). In addition, in computing 
returns, we only use daily target market and home market security prices accompanied by strictly 
positive trading volume to filter out stale prices from infrequent trading. We modify (1) and 
choose the set of one-day leading and lagged market return variables to reflect the actual market 
closing time differentials between the target and the home market. Instead of including a leading 
and a lagged market returns for both the target and the home market, we include the lagged and 
contemporaneous market returns if the closing time of this market is earlier than the other 
competing market. The leading and contemporaneous market returns are included in the cases 
where the market closing time is later compared to the other competing market. We use only the 
contemporaneous market returns if the two competing markets have the exactly the same closing 
time after adjusting for time zone differences. Furthermore, we conservatively allow the return 
differences between the cross-listed and its home market security to covary with the one-day 
lagged and leading currency returns as well as the contemporaneous currency returns because 
there could be non-synchronous measurement of currency returns and stock returns due to non-
synchronous trading hours between the stock market and the foreign exchange market. 
 
With the above adjustments, we estimate the following time series regression to capture 
systematic comovement in the return differences between the cross-listed share and its 
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counterpart home market share with the returns of the target market, the home market, and with 
the relevant exchange rate changes: using daily return data, given a sample year, for each cross-
listed security on target market l of firm i, we estimate, 
 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑙−𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑙−𝑖𝑀𝑅  𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀  + ∑ 𝛽𝑗−𝑖𝑇𝑀𝑙𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝑇𝑀𝑙𝑗=+1𝑗=−1  + ∑ 𝛽𝑗−𝑖𝐻𝑀𝑟𝑡+𝑗−𝑖𝐻𝑀𝑗=+1𝑗=−1  + ∑ 𝛽𝑗−𝑖𝐹𝑋𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝐹𝑋𝑗=+1𝑗=−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑙,𝑡   (2) 
 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 is the daily return difference between the target market security and its 
counterpart home market security based on target country currency denomination, 𝑟𝑡+𝑗
𝑇𝑀𝑙 indicates 
the target market index daily return (in terms of target country currency), 𝑟𝑡+𝑗−𝑖
𝐻𝑀  is the home 
market index return (in terms of home market currency), and 𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝐹𝑋  is the currency return for the 
home country of firm i relative to the target country currency.22 In (2), if the closing time of the 
target market is earlier than the home market, then 𝛽−1−𝑖𝐻𝑀 =0 and 𝛽+1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 =0. We impose the 
restriction, 𝛽+1−𝑖𝐻𝑀 =0 and 𝛽−1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 =0, in (2) for the cases where the target market’s closing time is later 
than that of the home market. When the closing time of the target and the home market is 
synchronized, we set 𝛽−1−𝑖𝐻𝑀 = 𝛽+1−𝑖𝐻𝑀 = 𝛽−1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 = 𝛽+1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 =0 in (2). We drop all terms on currency returns in 
(2) when the target and the home country have the same currency (e.g. the cases where the target 
and the home country use Euro). 
 
The daily return series are computed using closing prices in estimating (2). We draw daily data 
from DataStream International. We use the DataStream country index to obtain market returns as 
this offers the least data constraint. DataStream country indices are market capitalization 
                                                          
22 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 = [ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑀𝑙 ) −  ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝐻𝑀 )] ×  100 
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weighted indices and represent at least 70% of the total country market capitalization. The most 
of firms represented in our sample are a component of the DataStream country index for the 
home country. Obviously, none of the cross-listed securities is a part of the DataStream country 
index for the target country. Consequently, the estimated regression coefficients on home market 
returns can be biased as the most of firms in our sample are a component of the home market 
index. This bias in the beta estimates on the home market returns would be more severe if a 
firm’s market capitalization is large (i.e. a larger part of index capitalization). To eliminate any 
own-stock effects, we remove each firm’s return contributions to the home market index returns. 
The subscript –i in (2) indicates that the return contributions of firm i is removed in computing 
home market index returns. Furthermore, to obtain more accurate regression coefficient 
estimates in (2), given a sample year, we require at least 60 daily return observations 
accompanied by strictly positive trading volume for both the target and the home market 
security.        
 
The time series regression model in (2) includes the one-day lag of the return difference between 
the target market and its counterpart home market shares.23 The primary reason for the inclusion 
of the lag term of the return difference is to capture any effects of spurious cross-autocorrelation 
in the target market and home market share returns induced by non-synchronous trading.24 It is 
also possible that the coefficient, 𝛽𝑖,𝑙−𝑖𝑀𝑅 , on the lag term of the return difference captures the rate 
                                                          
23 The inclusion of additional lags may be unnecessary as we only include consecutive trading days with 
strictly positive trading volume in return computation. Hence, it is rare to observe further delays (more 
than one day) in price correction or reaction to the return deviation from the previous day.    
24 Our multivariate regression analyses presented in the later sections consider controls for non-
synchronous trading by including measures of the cross-listed and the home market security illiquidity 
and variables that measure the time zone difference and geographical distance between the target and the 
counterpart home market.    
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at which the return differentials decay as a result of trading by inter-market arbitrageurs in 
response to a return deviation between the cross-listed and the home market shares.25 Arbitrage 
that exploits the return differentials between the cross-listed shares and its home market shares is 
most likely to be carried out global institutional investors. If indeed global institutional traders 
are active arbitrageurs in global equity markets, then the return deviations between the cross-
listed securities and its home market securities should revert to zero. If the return differentials 
tend to revert towards some mean or zero, then we should find 𝛽𝑖,𝑙−𝑖𝑀𝑅  to be negative. The faster 
the return differentials revert to zero, the larger the negative value of 𝛽𝑖,𝑙−𝑖𝑀𝑅 . Of course, it would 
be impossible to completely distinguish which effect that the one-day lag term of the return 
difference between the target market and its counterpart home market shares captures.    
 
Our motivation for estimating the above time series regression in (2) is to capture the differential 
exposures of the cross-listed and its home market shares to the respective market index (the 
target and the home market index) fluctuations and the relevant foreign exchange rate changes, 
and to study the factors that explain the cross-sectional attributes of these differential exposures. 
From (2), for each sample year and for firm i, we define the net “excess” comovement home 
market beta, 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝛽−𝑖𝐻𝑀, to be the sum of all home market betas. The net “excess” comovement 
target market beta is defined similarly. If investors push up the local currency value of home 
market securities, then this may cause the return of the home market share of the firm to be 
higher relative to its cross-listed security return on the target market. In this hypothetical 
example, a decrease in the return difference, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀, would be associated with a rise in the 
                                                          
25 Alternatively, if the return difference between the target market and its counterpart home market shares 
contains a unit root, then the probability that the return differential becomes arbitrarily large over time is 
equal to one. However, we do not expect this to be the case. 
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home market index resulting in a negative net excess comovement beta on the home market 
index. In a similar manner, the net excess comovement betas for the return differential between 
the cross-listed and its counterpart home market share on the target market index would be 
positive.  
 
In the next section, we introduce our main hypothesis and control variables, and describe 
variable construction. 
 
3.3 Main hypothesis and key variables 
The objective of this paper is to understand the factors that explain the cross-sectional and time-
series attributes of the excess comovement market betas in (2). Our empirical tests are based on 
the theory of Basak and Pavlova (2013).  
 
Basak and Pavlova (2013) proposes a theory that incorporates institutional investors’ 
compensation incentives and their influence on asset prices. Basak and Pavlova (2013) notes that 
institutional investors’ portfolio holdings are influenced by compensation-induced incentives or 
implicit incentives to increase asset under management arising from the predictability of capital 
inflows resulting from portfolio performance. Basak and Pavlova (2013) focus on one of most 
prominent features of institutional investors’ incentives, which is the relative performance of 
their own portfolio vis-à-vis some benchmark stock index. This relative performance is 
important because new money inflows into institutional portfolios and payouts to asset managers 
at year end depend on it, or simply because managers care about their standing in the profession. 
Consequently, institutional investors hold stocks that compose their benchmark stock index. As a 
102 
 
result, coordinated trading by institutional investors induce excess comovement among stocks 
that belong to their benchmark index.   
 
One important implication of Basak and Pavlova (2013) is that institutional investors demand 
stocks that are highly correlated with some benchmark index and, thus, the returns of stocks that 
are well-owned by institutional investors are more correlated amongst themselves. Among global 
institutional investors in our setting, we hypothesize that institutional investors domiciled in the 
home country would have the incentive to hold and trade stocks that are highly correlated with 
home market stock returns as their relative performance vis-a-vis local stock market would be 
important to them for compensation or aforementioned implicit incentives. As a result, the 
coordinated demand and trading activities on these stocks by institutional investors domiciled in 
the home country is likely to induce excess comovement among these stocks and also with the 
home market index. Institutional investors domiciled in the target country would hold stocks that 
are highly correlated with the returns of target market index and coordinated demand on these 
stocks would induce excess comovement with the target market index. Specifically, we test 
whether the home country institutional investors’ demand contribute to the excess comovement 
of the return differentials between the cross-listed and its counterpart home market share with the 
fluctuations of home market index. Parallel to this, we also examine whether the target country 
institutional investors induce the excess comovement of the return differentials with the target 
market index returns. 
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We measure institutional investors’ trading activities for a stock using institutional ownership.26 
We construct our institutional ownership variable by using Lionshare/Factset Global Ownership 
dataset. Our paper is one of few papers that utilize Lionshare/Factset Global Ownership dataset 
in the study of cross-listed securities. Lionshare/Factset Global Ownership dataset offers 
comprehensive coverage of global institutional investors while 13-F filings only include US 
institutional investors. In Lionshare/Factset ownership dataset, the coverage on global 
institutions is most comprehensive from 2001 and on. Lionshare/Factset ownership dataset 
include all developed countries and most of emerging countries.27 In Lionshare/Factset 
ownership dataset, the reporting frequency of institutional ownership varies across countries 
from quarterly to yearly, and to reconcile different report frequencies, we collect institutional 
ownership data in annual frequency. For each stock, Lionshare/Factset ownership data allows us 
to identify the number of shares held by each institution at year end. Lionshare/Factset 
ownership data also reports each institution’s country of domicile.28  
 
For each firm i and each sample year t, we define the home country institutional ownership 
denoted IO(hc)i,t as the percentage of market capitalization (measured in US dollars) of firm i 
held by institutions domiciled in the home country. Similarly, for each firm i and each sample 
year t, we define IO(tcl)i,t as the percentage of market capitalization (measured in US dollars) 
held by institutions domiciled in the target country l. IO(hc)i,t and IO(tcl)i,t are the key variables 
                                                          
26 It would ideal to use institutional investors’ transaction level data to measure their coordinated trading 
activities in respective markets, the target and the home market. However, it is difficult to obtain the 
transaction data of institutional investors as they are often proprietary in nature.  
27 This is based on the list of developed and emerging countries from International Financial Corporation 
(IFC) of the World Bank Group. Lionshare/Factset ownership data has little coverage on Middle Eastern 
countries and countries in Africa. 
28 Ferreira and Matos (2008) provides detailed discussion on Lionshare/Factset ownership data set. 
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in testing our main hypothesis. If the home country institutional investors’ trading activities 
contribute to the excess comovement of the return differentials between the cross-listed and its 
counterpart home market share with the home market index returns, then we expect IO(hc)i,t to 
be negatively associated with the net excess comovement beta on the home market, 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝛽−𝑖𝐻𝑀, in 
(2). Furthermore, if the target country institutional investors induce the excess comovement of 
the return differentials with the target market index returns, then IO(tcl)i,t should be positively 
related to the net excess comovement target market beta, 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝛽𝑇𝑀, in (2). 
 
3.4 Control variables and variable construction 
We introduce our market and firm level control variables that may influence the cross-sectional 
and time-series attributes of the excess comovement market betas in (2). In a frictionless 
integrated global market, a long-short arbitrage portfolio consisting of the shares of cross-listed 
and its equivalent home market shares should not be exposed to any risk. To the extent that 
impediments limit investors’ abilities to conduct arbitrage between the cross-listed and its home 
market share, the residual market risk exposures of a long-short arbitrage position may be in part 
driven by the existence of such impediments. In this regard, for our control variables, we mainly 
focus on market and firm level impediments to arbitrage.   
   
3.4.1 Market-level controls 
{geographical distance, time zone difference, hm transaction cost, tm transaction cost, hm 
market capitalization-to-GDP, tm market capitalization-to-GDP, hm investor protection, tm 
investor protection, hm short sale restriction, tm short sale restriction, emerging market 
indicator}  
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The number of time zone difference that separates the home and the target market may result in 
non-synchronous trading arising from different closing times of daily trading sessions across 
markets. New information on firms is usually disseminated during local business hours, and 
trading based on this information is likely take place during local trading hours. For instance, 
Australian stocks cross-listed on US markets, US markets are closed during Australian business 
hours. This delays in how quickly the new information gets impounded to the prices of cross-
listed shares. Furthermore, the time zone difference between the target market and its counterpart 
home market may also affect arbitrageurs’ ability to force price parity between the cross-listed 
and its home market share. It would be easier for traders and market makers to arbitrage away 
any price differentials between the cross-listed and its home market security when trading 
sessions of the two markets overlap. We define time zone difference to be the absolute value of 
the time zone difference between the target and its counterpart home market. Similarly, the 
geographical distance between the target and its counterpart home market also captures the 
effects of non-synchronous trading. Geographical distance is the natural log of the distance (in 
miles) between the cities where the target and the home market is located in.  
 
Restrictions on short sales pose a direct impediment to arbitrage [Bris, Goetzman, and Zhu 
(2007); Jain, Jain, Mclnish, and Mckenzie (2013)]. Bris et al. (2007) reports that short-selling is 
permitted only in 24 of the 47 countries they study. Short-selling, in general, is more restrictive 
in non-US markets. In addition, Bris et al. (2007) finds that individual stock returns are more 
negatively skewed in markets with fewer or less stringent restrictions on short-selling. Different 
levels in short selling restrictions between the target and its counterpart home market could result 
in larger return differentials between the target and its home market share. The deviations from 
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price parity in which the share price on the market with more restrictions on short-selling is 
comparatively higher than the price of security that is listed on the market with less short-selling 
restrictions is less likely to dissipate quickly due to limits to arbitrage. We draw and update data 
on short sale restrictions for each target and home country from Bris et al. (2007). Tm short sale 
restriction and hm short sale restriction denote the degree of short sale restrictions in target and 
home market, respectively. Tm short sale restriction and hm short sale restriction take the value 
0 if there is no restriction on short sales. We assign the value 0.5 to tm short sale restriction and 
hm short sale restriction if there are some restrictions on short selling. Lastly, tm short sale 
restriction and hm short sale restriction take the value 1 in cases where short selling is not 
allowed.    
 
Direct or indirect barriers on foreign investment could impede inter-market arbitrage across 
different jurisdictions. Barriers on foreign investments include: (i) foreign exchange control, (ii) 
limits on repatriation of capital, (iii) tax withholdings on investment income earned by foreign 
investors, and (iv) complex approval process for foreigners to invest in a particular country. 
These restrictions on foreign investment could limit arbitrageurs’ ability to arbitrage away any 
return differentials between the cross-listed and it counterpart home market share. The literature 
shows that one of common country level proxies which captures the aforementioned restrictions 
on foreign investment is the level of economic development [Edison and Warnock (2003)]. The 
countries with lower degree of economic development tend to have more restrictions on foreign 
investments.  
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There are several measures that capture the degree of economic development. To capture the 
degree of economic development for target and home countries presented in our sample, we use 
the ratio of country stock market capitalization to GDP. We draw country stock market 
capitalization data from DataStream International, and obtain GDP data from the IMF website. 
For country stock market capitalization data, we use the total market capitalization of 
DataStream country index measured in millions of US dollars. GDP is also measured in millions 
of US dollars. The ratio of target market capitalization to its GDP and home market 
capitalization to its GDP are denoted tm market capitalization-to-GDP and tm market 
capitalization-to-GDP, respectively. Furthermore, Edison and Warnock (2003) shows that 
emerging countries are likely to have more foreign investment restrictions. Using the country 
classification by the International Financial Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group, we 
construct an indicator variable, emerging market indicator, which is 1 if a country is an emerging 
country and 0 otherwise. 
 
The level of investor protection and exchange trading rules in the target and its counterpart home 
country could influence the return differentials between the cross-listed and its home market 
share. Poor investor protection and exchange trading rules would pose as an indirect restriction 
to investments including arbitrage activities. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) argues that poor 
investor protection from corporate insiders can make informed arbitrage unattractive, and 
arbitrageurs with firm-specific information may be less inclined to trade on it. La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) shows that shareholders are entitled to a different set of 
legal protection depending on legal jurisdiction. Thus, depending on the country of origin, the set 
of legal rights underpinning a cross-listed and its counterpart home market security may be 
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different for an arbitrageur even though the claim on the cash flow underpinning each security is 
exactly the same. In this regard, different degree of investor protection across jurisdictions could 
affect inter-market arbitrage activities, which, in turn, could influence the return differentials 
between the cross-listed and its counterpart home market share. We use the investor protection 
index constructed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). The investor protection 
index is the principal component of anti-director rights, disclosure requirements, and liability 
standards. Tm investor protection and hm investor protection are the values of investor protection 
index drawn from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) for the target and its 
counterpart home country, respectively. Furthermore, Tm exchange rules and hm exchange rules 
are the values of exchange trading rules drawn from Cumming, Johan, and Li (2011) for the 
target and its counterpart home country, respectively.29 
 
Transaction costs could be an impediment to inter-market arbitrage. We use market-level 
transaction cost measures compiled by Elkins McSherry. Tm transaction cost and hm transaction 
cost are market-level transaction cost in basis points, which is the sum of commissions, fees, 
transfer taxes, and price impact of block trades, for the target and its counterpart home market, 
respectively. Elkins McSherry compiles these transaction cost measures quarterly. We use 
annual average of quarterly transaction costs for each market in our sample. 
 
3.4.2 Firm-level controls 
{size, market capitalization, analyst coverage, hm security illiquidity, tm security illiquidity} 
                                                          
29 Cumming, Johan, and Li (2011) provides exchange trading rule scores for 45 stock exchanges 
around the world. 
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Poor firm level information environment could be an impediment to arbitrage activities. One of 
the main functions of arbitrage is to impound firm specific information into stock prices and 
bring stock prices to fundamental values. However, the existence of asymmetric information 
between corporate insiders and other shareholders would make engaging in any arbitrage activity 
unattractive. Thus, the degree of asymmetric information for a given firm could affect the return 
differentials between the cross-listed and its equivalent home market share. Literature has shown 
that larger firms and/or firms with good analyst coverage tend to have a lower degree of 
information asymmetry between corporate insiders and other investors. We measure firm size in 
terms of total asset, and size is the natural logarithm of firm’s annual total asset value in US 
dollars at year-end obtained from Worldscope. Market capitalization of a firm is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the stock’s annual average of daily market capitalization in US dollars 
drawn from DataStream International. We note that size and market capitalization may also 
proxy for the liquidity of firm’s stock as stocks of larger firms tend to be more liquid. 
Furthermore, to measure the extent of analyst coverage, we use the number of 1-year-ahead 
earnings-per-share (EPS) estimates for the home market security. We use the year-end values of 
analyst EPS estimates compiled from International Summary data of I/B/E/S. The extent of 
analyst coverage may also reflect information acquisition costs for investors. 
 
Illiquidity either in the target market for the cross-listed securities or in its counterpart home 
market for the ordinary securities could potentially impede arbitrage activity. In the discussion 
above, we considered transaction costs at the market level. Illiquidity in the cross-listed share or 
its ordinary home market share or both would increase the cost associated with conducting 
arbitrage. The degree of illiquidity is related to price impact of order flow. To estimate price 
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impact cost for a security, we compute Amihud illiquidity measure separately for the cross-listed 
and its home market shares. Following Amihud (2002), we compute the annual average ratio of 
the daily absolute return to the dollar value of transaction on that day. Tm security illiquidity and 
hm security illiquidity are Amihud illiquidity measures for the cross-listed and its counterpart 
home market share, respectively.  
 
3.5 Sample construction & description 
In this section, we discuss the sample construction process and describe our sample of cross-
listed securities. The World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) provides statistics on the number of 
foreign firm listings on stock exchanges around the world. In choosing target (“host”) markets, 
we select stock exchanges that host foreign securities for each of the four regions, Africa, 
Americas, Asia, and Europe. This process results in 19 target stock exchanges over the period 
between 2001 and 2010. These 19 target markets include Johannesburg (Africa), Australia, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Tokyo (Asia), Lima, NASDAQ, New York, Toronto (Americas), 
Euronext Amsterdam, Euronext Brussels, Euronext Lisbon, Euronext Paris, Frankfurt, London, 
Luxembourg, Oslo, and Swiss (Europe). We only consider exchange listed securities. The 
London Stock Exchange listings include foreign listings on Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM). We do not include foreign securities trading on SEAQ International as securities traded 
on SEAQ are not exchange listed securities. Our data on Singapore Stock Exchange includes 
listings on SESDAQ. The listings on the TSX Venture are a part of the Toronto market sample. 
Our Euronext samples include listings on Alternext markets. The New York Stock Exchange 
sample includes listings on AMEX. For the Frankfurt sample, we only consider foreign securities 
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listed under prime standard, general standard, and entry standard. We ignore all foreign listings 
on OTC markets.  
 
We use the stock universe compiled by DataStream International in constructing our sample of 
cross-listed securities. We first exclude all securities of special types, such as preferred stocks, 
royalty trusts, and investment funds. We also drop all company stocks domiciled in tax havens, 
such as British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands. We then identify foreign securities based on 
the country of incorporation. To pair up each cross-listed share with its counterpart home market 
ordinary share, we manually match each security listed on target markets with its ordinary 
security listed on the home market using company name, security name, and ISIN codes. Our 
sample of cross-listed securities is further restricted by the availability of daily price and trading 
volume data provided by DataStream International. Our sample period spans from January 2001 
to December 2010. The above sample construction process yields the final sample of 2,020 
unique home market ordinary securities with cross-listings on at least one of the 19 target 
markets from 58 different home countries. 
 
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of cross-listed shares across 19 target exchanges grouped by 
home region and home country’s degree of economic development (developed vs. emerging). 
We use the classification of developed and emerging countries by International Financial 
Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group. The first coordinate in each cell in Table 3.1 
represents the number of cross-listings, and the second coordinate in each cell, which is in 
parentheses, represents the number of cross-listed securities that have at least 60 computable 
daily return data associated with strictly positive trading volume in any sample year. There are a 
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total of 2,726 cross-listed securities during the period between 2001 and 2010. The London 
Stock Exchange hosts the largest number of cross-listings, 717. The London Stock Exchange 
hosts more cross-listings than that of NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange combined, 
696. The Euronext Lisbon is the smallest host market with only 5 cross-listed securities. In Table 
1, we observe that most target markets draw a larger number of cross-listings from countries 
geographically close. This is consistent with the findings of Sarkissian and Schill (2004). 
Sarkissian and Schill (2004) finds that geographical proximity plays an important role in the 
choice of overseas listing venues. Furthermore, approximately 85% (2,317 out of 2,726) of 
cross-listings come from companies domiciled in developed countries. The majority of cross-
border listings from the emerging world originates from companies domiciled in emerging 
Americas and emerging Asia. Companies from emerging Americas mainly cross-list their shares 
on the New York Stock Exchange. On the other hand, cross-listing destinations for firms 
domiciled in emerging Asia are more diverse; the share of Asian, American, and European target 
(“host”) markets are about 42% (76 out of 178), 24% (42 out of 178), and 34% (60 out of 178), 
respectively. 
 
In estimating the time series regression specified in (2), for each cross-listed and its home market 
ordinary share pair, given a sample year, we require at least 61 days of trading (with strictly 
positive trading volume) for both the cross-listed and its counterpart home market share to ensure 
that we obtain reasonably precise regression coefficients in (2). As noted above, in Table 1, the 
second coordinate in each cell (in parentheses) shows the number of cross-listed securities that 
have at least 60 computable return days associated with strictly positive trading volume in any 
sample year. While there are a total of 2,726 cross-listed securities during the period between 
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2001 and 2010, we observe only 1,666 cross-listed securities that have at least 60 computable 
return days in any sample year. The drop from 2,726 to 1,666 cross-listed securities represents 
approximately 39% reduction. This dramatic reduction is primarily driven by the fact that cross-
listed securities on target markets have many days without trading.  
 
From Table 3.1, due to inactive trading of target market securities, we observe that the European 
target markets lose the largest number of cross-listings applying our trading days criteria 
described above. After applying our requirement on trading days, the reductions in our sample 
from the Asian, Americas, and European target markets are approximately 27% (from 291 to 
212), 15% (from 859 to 733), and 54% (from 1,576 to 721), respectively. The US target markets, 
NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange combined, lose a mere 7% (from 696 to 646) of 
their sample after applying our requirement on trading days. On the other hand, our sample of 
cross-listed securities on the London Stock Exchange, which hosts the largest number of cross-
listings of 717, is reduced to 236 (67% reduction) with the requirement on trading days that we 
impose. 
 
3.6 Summary statistics 
3.6.1 Summary statistics of return differentials    
After applying our requirement on trading days, we are left with 1,666 cross-listed- home-
market-share pairs for the sample period between 2001 and 2010. In Table 3.2, we present the 
summary statistics of the daily return differentials between the cross-listed and its counterpart 
home market share adjusted for bundling ratio. The daily return differential between the cross-
listed and its home market ordinary share is defined as ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑀𝑙 ) −  ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝐻𝑀 ). Panel 
114 
 
A of Table 3.2 shows time-series attributes and distribution of the daily return differentials 
between the cross-listed and its home market share. Panel A of Table 3.2 includes the mean of 
daily return differentials in the first column, the mean of absolute value on the daily return 
differentials in the second column, and the standard deviation of daily return differentials in the 
fourth column. The overall mean of the daily return differentials is only 0.8 basis points. The 
distribution of daily return differentials is fairly symmetric; the middle 50% of the distribution 
ranges from -93 to 94 basis points. This symmetry may reflect mean reverting tendency of the 
return differentials between the cross-listed and its counterpart home market share. The standard 
deviations of the return differentials are notably larger for 2008 and 2009, which coincide with 
the recent global financial crisis, and are 424 basis points and 351 basis points, respectively. This 
may be due to heightened volatility and additional liquidity constraints that limit arbitrage 
activities. Furthermore, Panel A of Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of cross-listed-home-
market-share pairs with completely synchronous trading hours as well as pairs with non-
synchronous trading hours. The means of the daily return differentials for the pairs with 
synchronous and non-synchronous trading hours are similar. However, we note that the standard 
deviation of 325 basis points for the pairs with non-synchronous trading hours is larger compared 
to that of 250 basis points for the pairs with synchronous trading hours. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of the daily return differentials between the 
cross-listed and its counterpart home market share by target (“host”) markets. We observe that 
the means of daily return differentials are generally positive across target markets. Among target 
markets that host larger number of cross-listings, the US target markets, the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ, have smaller return differentials on average, 8 basis points. 
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Furthermore, the standard deviation of daily return differentials for the New York Stock 
Exchange, 233 basis points, is the smallest among larger target markets. The standard deviations 
of daily return differentials are smaller for the European target markets compared to those of 
target markets located in other regions. The Asian target markets exhibit larger daily return 
differentials on average as well as larger standard deviation of daily return differentials.  
 
3.6.2 Summary statistics of time series regression estimates 
In Table 3.3, we report summary statistics of time series regression estimated from (2). We 
present distributional information on the estimated regression coefficients and associated p-
values for 8,950 observations (firm-target market-year) in Panel A of Table 3. Panel B of Table 
3.3 separately shows sample summary statistics and p-values for cross-listed-home-market-share 
pairs with synchronous trading hours (4,220 observations) and with non-synchronous trading 
hours (4,730 observations), respectively. The reported p-values on the mean-reversion 
coefficient are based on t-tests of the hypothesis that the coefficient of the mean-reversion term 
is equal to zero. The reported p-values on the net excess comovement market betas and the 
coefficients on exchange rate changes are for tests of the hypothesis that the coefficients of 
lagged, contemporaneous, and leading risk exposures are jointly zero. As discussed above, in (2), 
the dependent variable is the return measured in target market currency of a portfolio consisting 
one long position in the cross-listed share and short positions in an equivalent number of home 
market ordinary shares.  
 
In Panel A of Table 3.3, we note that the estimated intercepts in (2) are zero on average. 
Furthermore, on average, we find that return differentials exhibit negative mean-reversion (=-
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0.38), negative net exposure to the home market return (=-0.32), positive net exposure to the 
target market return (=0.33), and negative net exposure to the exchange rate change (=-0.29). 
Panel A of Table 3.3 shows that the most mean-reversion coefficient estimates are negative with 
small p-values less than 0.08. This indicates that return differences reverse within one day. The 
existence of mean-reversion may be evidence of significant cross-autocorrelations in the cross-
listed and its counterpart home market share returns due to delayed reactions to information, 
which stems from non-synchronous trading, or non-synchronous trading hours. The feature of 
mean-reversion may also be consistent with arbitrageurs responding to deviations in return 
between the cross-listed and its counterpart home market share. However, as we noted earlier, 
we are unable to distinguish between these two cases. The distribution of net excess comovement 
home market betas is negatively skewed as more than 75% of the values are negative. The 
hypothesis that the lagged, coincident, and leading home market betas are jointly zero can be 
rejected in 50% of all cases at 8% significance level. Furthermore, the distribution of net excess 
comovement target market betas has a positive skew as over 75% of the estimated values are 
positive. Approximately 50% of the estimated excess comovement target market betas have p-
values less than 0.09. Lastly, from Panel A of Table 3, we note that the adjusted r-squared is 0.29 
on average with the interquartile range between 0.17 and 0.38, which represents rather high 
explanatory power of our time series regression given that the portfolios are zero net investment 
arbitrage positions.       
 
In Panel B of Table 3.3, we report summary statistics separately for our samples based on the 
synchronicity of trading hours between the target and it counterpart home market. The means of 
the estimated coefficients on the mean-reversion term are similar between the cross-listed-home-
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market share pairs with synchronous trading hours and the pairs with non-synchronous trading 
hours, -0.39 and -0.36, respectively. On average, the estimated net excess comovement home 
market betas for the sample of the pairs with non-synchronous trading hours, -0.48, are much 
larger (in negative values) than those of pairs with synchronous trading hours, -0.13. Similarly, 
the net excess comovement target market beta estimates, 0.51, are also larger on average for the 
pairs with non-synchronous trading hours than those of the pairs that have synchronous trading 
hours, 0.14. Furthermore, by examining distributional information on the net excess comovement 
home market beta estimated for the pairs with synchronous trading hours, a little over 50% of the 
estimated coefficients are negative. In contrast, over 75% of the net excess comovement home 
market coefficient estimates are negative for the pairs with non-synchronous trading hours. We 
observe similar distributional attributes for the net excess comovement target market beta 
estimates across two different samples based on the synchronicity of trading hours between the 
target and it counterpart home market.       
 
In Table 3.4, we present the mean values of estimated coefficients of time series regression in (2) 
across 19 target markets grouped by home market region and home country’s degree of 
economic development (developed vs. emerging).30 We do not report the means of estimated net 
foreign exchange betas in Table 4 to conserve space as our paper does not focus on these betas 
and extensive analysis of these betas is beyond the scope of this paper. We note that the mean 
values of the mean-reversion coefficient estimates are all negative across target markets and 
across home market regions. On average, the estimated coefficient on the mean-reversion term is 
larger in absolute value for stocks with developed home markets, -0.40, compared to stocks with 
                                                          
30 We use the list of developed and emerging countries from International Financial Corporation (IFC) of 
the World Bank Group. 
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emerging home markets, -0.27. Thus, the returns of cross-listed-home-market-share pairs with 
developed home markets exhibit much stronger mean-reversion compared to the pairs with 
emerging home markets. Table 4 shows that the estimated net excess comovement home market 
betas are generally negative on average across target markets and across home market regions. 
The estimated net excess comovement home market betas for firms with developed home 
markets, -0.37, are larger in absolute value on average compared to those of firms with emerging 
home markets, -0.09. Furthermore, for firms with emerging home markets, on average, we 
observe that the estimated net excess comovement target market betas are larger than those of 
firms with developed home markets.     
 
3.6.3 Summary statistics of firm-level factors 
We report summary statistics of firm-level factors by target market in Table 3.5. Our sample 
includes 1,666 cross-listed securities between 2001 and 2010. For each target market, individual 
cell in Table 3.5 represents the average value of each firm-level variable. IO(hc) and IO(tc) are 
the percentages of market capitalization of a firm held by institutional investors domiciled in 
home country and in target country, respectively. The mean of IO(hc) is 12.1% but varies widely 
across target markets; IO(hc) ranges between 1.6% for Singapore Exchange and 34.3% for cross-
listed firms on Six Swiss Exchange. The average value of IO(tc) is approximately 9% and is 
smaller than average for IO(hc). However, for cross-listed firms on U.S. markets, the U.S. 
institutional ownership is higher than the institutional ownership of home country institutions. 
 
We employ three variables, size, market capitalization, and analyst coverage, to measure firm 
level information environment. Size is the natural logarithm of total asset value (U.S. dollar in 
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millions) of a firm, and market capitalization is the natural logarithm of total market 
capitalization (U.S. dollar in millions) of a firm. Not surprisingly, size and market capitalization 
are highly correlated. Six Swiss Exchange and Tokyo Stock Exchange host cross-listings of 
larger firms. The Asian target markets, in general, host smaller firms. The distribution of average 
analyst coverage across target markets is similar to size and market capitalization. Firms with 
cross-listings on European target markets have better analyst coverage on average. 
 
Home market security illiquidity and target market security illiquidity are price impact measures 
(proposed by Amihud (2002)) of the ordinary home market security and the cross-listed security 
on the target market, respectively. A larger value for Amihud measure indicates that a security is 
more illiquid. On average, the cross-listed securities are more illiquid compared to its counterpart 
home market securities. Furthermore, the standard deviation of target market security illiquidity, 
96.5, is much larger than that of home market security illiquidity, 16. Unexpectedly, target 
market security illiquidity for cross-listed securities on NASDAQ has a substantially larger value 
indicating high illiquidity. However, this large value, 12.7, on illiquidity measure for cross-listed 
securities on NASDAQ is primarily driven by a few extreme observations; the range from the 
fifth to the ninety fifth percentile is from 0.00003 to 1.68 with the median value, 0.01.    
 
3.6.4 Summary statistics of market-level factors 
In Table 3.6, we show summary statistics of market-level factors by target market. We include 
geographical distance and time-zone difference in our multiple regression analyses to control for 
the effects of non-synchronous and asynchronous trading between the target and its counterpart 
home market. Geographical distance is the natural logarithm of the distance (in miles) between 
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the cities in which the target and its counterpart home market is located. Time-zone difference is 
the absolute value of the time-zone difference between the cities where the target and the target 
and its home market is located in. Geographical distance and time-zone difference are highly 
correlated as expected. Furthermore, we observe that the European target markets draw cross-
listings from countries closer than other target markets on average.  
 
Hm transaction cost and tm transaction cost are measures of market level transaction costs in 
respective markets, the home and the target market, compiled by Elkins McSherry. Our market 
level transaction cost measures are expressed in basis points, which is the sum of commissions, 
fees, transfer taxes, and price impact of block trades. On average, transaction cost in the target 
market is lower than in home markets. One notable exception is London Stock Exchange. 
London, which is one of the world’s largest financial centers have higher transaction costs than 
its counterpart home markets.   
 
To the extent that barriers to foreign investments could impede inter-market arbitrage activities, 
we include measures of financial development, hm capitalization-to-GDP and tm capitalization-
to-GDP, to proxy for foreign investment barriers in our multiple regression analyses. These 
variables are constructed as ratios of total market capitalization to GDP for respective 
markets/countries. We observe that the means for target markets are higher than those of home 
markets indicating that target markets are more financially developed compared to cross-listing 
firms’ home markets on average.   
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Poor investor protection would pose as an indirect restriction to investments including arbitrage 
activities. We use the investor protection index constructed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2006). Tm investor protection and hm investor protection are the values of investor 
protection index drawn from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) for the target and 
its counterpart home country, respectively. On average, tm investor protection is higher than hm 
investor protection. However, for the European target markets, home markets provide better 
investor protection than in target markets. 
 
Our variables on short sale restrictions are based on Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007). Tm short 
sale restriction and hm short sale restriction represent the degree of short sale restrictions in 
target and home market, respectively. Tm short sale restriction and hm short sale restriction take 
the value 0 if there is no restriction on short sales. We assign the value 0.5 to tm short sale 
restriction and hm short sale restriction if there are some restrictions on short selling. Tm short 
sale restriction and hm short sale restriction take the value 1 in cases where short selling is not 
allowed. The sample average for tm short sale restriction is lower than hm short sale restriction. 
However, in general, the degree of restrictions on short sales is similar between target and its 
counterpart home market.  
 
3.7 Preliminary regression results 
In this section, we test our main hypothesis via regression analysis. We have documented 
significant negative home market and positive target market excess comovement in the long 
(cross-listed share)-short (equivalent number of home market shares) position returns. Our 
ultimate goal is to examine the influence of global institutional investors on return differentials 
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between the cross-listed and its counterpart home market share. Specifically, we test whether 
institutional investors domiciled in home country induce excess comovement in the long-short 
returns with the home market returns. Similarly, we examine whether institutional investors 
domiciled in target country contribute to excess comovement in the long-short position returns 
with the target market returns.  
 
The annual panel includes 7,112 observations (firm-target market-year) for 1,164 firms with 
cross-listings on 19 target markets between 2001 and 2010. We estimate pooled ordinary least 
squares (pooled OLS) regressions with robust standard errors. In all regression specifications, 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, we cluster standard errors by firm. 
This allows for potential correlation among observations of the same firm across different years 
[Petersen (2009); Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006)].31 The dependent variables are excess 
comovement home market net beta and excess comovement target market net beta obtained by 
estimating time-series regression in (2). To control for the effects of non-synchronous trading 
between the cross-listed and its home market shares, we include geographical distance in our 
preliminary regressions.32 
 
Table 3.7 reports preliminary regression results. The dependent variable of Model (1), (2), and 
(3) is  excess comovement home market net beta, and the dependent variable for Model (4), (5), 
and (6) is excess comovement target market net beta. Model (2) and (4) include year fixed-effect. 
In addition to year fixed-effect, Model (3) and (6) include both home and target market fixed-
                                                          
31 Based on Petersen (2009), we do not cluster by year as our sample spans only over 10 years.  
32 We do not include time-zone difference in our regressions because geographical distance and time-zone 
difference are highly correlated. The correlation between geographical distance and time-zone difference 
is approximately 0.8. 
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effects to control for market level factors that may influence return differentials between the 
cross-listed and its home market share. The key variables are IO(hc) and IO(tc). IO(hc) is 
statistically significant at 1% level in Model (1), (2), and (3). The coefficients of IO(hc) are 
negative indicating that institutional investors domiciled in home country induce excess 
comovement in the long-short returns with the home market returns. The inclusion of target and 
home market fixed effects reduces the effect of IO(hc) considerably, from -0.0074 to -0.0026, in 
Model (3). One standard deviation (20.9) increase in IO(hc) decreases home market net beta by 
0.1 standard deviation (-0.0026*20.9/0.52).   
 
The results on excess comovement target market net beta are weaker. In Model (1) and (2) of 
Table 7, IO(tc) is not statistically significant. IO(tc) becomes statistically significant once we 
include home and target market fixed-effects. In Model (3), the estimated coefficient on IO(tc) is 
positive, 0.0009, indicating that institutional investors contribute to excess return comovement in 
the arbitrage position consisting of cross-listed and its home market shares with the target market 
returns. One standard deviation (14.2) increase in IO(tc) results in 0.03 standard deviation 
(0.0009*14.2/0.51) increase in target market net beta. Compared to the effect of IO(hc), the 
impact of IO(tc) on excess comovement is much smaller.  
 
3.8 Main regression results 
In this section, we discuss our main regression results. We test our main hypothesis controlling 
for known firm- and market-level factors that may influence return differentials between the 
cross-listed and its counterpart home market share. Our main test is based on the theory of Basak 
and Pavlova (2013). To remind our readers, our main hypothesis examines whether home 
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country institutional investors is associated with excess comovement in the long (cross-listed 
share)-short (the equivalent number of home market shares) returns with the home market 
returns. In addition, we test whether institutional investors domiciled in target country contribute 
to excess comovement in the long-short position returns with the target market returns.   
 
The annual panel includes 6,600 observations (firm-target market-year) for 1,107 firms with 
cross-listed securities on 19 target markets over the span of 2001 and 2010. We estimate pooled 
OLS regressions with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We also cluster standard 
errors by firm. The dependent variables are excess comovement home market net beta and 
excess comovement target market net beta estimated via time-series regression in (2). In all 
regression specifications, we include year, home and target emerging market, home and target 
market region fixed-effects. We include emerging market indicator variables for home and target 
market to capture the potential effect of capital control, which we often observe among emerging 
markets. Furthermore, we report multiple regression results on our sub-samples: sample of U.S. 
cross-listed securities, non-U.S. cross-listed securities, cross-listed-home-market-share pairs with 
synchronous trading hours, the pairs with non-synchronous trading hours. 
 
In Panel A of Table 3.8, we report regression results on all sample and sub-sample of U.S. and 
non-U.S. cross-listed securities. The dependent variable for Model (1), (2), and (3) is excess 
comovement home market net beta. Home market net betas are negative on average and, thus, 
the variables with a negative estimated coefficient intensify the negative excess comovements 
with home market. The dependent variable for Model (4), (5), and (6) is excess comovement 
target market net beta. Since target market betas are positive on average, the variables associated 
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with a positive regression coefficient induce the excess return comovements with target market. 
Model (1) and (4) use all samples. Model (2) and (5) employ a sample of U.S. cross-listed 
securities, and Model (3) and (6) use a sample of non-U.S. cross-listed securities. IO(hc) and 
IO(tc) are the key variables of interest.  
 
In Model (1), the estimated coefficient of IO(hc) is negative, -0.0037, and IO(hc) is statistically 
significant at 1% level. Thus, institutional investors domiciled in home country induce excess 
return comovement in the long-short position returns with the home market returns. One standard 
deviation (20.9) increase in IO(hc) results in 0.15 standard deviation (-0.0037*20.9/0.52) 
decrease in excess comovement home market net beta. 
 
Among our control variables, some results are consistent with our hypothesis, but some are 
contrary to what we expected. The estimated coefficient on tm security illiquidity is negative, 
which shows that illiquidity in cross-listed securities on target markets impedes arbitrage and 
exacerbates the excess return comovements. One standard deviation (96.5) increase in tm 
security illiquidity is associated with 0.33 standard deviation (-0.0018*96.5/0.52) decrease in 
home market net beta. The economic significance of tm security illiquidity is more than twice as 
large as that of IO(hc). Furthermore, we note that the sign of the coefficient on size is negative 
indicating that the excess negative comovement with the home market returns increases with the 
size of firm. Larger firms are better known to investors and that there is less information 
asymmetry. In addition, larger firm stocks tend to be more liquidity. In this regard, we would 
expect that price differences between the cross-listed and its counterpart home market share are 
more easily arbitraged away and, thus, return differentials between the two shares, the cross-
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listed and its counterpart home market share, are small. However, this is not we find from our 
regression results. Furthermore, to the contrary to our hypothesis, we find better investor 
protection in target market is associated with more intense excess negative comovement. After 
controlling for other factors, short sale restrictions in target and home market are not important 
explanatory variables. 
 
We report sub-sample results on U.S. cross-listed stocks and non-U.S. cross-listed stocks in 
Model (2) and (3), respectively. In Model (2), for U.S. cross-listed firms, we find that the 
estimated coefficient on IO(hc) is positive, 0.0022, indicating higher home country institutional 
ownership reduces the excess negative comovement in the long-short position returns with the 
home market returns. One standard deviation (12.5) increase in IO(hc) is associated with 0.07 
standard deviation (0.0022*12.5/0.38) increase in home market net beta. On the other hand, in 
the sub-sample results on a sample of non-U.S. cross-listed firms in Model (3), IO(hc) has a 
negative estimated regression coefficient, -0.0031. Thus, for non-U.S. cross-listed firms, higher 
institutional ownership by institutions domicile in the home country intensifies the excess 
negative comovement with the home market returns, which is what we find on our overall 
sample. One standard deviation (26.3) increase in IO(hc) decreases home market net beta by 0.13 
standard deviation (-0.0031*26.3/0.64). The absolute economic effect of IO(hc) is much larger 
for cross-listed stocks on non-U.S. target markets compared to those on U.S. target markets.  
 
In Panel A, Table 3.8, Model (4), (5), and (6) shows regression estimates on excess comovement 
target market net beta. In all models, Model (4), (5), and (6), we find that the estimated 
coefficients of IO(tc) are positive, but IO(tc) is not statistically significant. Thus, institutional 
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investors domiciled in target countries do not exert significant influence on the excess 
comovement in the long-short position returns with the target market returns. This result may be 
because the trading patterns and demand for cross-listed securities are different from those of 
local stocks, and that, generally, target country institutional investors do not trade cross-listed 
stocks in coordination with other local stock holdings.  
 
Furthermore, in general, we expect the influence of other control variables on net target market 
betas to be of opposite sign to the home market betas. Illiquidity in ordinary home market shares 
exacerbate the excess comovement in returns with the target markets as the estimated coefficient 
on hm security illiquidity is positive but significant only at 10% level. However, in Model (4), 
the influence of tm short sale restriction is different compared to Model (1). In Model (4), 
unexpectedly, the restrictions on short sales in target market reduce the intensity of excess 
comovement with the target market returns. Furthermore, higher transaction cost in target market 
is associated with lower excess comovement. 
 
Model (5) shows the regression estimates on a sample of U.S. cross-listed stocks. We note that 
the adjusted r-squared of Model 5 is 0.5, which is the largest among Model (1)-(6). One notable 
result is that the estimated coefficient of geographical distance is negative. As the geographical 
distance between the target and its counterpart home market increases, the excess positive 
comovement in the long-short pair returns with the target market returns decreases. However, we 
would expect the opposite as the distance between the target and the home market poses as an 
impediment to arbitrage activity. The inclusion of target and home market region fixed-effects 
may be adding to the complexity in the effects of geographical distance. In Model (5), we note 
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that the restriction on short sales in home market intensifies the excess comovement with the 
target market returns. Model (6) is estimated using a sample of non-U.S. cross-listed stocks. For 
cross-listed securities on non-U.S. target markets, better investor protection in home market 
reduces the excess positive comovement. Furthermore, we note that our regression models 
explain a substantial fraction of the cross-sectional and time series variation in the estimated net 
home and target market betas: the adjusted r-squared for our models range from 0.15 to 0.49 in 
Model (1) through Model (6). 
 
To separate out the effects of non-synchronous trading due to trading hour difference between 
target and it counterpart home market, we split our sample into two: cross-listed-home-market-
share pairs with synchronous trading hours and the pairs with non-synchronous trading hours. In 
Panel B of Table 3.8, Model (7) and (8) show regression estimates on excess comovement home 
market net beta, and the dependent variable for Model (9) and (10) is excess comovement target 
market net beta. The sample for Model (7) and (9) is the cross-listed-home-market-share pairs 
with synchronous trading hours. Model (8) and (10) are estimated using a sample of the pairs 
with non-synchronous trading hours. 
 
Our key variables are IO(hc) and IO(tc). In Model (7), for the pairs with synchronous trading 
hours, the estimated coefficient of IO(hc) negative, -0.0012, indicating that the presence of 
institutional investors in home country increases the excess negative comovement in the long-
short pair returns with the home market returns. On standard deviation (14.8) increase in IO(hc) 
results in 0.05 standard deviation (-0.0012*14.8/0.39) decrease in home market net beta. In 
Model (7), we note that IO(hc) is statistically significant at 5% level. Furthermore, for the pairs 
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with non-synchronous trading hours between the target and the counterpart home market, the 
estimated regression coefficient on IO(hc) is negative, -0.0035, and statistically significant at the 
1% level. On standard deviation (24.6) increase in IO(hc) decreases home market net beta by 
0.15 standard deviation (-0.0035*24.6/0.57). The economic significance of IO(hc) in Model (7) 
is only one third of the effect in Model (8). However, we note that a direct comparison of these 
economic significance may be difficult as the estimated excess comovement home market net 
beta may be affected by non-synchronous trading.   
 
In Model (4), (5), and (6), IO(tc) did not appear to be an important explanatory variable for target 
market risk exposures, and did not play a role in understanding excess comovements with the 
target market returns. In Model (9), for the cross-listed-home-market-share pairs with 
synchronous trading hours, the estimated coefficient of IO(tc) positive, 0.001, indicating that the 
presence of institutional investors domiciled in target country intensifies the excess positive 
comovement in the long-short pair returns with the target market returns. One standard deviation 
(16.5) increase in IO(tc) increases target market net beta by 0.04 standard deviation 
(0.001*16.5/0.38). Thus, the economic significance of IO(tc) is small. On the other hand, for the 
pairs with non-synchronous trading hours, in Model (10), we find that institutional investors in 
target country do not exert significant influence on excess return comovements as IO(tc) is not 
statistically significant in Model (10).   
 
In summary, we find that institutional investors induce excess comovement in returns. In overall 
sample, the higher the institutional ownership by home country institutions, the more intense the 
excess negative comovements in the long (one cross-listed share)-short (the equivalent number 
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of home market shares) position returns with the home market returns. However, for a sample of 
U.S. cross-listed securities, institutional investors domiciled in home country reduce the intensity 
of excess comovement in the long-short position returns with the home market returns. Our 
results on target market net betas are weaker. Our regression analysis on overall sample indicates 
that IO(tc) is not a significant explanatory variable for target market risk exposures. However, 
for the cross-listed-home-market-share pairs with synchronous trading hours between the target 
and its counterpart home market, we find that institutional investors domiciled in target country 
exacerbate the excess positive comovement in the long-short position returns with the target 
market returns.   
  
3.9 Robustness test 
Our sample consists of stocks traded in different markets around the world. In many cases, 
trading hours between target and it counterpart home market are not synchronous. As intraday 
security prices are typically not available for non-U.S. markets, we used daily return series 
computed from closing prices in estimating (2). Non-synchronous trading that stems from either 
non-synchronized trading hours or infrequent trading can induce spurious cross-autocorrelations 
in cross-listed and home market share returns, and would artificially result in a mean-reverting 
structure in the return differentials between the cross-listed and its home market security in 
estimating (2). To control for this effect, we included the mean-reversion term in (2). 
 
One way to control for the effects of non-synchronous trading between the cross-listed and its 
home market shares is to use security returns measured over longer period. For our robustness 
test, we increase return measurement horizon to 1 week from daily. Furthermore, by using 
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security returns measured over longer period (1 week returns), we can observe the extent to 
which the return differentials between the cross-listed and its counterpart home market share, 
their mean-reversion tendency, and excess comovement in returns are transitory.  
 
We measure weekly returns from Wednesday to Wednesday to reduce any potential noise from 
Monday or Friday effects. Using weekly returns, we re-estimate time-series regressions specified 
in (2) without the lead and lag terms on returns to obtain weekly beta estimates. Given a sample 
year and for each cross-listed-home-market-share pair, we require 12 weekly return observations 
in estimating (2). In Table 9, we report summary statistics of estimated regression coefficients 
obtained by estimating (2) using weekly return series. In comparison with Table 3.3, 
surprisingly, we observe that the distribution of mean-reversion coefficients estimated using 
weekly returns is similar the distribution of mean-reversion coefficients estimated using daily 
return series. Clearly, by examining the mean values in Table 3.9, we note that the absolute size 
of the estimated coefficients using weekly returns on target market and home market returns are 
smaller than those estimated using daily return data. This suggests that excess comovement in 
the long (a cross-listed share)-short (the equivalent number of home market shares) pair returns 
with the target and its counterpart home market index returns is transitory to some degree.  
 
Furthermore, we re-estimate our panel regressions to examine the sources of excess comovement 
in the long-short pair returns with the respective market index returns. Our panel regression 
results are reported in Table 3.10. The annual panel includes 6,640 observations (firm-target 
market-year) for 1,113 firms with cross-listed securities on 19 target markets over the span of 
2001 and 2010. We estimate pooled OLS regressions. Furthermore, we cluster standard errors by 
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firm. In Table 10, the dependent variables are excess comovement home market net beta and 
excess comovement target market net beta for Model (1) and (2), respectively. For Model (1) and 
(2) in Table 9, we include year, home and target emerging market, home and target market 
region fixed-effects. We also include emerging market indicator variables for home and target 
markets to capture the potential effect of capital control and foreign investment restrictions. 
 
From Model (1) in Table 3.10, we find that the estimated coefficient on IO(hc) is negative, -
0.0014, and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that an increase in institutional 
ownership by home country institutions (IO(hc)) intensifies excess comovement in the long-short 
pair returns with the home market returns. One standard deviation (20.9) increase in IO(hc) 
results in 0.06 standard deviation (-0.0014*20.9/0.5) decrease in home market beta. It is not 
surprising to find that the economic significance of IO(hc) is only one third in magnitude 
compared to its influence on home market net beta estimated using daily returns. In Model (2), 
IO(tc) has a positive estimated regression coefficient, 0.0007, which indicates that an increase in 
IO(tc) exacerbates excess comovement in the long-short pair returns with the target market index 
returns. However, IO(tc) is statistically significant only at the 10% level. One standard deviation 
(14.2) increase in IO(tc) is associated with 0.02 standard deviation (0.0007*14.2/0.52) increase 
in target market beta. Thus, IO(tc) has negligible economic impact on excess comovement. 
Furthermore, the adjusted r-squared for Model (1) and (2) in Table 9 are much smaller compared 
to those from the regressions that use excess comovement market beta estimates based on daily 
returns.     
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3.10 Conclusion 
In an integrated global stock market, arbitrage should ensure that the return deviations between 
the cross-listed (target market) security and its counterpart home market security is zero. If the 
arbitrage is perfect, the return differential between the cross-listed and its counterpart home 
market share is zero, and the return differential is not exposed to any risks. However, a number 
of studies uncovered systematic components related to market returns and exchange rate changes 
in the returns of arbitrage portfolios consist of a long position in a cross-listed share and short 
positions in its ordinary home market shares. 
 
In this paper, using 1,666 cross-listed securities on 19 target markets from 60 different home 
markets around the world, we document that the return differential between the cross-listed and 
its counterpart home market share is small, 0.8 basis points, on average. However, we find that 
the return differentials between the cross-listed and its ordinary home market share, though 
small, exhibit excess comovements relative to market index returns, the home and the target 
market returns. These particular phenomena on excess return comovements are first studied with 
a small sample of dual-listed companies by Froot and Dabora (1999). De Jong, Rosenthal, and 
van Dijk (2009) examines a complete set of dual-listed companies around the world. More 
recently, Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) uncovers excess comovement in returns for U.S. cross-
listed stocks. We show that excess comovement in stock returns are not limited to a sample of 
U.S. cross-listed stocks but, in fact, pervasive among a large number of cross-listed-home-
market-share pairs trading around the world.       
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In examining sources of excess comovement in the long (a cross-listed share)-short (the 
equivalent number of counterpart home market shares) pair returns with respective market index 
returns, we test our hypothesis based on the theories put forth by Basak and Pavlova (2013). 
Specifically, we test whether coordinated trading by institutional investors domiciled in home 
country induces to the excess comovement of the return differentials between the cross-listed and 
its counterpart home market share with the fluctuations of home market index. With parallel to 
this, we also examine whether the target country institutional investors induce the excess 
comovement of the return differentials with the target market index returns. 
 
We find that, in general, institutional investors domiciled in home country intensify the excess 
comovement in the long-short position returns with the home market returns. For U.S. cross-
listed securities, however, stronger presence of home country institutional investors reduces the 
intensity of excess comovement in the long-short position returns with the home market returns. 
Our results on target market net betas are weaker. Our findings indicate that target country 
institutional investors do not exert significant influence on the return dynamics of the long-short 
position. However, for the cross-listed-home-market-share pairs with synchronous trading hours 
between the target and its counterpart home market, we find that institutional investors domiciled 
in target country exacerbate the excess comovement in the long-short position returns with the 
target market returns.  
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Table 3.1: 
This table reports the distribution of cross-listings (secondary listings) across 19 target (“host”) exchanges grouped by home market region and home country’s degree of economic development 
(developed vs. emerging). We use the list of developed and emerging countries from International Financial Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group. Our sample period spans from January 2001 to 
December 2010. The first coordinate in each cell in the table represents the number of cross-listings, and the second coordinate in each cell, which is in parenthesis, represents the number of cross-listed 
securities that have at least 60 computable daily return data associated with strictly positive trading volume in any sample year. There are a total of 2,726 cross-listed securities during the period between 
2001 and 2010. Furthermore, there are 1,666 cross-listed securities that have at least 60 computable daily return data in any sample year.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
target market
Australia 35 (25) 37 (24) 26 (22) . . 2 (2) . . 1 . . . . . 101 (73)
Hong Kong 10 (5) 11 (5) 4 (3) . . . . 2 . 68 (64) . . . . 95 (77)
Singapore . . 20 (14) 4 (2) . . . . . . 5 (4) . . . . 29 (20)
Taiwan . . 22 (16) . . . . 1 (1) . . . . . . . . 23 (17)
Tokyo 16 (11) 3 (3) 22 (9) . . . . . . 2 (2) . . . . 43 (25)
Lima 37 (13) . . 5 (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 (15)
NASDAQ 76 (68) 12 (11) 58 (46) 36 (36) 2 (2) 7 (7) 3 (3) 1 (1) . . 195 (174)
New York 201 (189) 20 (18) 120 (116) 4 (4) 6 (5) 107 (98) 39 (38) 3 (3) 1 (1) 501 (472)
Toronto 58 (39) 37 (20) 24 (13) . . 1 . 1 . . . . . . . 121 (72)
Euronext Amsterdam 44 (7) . . 65 (34) . . . . . . 1 (1) . . . . 110 (42)
Euronext Brussels 10 (9) . . 41 (32) 1 (1) 2 (1) . . . . . . . . 54 (43)
Euronext Lisbon . . . . 5 (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 (3)
Euronext Paris 39 (29) 2 (1) 110 (68) . . 6 (4) 1 (1) . . . . . . 158 (103)
Europe Frankfurt 85 (55) 12 (4) 101 (58) 1 (1) 3 (1) 4 . 3 (1) 22 (3) 2 (1) 233 (124)
& Africa London 228 (66) 60 (40) 354 (100) 6 (1) 10 (4) . . 28 (6) 27 (19) 4 . 717 (236)
Luxembourg . . . . 19 (2) . . 1 . 3 . 28 (1) 3 . 1 . 55 (3)
Oslo 19 (9) . . 11 (10) . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 (19)
Swiss 84 (61) 2 (2) 77 (56) . . 3 (1) 1 . . . . . . . 167 (120)
Johannesburg 10 (6) 4 (3) 29 (19) . . 4 . . . . . . . . . 47 (28)
Total 952 (592) 242 (161) 1,075 (595) 48 (43) 41 (21) 126 (106) 178 (120) 56 (26) 8 (2) 2,726 (1,666)
Number of cross-listed securities by target market and home market region
Asia
America
Emerging
Africa
Emerging
Americas
Developed
Americas
Developed
Asia
Developed
Europe
Developed
Middle East total
home market region
Emerging
Asia
Emerging
Europe
Emerging
Middle East
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Table 3.2: Panel A 
Table 3.2 Panel A reports summary statistics of return differences for a sample of 1,666 target (“host”) market cross-listed and the counterpart home market ordinary share pairs from January 2001 to 
December 2010. The table shows summary statistics based on all sample, a sub-sample of cross-listed-home-market-share pairs with synchronous trading hours, and cross-listed pairs with non-
synchronous trading hours. We only include cross-listed security pairs with at least 60 computable daily return data associated with strictly positive trading volume in any sample year. Each pair consists 
of a long position in one target market cross-listed share and a short position in an equivalent (adjusted for bundling ratio) number of shares in the counterpart home market security. All return data are 
generated using daily closing prices in target market currency from DataStream International. 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀denotes the return difference between the cross-listed security on the target market and its 
counterpart home market security on day t.33 Number of trading days is the average number of days with computable daily return data in a given year for each cross-listed-home-market-share pairs. 
Table 3.2 Panel B shows summary statistics of return difference by target market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 = [ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑀𝑙 ) −  ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝐻𝑀 )] ×  100 
number of standard 1st 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 99th
year trading days deviation percentile percentile percentile percentile percentile percentile percentile
2001 0.032 2.02 183.1 3.35 -9.61 -2.99 -1.17 0.01 1.21 3.04 10.00
2002 0.020 1.95 191.8 3.20 -9.08 -2.92 -1.17 0.00 1.18 2.95 9.27
2003 0.026 1.59 195.8 2.68 -7.33 -2.35 -0.93 0.01 0.96 2.40 7.59
2004 0.003 1.33 199.3 2.28 -6.55 -1.94 -0.77 0.00 0.78 1.95 6.50
All 2005 0.005 1.23 196.8 2.10 -6.16 -1.80 -0.69 0.00 0.70 1.80 6.18
sample 2006 -0.002 1.29 195.2 2.22 -6.67 -1.91 -0.71 0.00 0.71 1.91 6.61
2007 -0.015 1.47 192.4 2.51 -7.43 -2.23 -0.81 -0.01 0.78 2.17 7.50
2008 0.013 2.52 193.1 4.24 -12.54 -3.80 -1.38 0.00 1.38 3.80 12.88
2009 -0.002 2.12 201.3 3.51 -10.30 -3.16 -1.25 0.00 1.24 3.14 10.29
2010 0.008 1.49 207.1 2.49 -7.24 -2.18 -0.85 0.00 0.88 2.25 7.23
overall 0.008 1.69 195.6 2.92 -8.51 -2.49 -0.93 0.00 0.94 2.49 8.67
Synchronous trading hours 0.009 1.41 199.4 2.50 -7.40 -2.05 -0.73 0.00 0.74 2.06 7.52
Non-synchronous trading hours 0.008 1.95 192.1 3.25 -9.40 -2.86 -1.15 0.00 1.15 2.86 9.59
Panel A: Summary statistics of return difference
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Table 3.2: Panel B 
Table 3.2 Panel B reports summary statistics of return differences by target market for a sample of 1,666 target (“host”) market cross-listed and the counterpart home market ordinary share pairs from 
January 2001 to December 2010. We only include cross-listed security pairs with at least 60 computable daily return data associated with strictly positive trading volume in any sample year. Each pair 
consists of a long position in one target market cross-listed share and a short position in an equivalent (adjusted for bundling ratio) number of shares in the counterpart home market security. All return 
data are generated using daily closing prices in target market currency from DataStream International. 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀denotes the return difference between the cross-listed security on the target market and its 
counterpart home market security on day t.34 Number of trading days is the average number of days with computable daily return data in a given year for each cross-listed-home-market-share pairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 = [ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑀𝑙 ) −  ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝐻𝑀 )] ×  100 
Panel B: Summary statistics of return difference: by target market
number of standard 1st 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 99th
target market trading days deviation percentile percentile percentile percentile percentile percentile percentile
Australia 0.036 2.32 180.5 3.74 -10.97 -3.43 -1.36 0.01 1.43 3.48 11.18
Hong Kong 0.039 2.61 200.3 3.61 -9.21 -4.04 -1.94 0.00 1.93 4.12 10.01
Singapore 0.040 3.04 152.4 5.07 -16.05 -4.45 -1.77 0.00 1.77 4.53 16.80
Taiwan -0.015 2.85 174.5 4.13 -11.61 -4.59 -1.97 -0.01 1.98 4.60 10.48
Tokyo 0.080 3.07 126.1 4.93 -14.89 -4.45 -1.80 0.10 1.98 4.49 14.84
Lima -0.022 1.68 181.8 3.03 -9.73 -2.39 -0.82 0.01 0.82 2.36 9.04
NASDAQ 0.008 1.88 198.4 3.12 -9.12 -2.80 -1.10 0.00 1.09 2.81 9.36
New York 0.008 1.31 214.3 2.33 -6.58 -1.87 -0.74 0.00 0.73 1.88 6.75
Toronto 0.014 2.48 165.1 4.27 -12.33 -3.83 -1.30 -0.01 1.26 3.71 13.47
Euronext Amsterdam -0.002 1.55 182.6 2.70 -8.38 -2.41 -0.76 0.00 0.79 2.35 8.50
Euronext Brussels 0.014 1.48 179.9 2.39 -6.84 -2.24 -0.89 0.00 0.92 2.28 6.89
Euronext Lisbon 0.013 0.72 233.2 1.15 -3.17 -1.10 -0.44 0.01 0.48 1.08 3.26
Euronext Paris 0.009 1.61 201.4 2.67 -7.83 -2.41 -0.93 0.00 0.94 2.42 8.04
Europe Frankfurt 0.001 1.86 180.5 3.00 -8.86 -2.83 -1.11 0.00 1.11 2.82 8.91
& Africa London -0.018 2.03 167.8 3.64 -11.30 -3.01 -1.01 0.00 1.03 3.00 10.67
Luxembourg 0.024 1.43 205.4 2.18 -6.94 -2.22 -0.88 0.00 0.99 2.21 6.78
Oslo -0.026 2.53 195.9 4.11 -13.00 -3.72 -1.53 0.00 1.55 3.70 11.72
Swiss 0.014 1.54 176.4 2.46 -6.94 -2.27 -0.95 0.02 0.99 2.32 6.87
Johannesburg -0.018 1.76 211.6 3.19 -9.70 -2.46 -0.93 0.00 0.91 2.44 9.46
Asia
America
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Table 3.3: Panel A, Panel B 
Table 3.3 Panel A reports summary statistics of time series regression estimated using (2). We present distributional information on the estimated regression coefficients and associated p-values for 
8,950 observations (firm-target market-year) in Panel A of Table 3.3.Using daily return data, given a sample year, for each cross-listed security on target market l of firm i, we estimate, 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑙−𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑙−𝑖𝑀𝑅  𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀  + ∑ 𝛽𝑗−𝑖𝑇𝑀𝑙𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝑇𝑀𝑙𝑗=+1𝑗=−1  + ∑ 𝛽𝑗−𝑖𝐻𝑀𝑟𝑡+𝑗−𝑖𝐻𝑀𝑗=+1𝑗=−1  + ∑ 𝛽𝑗−𝑖𝐹𝑋𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝐹𝑋𝑗=+1𝑗=−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 – (2) 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 is the daily return difference between the target market security and its counterpart home market security based on target country currency denomination, 𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝑇𝑀𝑙 indicates the target market 
index daily return (in terms of target country currency), 𝑟𝑡+𝑗−𝑖
𝐻𝑀  is the home market index return (in terms of home market currency), and 𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝐹𝑋  is the currency return for the home country of firm i relative 
to the target country currency.35 We only include cross-listed-home-market-share pairs with at least 60 computable daily return data associated with strictly positive trading volume in any sample year. 
Each pair consists of a long position in one cross-listed share and a short position in the equivalent (adjusted for bundling ratio) number of shares in the counterpart home market security. In (2), if the 
closing time of the target market is earlier than the home market, then 𝛽−1−𝑖
𝐻𝑀 =0 and 𝛽+1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 =0. We impose the restriction, 𝛽+1−𝑖
𝐻𝑀 =0 and 𝛽−1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 =0, in (2) for the cases where the target market’s closing time is 
later than that of the home market. When the closing time of the target and the home market is synchronized, we set 𝛽−1−𝑖
𝐻𝑀 = 𝛽+1−𝑖
𝐻𝑀 = 𝛽−1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 = 𝛽+1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 =0 in (2). We drop all terms on currency returns in (2) 
when the target and the home country have the same currency. The daily return series are computed using closing prices in estimating (2). We draw daily data from DataStream International. The 
reported p-values on the mean-reversion coefficient are based on t-tests of the hypothesis that the coefficient of the mean-reversion term is equal to zero. The reported p-values on the net excess 
comovement market betas and the coefficients on exchange rate changes are for tests of the hypothesis that the coefficients of lagged, contemporaneous, and leading risk exposures are jointly zero. Panel 
B of Table 3.3 separately shows sample summary statistics and p-values for cross-listed-home-market-share pairs with synchronous trading hours (4,220 observations) and with non-synchronous trading 
hours (4,730 observations), respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 = [ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑀𝑙 ) −  ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝐻𝑀 )] ×  100 
Panel A
Estimated betas and p-values
N = 8,950 intercept coeffcient p-value coeffcient p-value coeffcient p-value coeffcient p-value adj. r-squared
mean 0.000 -0.38 0.04 -0.32 0.24 0.33 0.25 -0.29 0.29 0.29
standard deviation 0.002 0.14 0.15 0.52 0.30 0.51 0.30 40.99 0.30 0.18
10th percentile -0.001 -0.52 0.00 -0.94 0.00 -0.14 0.00 -1.18 0.00 0.09
25th percentile 0.000 -0.47 0.00 -0.57 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.48 0.01 0.17
50th percentile 0.000 -0.40 0.00 -0.24 0.08 0.26 0.09 -0.06 0.18 0.27
75th percentile 0.000 -0.32 0.00 -0.03 0.44 0.59 0.45 0.23 0.52 0.38
90th percentile 0.001 -0.18 0.08 0.17 0.75 0.95 0.76 0.94 0.79 0.55
Panel B
Estimated betas by trading hours
mean reversion hm net beta tm net beta fx net beta adj. r-squared mean reversion hm net beta tm net beta fx net beta adj. r-squared
mean -0.39 -0.13 0.14 -0.43 0.25 -0.36 -0.48 0.51 -0.16 0.33
standard deviation 0.16 0.39 0.38 56.74 0.13 0.12 0.57 0.56 17.53 0.20
10th percentile -0.54 -0.53 -0.20 -1.29 0.08 -0.50 -1.13 -0.06 -1.14 0.09
25th percentile -0.49 -0.29 -0.02 -0.25 0.17 -0.44 -0.76 0.19 -0.60 0.18
50th percentile -0.44 -0.11 0.12 0.00 0.25 -0.38 -0.45 0.48 -0.22 0.30
75th percentile -0.35 0.02 0.30 0.26 0.32 -0.30 -0.15 0.80 0.19 0.46
90th percentile -0.13 0.24 0.53 1.15 0.40 -0.20 0.09 1.15 0.84 0.62
mean reversion hm net beta tm net beta fx net beta
Synchronous trading hours, N = 4,220 Non-synchronous trading hours, N = 4,730
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Table 3.4 
Table 3.4 presents the mean values of estimated coefficients of time series regression in (2) across 19 target markets grouped by home market region and home country’s degree of economic 
development (developed vs. emerging).36 Using daily return data, given a sample year, for each cross-listed security on target market l of firm i, we estimate, 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑙−𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑙−𝑖𝑀𝑅  𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀  + ∑ 𝛽𝑗−𝑖𝑇𝑀𝑙𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝑇𝑀𝑙𝑗=+1𝑗=−1  + ∑ 𝛽𝑗−𝑖𝐻𝑀𝑟𝑡+𝑗−𝑖𝐻𝑀𝑗=+1𝑗=−1  + ∑ 𝛽𝑗−𝑖𝐹𝑋𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝐹𝑋𝑗=+1𝑗=−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 – (2) 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 is the daily return difference between the target market security and its counterpart home market security based on target country currency denomination, 𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝑇𝑀𝑙 indicates the target market 
index daily return (in terms of target country currency), 𝑟𝑡+𝑗−𝑖
𝐻𝑀  is the home market index return (in terms of home market currency), and 𝑟𝑡+𝑗𝐹𝑋  is the currency return for the home country of firm i relative 
to the target country currency.37 We only include cross-listed-home-market-share pairs with at least 60 computable daily return data associated with strictly positive trading volume in any sample year. 
Each pair consists of a long position in one cross-listed share and a short position in the equivalent (adjusted for bundling ratio) number of shares in the counterpart home market security. In (2), if the 
closing time of the target market is earlier than the home market, then 𝛽−1−𝑖
𝐻𝑀 =0 and 𝛽+1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 =0. We impose the restriction, 𝛽+1−𝑖
𝐻𝑀 =0 and 𝛽−1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 =0, in (2) for the cases where the target market’s closing time is 
later than that of the home market. When the closing time of the target and the home market is synchronized, we set 𝛽−1−𝑖
𝐻𝑀 = 𝛽+1−𝑖
𝐻𝑀 = 𝛽−1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 = 𝛽+1−𝑖
𝑇𝑀𝑙 =0 in (2). We drop all terms on currency returns in (2) 
when the target and the home country have the same currency. The daily return series are computed using closing prices in estimating (2). We draw daily data from DataStream International. 
 
                                                          
36 We use the list of developed and emerging countries from International Financial Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group. 
37 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙−𝐻𝑀 = [ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑀𝑙/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑀𝑙 ) −  ln (𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑀/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝐻𝑀 )] ×  100 
Developed Developed Developed Developed Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging total
target market Americas Asia Europe Middle East Africa Americas Asia Europe Middle East mean
mean reversion -0.32 -0.39 -0.26 . -0.35 . . . . -0.34
hm net beta -0.85 -0.19 -0.38 . -0.86 . . . . -0.46
tm net beta 0.59 0.15 0.18 . 0.54 . . . . 0.30
mean reversion -0.35 -0.33 -0.34 . . . -0.05 . . -0.08
hm net beta -1.19 -0.45 -0.92 . . . 0.16 . . 0.06
tm net beta 0.50 0.28 0.60 . . . 0.43 . . 0.44
mean reversion . -0.29 -0.18 . . . -0.14 . . -0.24
hm net beta . -0.20 0.01 . . . -0.22 . . -0.19
tm net beta . 0.24 0.48 . . . 0.68 . . 0.38
mean reversion . -0.11 . . -0.01 . . . . -0.10
hm net beta . -0.44 . . 0.05 . . . . -0.37
tm net beta . 0.39 . . 0.11 . . . . 0.35
mean reversion -0.36 -0.32 -0.34 . . . -0.27 . . -0.34
hm net beta -1.02 -0.93 -1.02 . . . -0.43 . . -0.97
tm net beta 0.58 0.29 0.40 . . . 0.22 . . 0.44
mean reversion -0.41 . -0.37 . . . . . . -0.40
hm net beta -0.17 . -0.18 . . . . . . -0.17
tm net beta 0.01 . 0.29 . . . . . . 0.07
mean reversion -0.46 -0.33 -0.36 -0.37 -0.38 -0.39 -0.26 -0.38 . -0.40
hm net beta -0.05 -0.34 -0.50 -0.48 -0.35 0.00 -0.53 -0.49 . -0.29
tm net beta 0.07 0.51 0.61 0.48 0.38 0.22 1.22 0.74 . 0.36
mean reversion -0.45 -0.37 -0.38 -0.32 -0.40 -0.37 -0.24 -0.34 -0.33 -0.39
hm net beta -0.09 -0.56 -0.53 -0.25 -0.57 -0.07 -0.22 -0.27 -0.45 -0.24
tm net beta 0.12 0.74 0.63 0.15 0.55 0.19 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.38
mean reversion -0.43 -0.29 -0.29 . . . . . . -0.38
hm net beta -0.15 -0.64 -0.09 . . . . . . -0.26
tm net beta 0.01 0.94 0.27 . . . . . . 0.27
Estimated betas by target market and home market region
Developed Home Market Emerging Home Market
Asia
America
Australia
Hong Kong
Singapore
Taiwan
Tokyo
Lima
NASDAQ
New York
Toronto
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Table 3.4 (cont’d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developed Developed Developed Developed Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging
target market Americas Asia Europe Middle East Africa Americas Asia Europe Middle East mean
mean reversion -0.37 . -0.42 . . . -0.06 . . -0.42
hm net beta -0.84 . -0.18 . . . -0.41 . . -0.24
tm net beta 0.52 . 0.08 . . . 0.62 . . 0.13
mean reversion -0.39 . -0.44 -0.07 -0.42 . . . . -0.42
hm net beta -0.54 . -0.25 1.27 -0.24 . . . . -0.30
tm net beta 0.45 . 0.11 0.02 0.06 . . . . 0.18
mean reversion . . -0.44 . . . . . . -0.44
hm net beta . . -0.13 . . . . . . -0.13
tm net beta . . 0.08 . . . . . . 0.08
mean reversion -0.41 -0.17 -0.42 . -0.39 -0.42 . . . -0.42
hm net beta -0.92 -0.93 -0.28 . -0.36 -1.64 . . . -0.51
tm net beta 0.57 0.71 0.12 . -0.06 0.79 . . . 0.26
mean reversion -0.43 -0.36 -0.44 -0.03 -0.45 . -0.35 -0.36 -0.46 -0.43
hm net beta -0.84 0.01 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21 . -0.41 0.08 -0.53 -0.47
Europe tm net beta 0.60 0.38 0.08 0.97 0.15 . 0.32 0.09 -1.57 0.33
& Africa mean reversion -0.33 -0.25 -0.40 -0.18 -0.32 . -0.22 -0.33 . -0.35
hm net beta -0.73 -0.17 -0.15 0.08 -0.22 . -0.27 -0.04 . -0.29
tm net beta 0.48 0.16 0.00 0.81 -0.05 . 0.27 0.05 . 0.15
mean reversion . . -0.44 . . . -0.50 . . -0.45
hm net beta . . -0.25 . . . -0.45 . . -0.27
tm net beta . . 0.08 . . . 1.00 . . 0.19
mean reversion -0.35 . -0.40 . . . . . . -0.37
hm net beta -0.56 . -0.12 . . . . . . -0.34
tm net beta 0.48 . 0.10 . . . . . . 0.29
mean reversion -0.44 -0.44 -0.47 . -0.43 . . . . -0.45
hm net beta -0.89 -0.59 -0.39 . -0.27 . . . . -0.64
tm net beta 0.67 0.58 0.23 . -0.20 . . . . 0.45
mean reversion -0.30 -0.21 -0.40 . . . . . . -0.38
hm net beta -0.95 -0.68 -0.34 . . . . . . -0.44
tm net beta 0.55 0.61 0.24 . . . . . . 0.30
mean reversion -0.38
hm net beta -0.32
tm net beta 0.33
Sample mean
-0.40 -0.27
-0.37 -0.09
0.32 0.40
Estimated betas by target market and home market region (cont 'd)
Developed Home Market Emerging Home Market
Euronext Amsterdam
Euronext Brussels
Euronext Lisbon
Euronext Paris
Frankfurt
London
Luxembourg
Oslo
Swiss
Johannesburg
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Table 3.5 
Table 3.5 reports summary statistics of firm-level factors by target market. Our sample includes 1,666 cross-listed securities between 2001 and 2010. For each target market, individual cell in Table 3.5 
represents the average value of each firm-level variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
hm analyst hm security tm security hm share of tm share of
target market IO(hc) IO(tc) size mrkt. cap. estimates illiquidity illiquidity trading volume trading volume
Australia 13.2 0.4 13.7 6.8 8.0 0.5 2.0 0.71 0.24
Hong Kong 3.9 1.4 15.3 8.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.62 0.35
Singapore 1.6 0.5 13.3 5.8 7.5 8.4 0.8 0.67 0.33
Taiwan 4.8 0.2 12.6 5.3 6.4 0.7 0.1 0.37 0.63
Tokyo 22.5 0.1 18.8 10.7 22.0 0.0 0.9 0.88 0.02
Lima 12.2 0.0 14.6 7.4 19.0 0.3 0.2 0.73 0.22
NASDAQ 6.2 19.5 12.9 6.1 8.4 0.6 12.7 0.49 0.51
New York 7.6 14.7 15.5 8.1 12.8 0.2 0.1 0.61 0.37
Toronto 23.1 4.8 12.5 5.9 5.6 0.7 2.1 0.76 0.22
Euronext Amsterdam 7.6 1.0 16.2 8.6 20.3 5.4 1.1 0.66 0.23
Euronext Brussels 18.0 0.2 17.3 9.7 21.9 0.1 0.8 0.79 0.08
Euronext Lisbon 2.5 0.0 19.6 10.4 28.1 0.0 0.0 0.97 0.00
Euronext Paris 22.0 0.9 17.1 9.7 18.9 0.0 5.1 0.83 0.06
Europe Frankfurt 27.7 0.6 15.6 8.1 15.8 0.1 1.7 0.90 0.05
& Africa London 7.3 3.1 14.5 7.4 12.0 3.1 4.5 0.68 0.27
Luxembourg 4.0 0.0 15.8 8.1 18.8 0.1 0.3 0.86 0.13
Oslo 18.9 5.6 13.1 6.1 7.9 10.0 0.4 0.50 0.49
Swiss 34.3 0.3 17.5 10.2 24.2 0.0 0.5 0.87 0.03
Johannesburg 5.2 2.4 15.4 8.0 9.2 0.0 0.4 0.68 0.25
mean 12.1 9.0 15.2 7.9 13.7 0.8 2.7 0.67 0.29
standard deviation 20.9 14.2 2.8 2.4 10.6 16.0 96.5 0.29 0.29
25th percentile 0.0 0.3 13.2 6.1 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.44 0.03
50th percentile 1.8 2.3 15.4 8.1 11.5 0.0 0.0 0.76 0.17
75th percentile 12.6 11.3 17.3 9.8 20.1 0.0 0.2 0.94 0.50
Summary statistics of firm-level factors
firm-level factors
Asia
America
Sample
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Table 3.6 
Table 3.6 reports summary statistics of market-level factors by target market. Our sample includes 1,666 cross-listed securities between 2001 and 2010. For each target market, individual cell in Table 
3.6 represents the average value of each market-level variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
hm tm
geographical time-zone transaction transaction hm mrkt. cap. tm mrkt. cap. hm inv. tm inv. hm exchange tm exchange hm short sale tm short sale
target market distance difference cost cost -to-GDP -to-GDP protection protection trading rule trading rule restriction restriction
Australia 8.4 8.6 34.3 29.4 0.8 1.0 7.6 6.9 14.2 8.0 0.3 0.3
Hong Kong 6.2 0.7 46.3 38.3 0.4 4.9 4.1 8.6 7.8 7.0 0.9 0.3
Singapore 7.7 1.4 40.0 36.6 2.1 1.6 6.9 7.7 8.1 11.0 0.4 0.3
Taiwan 7.1 0.8 32.4 45.1 3.8 1.0 8.2 5.7 8.8 2.0 0.4 0.6
Tokyo 8.5 9.0 31.0 18.9 1.2 0.7 6.5 6.9 14.2 3.0 0.1 0.2
Lima 8.3 1.3 25.3 70.7 0.9 0.4 9.1 4.3 17.9 0.0 0.1 0.7
NASDAQ 7.5 4.0 35.1 23.6 0.8 1.0 7.2 10.0 10.2 26.0 0.2 0.0
New York 7.5 4.1 37.0 23.0 0.8 1.0 6.8 10.0 10.0 23.0 0.2 0.0
Toronto 7.0 4.7 25.2 26.3 1.0 0.9 8.6 9.7 18.4 15.0 0.1 0.0
Euronext Amsterdam 5.9 0.9 31.6 24.8 0.9 0.9 4.7 4.9 11.2 7.9 0.2 0.0
Euronext Brussels 6.1 1.7 30.0 29.0 0.9 0.6 5.7 0.5 9.9 6.1 0.1 0.0
Euronext Lisbon 5.7 1.0 28.6 27.7 0.6 0.4 6.0 4.6 9.8 8.8 0.7 0.7
Euronext Paris 6.9 2.8 31.4 27.1 0.9 0.7 6.7 4.2 12.9 6.7 0.1 0.2
Europe Frankfurt 7.1 3.4 29.4 26.2 1.0 0.4 6.9 0.1 14.8 5.3 0.1 0.2
& Africa London 7.1 3.6 44.0 46.4 0.8 1.2 6.8 8.3 10.0 14.7 0.3 0.0
Luxembourg 5.6 0.6 32.7 45.6 0.7 0.8 4.8 . 5.9 . 0.2 0.5
Oslo 7.1 3.2 30.5 28.9 1.0 0.5 7.7 5.5 15.9 10.2 0.1 0.0
Swiss 7.0 3.2 26.9 28.1 0.8 2.3 6.3 3.6 14.5 9.4 0.1 0.2
Johannesburg 8.7 3.0 40.1 42.9 1.2 1.0 8.1 8.3 14.4 . 0.0 0.3
mean 7.3 3.7 35.3 28.3 0.9 1.2 6.7 7.7 11.3 16.5 0.2 0.1
standard deviation 1.4 4.3 16.2 10.8 0.6 1.0 3.0 3.2 6.8 8.1 0.4 0.2
25th percentile 5.8 0.0 22.9 18.9 0.5 0.9 4.2 5.5 5.0 8.0 0.0 0.0
50th percentile 8.2 2.0 31.2 28.6 0.8 1.0 6.9 9.7 14.0 23.0 0.0 0.0
75th percentile 8.5 6.0 43.7 34.2 1.0 1.2 9.7 10.0 15.0 23.0 0.5 0.0
Summary statistics of market-level factors
market-level factors
Asia
America
Sample
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Table 3.7 
Table 3.7 reports the preliminary regression results. The annual panel includes 7,112 observations (firm-target market-year) for 1,164 cross-listed 
firms from 2001 to 2010. The regressions are estimated using the pooled OLS method. The dependent variable for Model (1), (2), and (3) is the 
home market excess comovement net beta obtained from estimating the time-series regression specification in (2). The dependent variable for 
model (4) through (6) is the target market excess comovement net beta obtained from estimating (2). Model (2) and (4) include year fixed-effects. 
Model (3) and (6) include both home and target market fixed-effects in addition to year fixed effects. IO(hc) and IO(tc) are the percentage of 
market capitalization owned by institutional investors domiciled in the home country and the target country, respectively. The geographical 
distance is the natural logarithm of the distance in miles between the cities in which the home market and the target market are located. The 
reported standard errors are robust to clustering by firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preliminary regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
geo. distance -0.1165*** -0.1168*** -0.1636*** 0.1334*** 0.1337*** 0.1564***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008] [0.013]
IO(hc) -0.0073*** -0.0074*** -0.0026***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
IO(tc) 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0009**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
Year fixed-effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Home market fixed-effects No No Yes No No Yes
Target market fixed-effects No No Yes No No Yes
Adjusted r-squared 0.19 0.20 0.34 0.14 0.15 0.28
Observations 7,112 7,112 7,112 7,112 7,112 7,112
Number of Firms 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164
Standard errors are clustered at firm level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
home market net beta target market net beta
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Table 3.8: Panel A 
Table 3.8 reports the main regression results. The annual panel includes 6,600 observations (firm-target market-year) for 1,107 cross-listed firms 
from 2001 to 2010. The regressions are estimated using the pooled OLS method. The dependent variable for model (1), (2), and (3) is the home 
market excess comovement net beta obtained from estimating the time-series regression specification in (2). The dependent variable for model (4) 
through (6) is the target market excess comovement net beta obtained from estimating (2). Model (1) and (4) are estimated using the overall 
sample. The regression estimates from Model (2) and Model (5) are obtained using a sample of US cross-listed stocks. Model (3) and (6) are 
estimated with a sample of non-U.S. cross-listings. All models in Table 8 include the following fixed-effects: year-fixed effects, home and target 
market region fixed-effects, home and target market emerging market indicator variables. IO(hc) and IO(tc) are the key variables, and are the 
percentage of market capitalization owned by institutional investors domiciled in the home country and the target country, respectively. The 
reported standard errors are robust to clustering by firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Main regression results
All US target Non-US target All US target Non-US target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
size -0.0201*** -0.0261*** -0.0161*** 0.0253*** 0.0201*** 0.0180***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006]
hm security illiquidity -0.0003 0.0042*** -0.0005 0.0010** -0.0026* 0.0011***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
tm security illiquidity -0.0018*** -0.0111*** -0.0015** -0.001 -0.0008 -0.0012
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
geo. distance -0.1572*** -0.0971*** -0.1116*** 0.1408*** -0.1169*** 0.1112***
[0.007] [0.034] [0.014] [0.008] [0.022] [0.014]
hm transaction cost 0.0023*** 0.0040** -0.0016 -0.0016* -0.0016 0.0042***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
tm transaction cost 0.0067*** 0.0091*** -0.0062*** -0.0059***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
hm mrkt. cap.-to-GDP -0.0260* -0.0300* -0.0326* 0.0212 0.0594*** 0.0562***
[0.014] [0.016] [0.018] [0.015] [0.020] [0.022]
tm mrkt. cap.-to-GDP -0.0432*** -0.0043 0.0872*** 0.0503***
[0.011] [0.015] [0.011] [0.013]
hm inv. protection -0.0038 -0.0198** 0.0406*** 0.0236*** 0.0032 -0.0334***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.010] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009]
tm inv. protection -0.008 -0.0147 -0.0182** -0.0114
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
hm short sale restriction -0.0475 -0.1120*** 0.0733 0.0012 0.0668*** -0.0519
[0.032] [0.043] [0.048] [0.030] [0.025] [0.048]
tm short sale restriction 0.1325** 0.1577** -0.2285*** -0.0549
[0.063] [0.073] [0.057] [0.074]
IO(hc) -0.0037*** 0.0022*** -0.0031***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
IO(tc) 0.0004 0.0007 -0.0028
[0.001] [0.000] [0.004]
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home market region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target market region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home market emerging market indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target market emerging market indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted r-squared 0.25 0.24 0.28 0.22 0.49 0.15
Observations 6,600 3,475 3,125 6,600 3,475 3,125
Number of Firms 1,107 567 625 1,107 567 625
Standard errors are clustered at firm level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
home market net beta target market net beta
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Table 3.8: Panel B 
Table 3.8 reports the main regression results. The annual panel includes 6,600 observations (firm-target market-year) for 1,107 cross-listed firms 
from 2001 to 2010. The regressions are estimated using the pooled OLS method. The dependent variable for model (7) and (8) is the home 
market excess comovement net beta obtained from estimating the time-series regression specification in (2). The dependent variable for model (9) 
and (10) is the target market excess comovement net beta obtained from estimating (2). The sample for Model (7) and (9) is the cross-listed-
home-market-share pairs with synchronous trading hours. Model (8) and (10) are estimated using a sample of the pairs with non-synchronous 
trading hours. All models in Table 8 include the following fixed-effects: year-fixed effects, home and target market region fixed-effects, home 
and target market emerging market indicator variables. IO(hc) and IO(tc) are the key variables, and are the percentage of market capitalization 
owned by institutional investors domiciled in the home country and the target country, respectively. The reported standard errors are robust to 
clustering by firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Main regression results
Synchronous Non-synchronous Synchronous Non-synchronous
(7) (8) (9) (10)
size -0.0069 -0.0311*** 0.0095** 0.0336***
[0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006]
hm security illiquidity 0.0009*** -0.0007 0.0015 0.0010**
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
tm security illiquidity -0.0019*** -0.0015 0.0017** -0.0036***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
geo. distance -0.0397*** -0.1363*** 0.0007 0.1348***
[0.013] [0.042] [0.013] [0.037]
hm transaction cost 0.001 0.0044*** 0.0016* -0.0055***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
tm transaction cost 0.0056*** 0.0063* -0.0050*** -0.0073**
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]
hm mrkt. cap.-to-GDP 0.0147 -0.0108 -0.0121 0.0304*
[0.026] [0.017] [0.022] [0.018]
tm mrkt. cap.-to-GDP 0.0021 0.0206 0.0462*** 0.0201
[0.019] [0.027] [0.016] [0.022]
hm inv. protection 0.0306*** -0.0430*** -0.0236*** 0.0545***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
tm inv. protection -0.0153* -0.0141 -0.0047 -0.0228
[0.008] [0.016] [0.008] [0.015]
hm short sale restriction 0.0738 -0.1700*** -0.0509 0.0981***
[0.058] [0.039] [0.049] [0.033]
tm short sale restriction 0.0999* 0.0911 -0.1883*** -0.148
[0.055] [0.110] [0.057] [0.097]
IO(hc) -0.0012** -0.0035***
[0.001] [0.001]
IO(tc) 0.0010*** 0.0013
[0.000] [0.001]
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home market region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target market region fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home market emerging market indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target market emerging market indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted r-squared 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.14
Observations 2,978 3,622 2,978 3,622
Number of Firms 564 622 564 622
Standard errors are clustered at firm level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
home market net beta target market net beta
151 
 
 
Table 3.9 
Table 3.9 reports summary statistics of estimated regression coefficients obtained by estimating (2) using weekly return series. We measure 
weekly returns from Wednesday to Wednesday to reduce any potential noise from Monday or Friday effects. Using weekly returns, we re-
estimate time-series regressions specified in (2) without the lead and lag terms on returns to obtain weekly beta estimates. Given a sample year 
and for each cross-listed-home-market-share pair, we require 12 weekly return observations in estimating (2). In comparison with Table 3.3, we 
observe that the distribution of mean-reversion coefficients estimated using weekly returns is similar the distribution of mean-reversion 
coefficients estimated using daily return series. Clearly, we note that the absolute size of the estimated coefficients using weekly returns on target 
market and home market returns are smaller than those estimated using daily return data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimated weekly betas
mean reversion hm net beta tm net beta fx net beta
N = 8,990 intercept coeffcient coeffcient coeffcient coeffcient
mean 0.000 -0.37 -0.14 0.20 -0.23
standard deviation 0.006 0.19 0.50 0.52 33.70
10th percentile -0.004 -0.58 -0.65 -0.22 -0.89
25th percentile -0.001 -0.50 -0.34 -0.01 -0.29
50th percentile 0.000 -0.39 -0.10 0.14 0.00
75th percentile 0.001 -0.27 0.05 0.40 0.28
90th percentile 0.004 -0.14 0.27 0.71 0.89
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Table 3.10 
Table 3.10 reports panel regression results based on weekly beta estimates. The annual panel includes 6,640 observations (firm-target market-
year) for 1,113 firms with cross-listed securities on 19 target markets over the span of 2001 and 2010. We estimate pooled OLS regressions. 
Furthermore, we cluster standard errors by firm. In Table 9, the dependent variables are excess comovement home market net beta and excess 
comovement target market net beta for Model (1) and (2), respectively. For Model (1) and (2) in Table 3.9, we include year, home and target 
emerging market, home and target market region fixed-effects. We also include emerging market indicator variables for home and target markets 
to capture the potential effect of capital control and foreign investment restrictions. 
 
 
Regression results using weekly data
home market beta target market beta
All All
(1) (2)
size -0.0059* 0.0098***
[0.003] [0.003]
hm security illiquidity 0.0010** -0.0021
[0.000] [0.001]
tm security illiquidity 0.0004 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001]
geo. distance -0.1005*** 0.0818***
[0.006] [0.006]
hm transaction cost 0.0005 -0.0005
[0.001] [0.001]
tm transaction cost 0.0029** -0.0066***
[0.001] [0.002]
hm mrkt. cap.-to-GDP -0.0124 0.0174
[0.009] [0.011]
tm mrkt. cap.-to-GDP -0.0108 0.0867***
[0.009] [0.011]
hm inv. protection -0.0069* 0.0143***
[0.004] [0.004]
tm inv. protection -0.0034 0.0007
[0.006] [0.006]
hm short sale restriction 0.0328 -0.0089
[0.022] [0.024]
tm short sale restriction 0.0379 -0.1247***
[0.046] [0.047]
IO(hc) -0.0014***
[0.001]
IO(tc) 0.0007*
[0.000]
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes
Home market region fixed-effects Yes Yes
Target market region fixed-effects Yes Yes
Home market emerging market indicator Yes Yes
Target market emerging market indicator Yes Yes
Adjusted r-squared 0.13 0.11
Observations 6,640 6,640
Number of Firms 1,113 1,113
Standard errors are clustered at firm level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
